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ABSTRACT
Richard of Saint Victor deliberately constructs his treatise De Trinitate with 
trinitarian structures to sustain the hearts and shape the minds of his readers with the 
contemplation of the Trinity. His work fits within a genre of writing in the Middle Ages 
where the formation of the theological apprentice was at the heart of crafting one’s 
theological work. And while probably not unique among other compositions on the 
Trinity, Richard imbues his treatise with some “trinitarian dimensions” that make us 
appreciate the level of his creativity as a theologian and the impact these further 
dimensions had upon his readers’ spiritual formation. 
Richard’s work has three major levels. Level one is a linear argument for the 
Trinity. It begins by establishing that God is one substance, then that God is three 
persons, and finally how the unity of divine substance fits with the triunity of persons. 
That is one level. And to read the work the first time is to encounter and be taken by this 
argument. Level two is the style and structure with which that argument is made. In 
addition to arguing for the Trinity, Richard argues for the Trinity “trinitarianly”; and to 
discover Richard’s deliberate use of triads and an organization to his treatise reflective of 
its main subject matter is to find delight in another dimension of the work. It is to read the
work again—a second time—with a view to how this linear argument is designed and 
organized. Finally, in addition to the linear argument and its structure, there are also 
“allusions” such as Richard’s attempt to make his triadic structures appropriate to each 
person of the Trinity. So while at the level of (a) argument/content he makes a case for 
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the Power, the Wisdom, and the Goodness of the Divine, and at the level of (b) structure 
he builds with triads, he also appropriates the (c) significance for each person of the 
Trinity: Power of the Father, Wisdom of the Son, and Goodness of the Spirit.
The dissertation consists of three sections: Section I, “Introduction & Background,” 
establishes the context for the thesis; Section II, “Articulating the Trinity ‘Trinitarianly’ 
for the Formation of Souls,” argues the main thesis; and Section III, “Objections & 
Response,” handles objections and is followed by a brief conclusion. The introductory 
section answers questions leading up to a detailed study of the structuring of Richard’s 
De Trinitate. Section II develops the substance of the thesis in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 
4 argues for the structural dimension of the thesis and is divided into five parts. Part one, 
“Inventional, Ordering Devices,” shows how Richard structures his written works in 
accordance with their main objects of study in order to aid his readers’ contemplation. 
Part two, “Breadth: Beginning with the End in Mind” looks at the broader horizon of 
Richard’s De Trinitate by showing how the Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad structures the
linear layout of the treatise. Part three, “Depth: Richard’s Trinitarian Structures in Book 
III,” looks at the detail of Richard’s work in book III where his trinitarian structuring is 
the most ornate. In part four, “Perspective: Additional Trinitarian Structures and Triads,” 
we show the declining intricacy of these trinitarian structures and triads in the rest of the 
work. And part five, “Book VI and Discovering De Trinitate in Relief” brings all of these
dimensions together to reveal Richard’s treatise as a work of art still attached to the 
marble from which it was carved and discovers the method by which he “drew out” 
contemplations from his previous work. Then, in chapter 5, “Forging These ‘Trinitarian 
Dimensions’ in the Faithful,” we show how Richard uses these forms to shape the 
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trinitarian consciousness of his readers and consummate trinitarian love within his 
community. Section III takes up objections to the thesis and gives a response, concluding 
that neither forms of meditative practice in the 12th century nor borrowing paradigms 
from theological predecessors accounts for the trinitarian structuring of De Trinitate. We 
fittingly end our work with a summary of our findings and a meditative reflection on the 
“craftsmanship” and “artistry” of Richard as a “constructive theologian.” 
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INTRODUCTION
There was a time when the theological task was about devotion to the one true God; 
where imagination traced the vestiges of the Divine. Theology was caught up—
enraptured—by its object of study. As a result, the style as well as the substance of 
theology was imbued with a spirit reflective of its focus. Theologians saw themselves as 
made in the image of their Creator and undertook to study and write their theological 
works in ways that gave evidence of this.1 To be creative was the grand duty of one 
created by divine creativity. To write theology meant writing creatively, of “letting it be” 
on the page so as to reflect the divine glory. To practice theology was not merely to study
about God; it was, rather, to worship Him. It therefore consisted of evangelizing one’s 
own mind as well as others with divine meditations creatively “constructed” to sustain 
the soul in a meditative journey of theological reflection and devotion toward God.
Richard of St. Victor’s treatise De Trinitate fits within this genre of composition in 
the Middle Ages, where the formation of the theological apprentice was at the heart of 
crafting one’s theological work. And while probably not unique among other written 
compositions on the Trinity, Richard imbues his work with some “trinitarian dimensions”
1 As Richard writes, “If you marvel how God the Maker of everything brought into actuality from 
nothing at the very beginning of the world so much and so many various species of things just as He willed,
think how easy it is for the human soul to fashion by means of the imagination any representations of things
whatsoever at any hour and to form some unique creatures, as it were, as often as it wishes, without 
preexisting material and from nothing, as it were.” Grover A. Zinn, trans., Richard of St. Victor: The 
Twelve Patriarchs, The Mystical Ark, Book Three of the Trinity, Classics of Western Spirituality Series 
(New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 298. Richard of St. Victor, Mystical Ark IV.20. Hereafter referred to as 
RSV’s Three Main Works.
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that make us appreciate the level of his creativity as a theologian and the impact these 
further dimensions had upon his readers’ spiritual formation. In what follows we 
demonstrate that Richard intentionally crafts De Trinitate with triadic structures and 
forms that are suitable to the task of sustaining the hearts and shaping the minds of his 
readers with the contemplation of the Trinity. 
The Levels of De Trinitate
Richard’s De Trinitate contains three levels. On one level, the argument of the work 
progresses in a linear fashion to make a case for the truth of orthodox, Trinitarian belief. 
Richard establishes that God is one substance, that God is three persons, and how the 
unity of divine substance fits with the triunity of persons. That is one level. And to read 
the work the first time is to encounter and be taken by this argument. But at another level 
is the style and structure with which that argument is made. It is to see, in addition to 
arguing for the Trinity, that Richard argues for the Trinity “trinitarianly.” And to discover
Richard’s deliberate use of triads and an organization to his treatise reflective of its main 
subject matter is to find delight in another dimension of the work. One reads the work 
again—a second time—with a view to how this linear argument is designed and 
organized. Furthermore, one finds greater delight when reading it at this other level. In 
the same way that the presentation of a culinary work might stimulate your senses as well
as your appetite, so too does a theological work impress when its arrangement is as well 
cared for as its content. Thus to read De Trinitate attending to this other level—its 
structure—is to delight in it in another way.2 Finally, in addition to the treatise’s 
2 ‘Delight’ in theological contemplation sustains interest in spiritual things. When there is always 
something new to discover, the mind is enticed with a “holy curiosity” for further “treasures.” Delight thus 
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argument and structure, there are also trinitarian allusions such as Richard’s attempt to 
make various triadic structures appropriate to each person of the Trinity. So while at the 
level of (a) argument/content he makes a case for the Power, the Wisdom, and the 
Goodness of the Divine,3 and at the level of (b) structure he builds on a triadic structure 
to make this case, he also appropriates the (c) significance of each one to each person of 
the Trinity: Power of the Father, Wisdom of the Son, and Goodness of the Spirit.
These three strata show the levels of his work. And just as the vessels within the 
layers of an archeological investigation begin to reveal the way of life of a particular time
period or people group, so discovering these strata and treasures within De Trinitate 
reveals something of the process involved in constructing a theological contemplation of 
the Trinity. On the first level, they reveal the role of reason and its function within the 
theological-contemplative process. Richard plainly and simply offers sound, logical 
arguments for the belief that God is “one substance, three persons.” Two things are 
noteworthy here. First, Richard does not offer an argument for the Trinity that excludes 
other sources for the same belief (e.g., Scripture, experience). He is very explicit about 
this in the introduction. There he notes that all resources—visible and invisible—are at 
the disposal of the theologian who wishes to pursue, by means of them, the knowledge of 
aids the mind in memory and recollection. Consequently, language of delight in Richard’s works should not
be regarded as simple rhetorical flourish. See Mary Carruthers, The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric,
and the Making of Images, 400-1200, Cambridge Studies in Medieval Literature, 34 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 117. See also Achard of St. Victor’s Sermon 13.33 in Hugh Feiss, 
trans., Achard of Saint Victor: Works, Cistercian Studies, 165 (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Cistercian 
Publications, 2001), 249-50.
3 Since ‘God’, traditionally, can designate either the divine essence or the first person of the Trinity 
(i.e., the Father) I prefer to use the term ‘Divine’ when speaking of the divine essence trinitarianly 
conceived. This provides greater clarity in places where one or the other meaning can be clarified. In 
allusions to Scripture or creedal formulas, I default to the traditional use of these words.
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the triune God. Second, Richard is not overly ambitious with respect to what reason can 
deliver when peering into the divine mystery of the Trinity; there is no denigration of the 
mystery of God, nor circumscription of God within the confines of rational reasons in 
such a way that God becomes “boxed-in” by a set of self-evident and necessary truths. As
Richard makes clear in The Mystical Ark, knowledge of the Trinity comes at the 
intersection of the fifth and sixth levels of theological contemplation, where the faithful 
soul reaches the heights of those things that are both “above reason” and “beyond 
reason.” Here the traditional philosophical categories and distinctions that served earlier 
stages of contemplation begin to bleed into one another. As Richard puts it: 
There is nothing in which [imagination] is able to assist this work. 
For where reason fails, what can imagination do? What would 
imagination do there, where there is no changing and no shadow of 
vicissitude; where the part is not less than its whole, nor the whole 
is more universal than its individual parts; indeed, where the part is 
not lessening the whole, and the whole is not made up from parts, 
since that is simple which is set forth universally, and that is 
universal which is brought forth in the particular as it were; where 
the whole is single; where all is one and one is all? Certainly 
without doubt human reason fails in these things. And what can 
imagination do there? Without doubt in such a kind of 
manifestation imagination can hinder it and is completely unable to 
assist.4
But lest we think reason has failed in providing any sort of progress in trinitarian 
contemplation, we need to see how Richard understands this. Reason succeeds in 
affording the faithful soul with a fleeting glimpse but not a full gaze. Reason does 
provide comprehension, just not full comprehension. As we stare into the brilliance of the
sun, we can see its contours, dimensions, and luminance. We can make various 
4 Richard, Mystical Ark IV.4; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 263-264.
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inferences and judgments about it. Yet because we are blinded every time we gaze upon 
it, we cannot fully see it. So too, reason provides the contours of the Trinity—that the 
Divine is one and three—in such a way that one can believe but not fully comprehend. As
he says:  
However, no corporeal sense teaches, nor does any human reason 
fully convince us, that God is three in person in one substance and 
one in substance in three persons. . . . And so corporeal things are 
below reason, but divine things are above reason. . . . We call 
“above reason” what we truly believe exists although we are able 
neither to comprehend it by the intellect nor to prove it by a proof 
from experience. . . . Therefore everything of that sort which 
transcends the smallness of our capacity by the greatness of its 
incomprehensibility ought rightly to be said to be above reason. . . . 
Therefore so that we may be able in whatever kind of way to 
hammer out the form of angelic similitude in ourselves, it is 
necessary to suspend our soul with continual quickness in wonder 
at such things and to accustom the wings of our contemplation to 
sublime and angelic flights.5
For Richard, reason succeeds as it fails, like a mother who succeeds in bringing her 
child to life even as she succumbs to the pains of childbirth. It marks the transition from 
the terrestrial climb to the heavenly ascent. Reason gives way to wonder; and this wonder
shapes and forms the soul in such a way as to merit angelic flights into the mystery of the
Divine. Like the winged cherubim who guard the throne of God, such wonder tempers 
the soul with an angelic disposition worthy of His presence. The corollary to this notion 
of not denigrating the mystery of the Divine by the use of reason consists of this latter 
point: that reason is one among many forms of investigation into the Trinity. Reason is 
necessary but not sufficient for the theological contemplation of the Divine. It is part of a 
theological process that includes discretion, wonder, virtue, discipline, patience, and 
5 Richard, Mystical Ark IV.2; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 260-261.
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grace; all contribute to the formation of one seeking to be transfixed by the contemplation
of God. To assess Richard’s argument on the basis of his rational argumentation alone, 
therefore, fails to see the important, but limited role reason plays in the theological 
journey and to give reason a place and a standing that not even Richard himself affords it 
in his own work.
On the second level, De Trinitate reveals the creativity and ingenuity with which 
Richard crafted his treatise. At this level we see how his arguments and meditations 
reflect the main aspects of the Trinity in an organizational form. Any treatise on the 
Trinity requires showing that the Divine is one and that the Divine is three without any 
sort of contradiction, but individual writers can choose how to do so. In Richard’s case, 
he deliberately structures his De Trinitate in regular series of threes and ones. Three 
unique arguments are given for the truth of one of his claims and then a summary is given
to show how all three of those arguments support and undergird that one claim. For 
example, in book III, Richard uses three separate arguments to show that the Divine must
be a plurality of persons. The first is an argument from the fullness of goodness, the 
second, an argument from the fullness of happiness, and the third is an argument from the
fullness of glory. Each of these arguments, on its own, establishes the truth of the claim 
that the Divine must be a plurality of persons; but Richard goes further to show how all 
three form the single substance of that conclusion. And this triadic structuring of De 
Trinitate showcases how Richard deliberately crafts his content with forms that creatively
reinforce its trinitarian significance. After all, if a reader is frequently struck by how the 
regular occurrences of three mutually exclusive and sound arguments come together to 
undergird the same truth, how much more likely is he to be persuaded by the argument 
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that despite the triunity of persons, God remains one? Indeed, it is precisely this idea that 
“one truth” can be learned in three different ways and yet remain one-and-the-same that 
Richard uses for his final argument in De Trinitate VI.25. 
So one way Richard fills out the trinitarian dimensions of his treatise is with the 
triadic structures he uses to organize his rhetoric. Another way is by limiting himself to 
strictly triadic illustrations and metaphors. The introduction alone shimmers with a 
superabundance of triads: faith, hope, and love; faith, knowledge, consummation; first, 
second, and third heaven; immortality, incorruptibility, and eternity; human, angelic, and 
divine; inheritance, merit, and divinity; actuality, virtue, and intellect; faith, reason, and 
experience. As the work progresses the triads come more in line with the trinitarian 
divisions of persons (e.g., Unbegotten, Only-Begotten, and Neither-Begotten-Nor-
Unbegotten), such that triadic distinctions come to be expected. But the fact that these 
illustrations and metaphors are so widespread and non-triadic patterns and illustrations so
scarce, demonstrates just how intentional Richard is in structuring and styling his treatise 
in this “trinitarian” way. 
The third and final level of De Trinitate gets to the heart and soul of what Richard 
does with the trinitarian crafting of his work. Here the trinitarian content mingles with a 
trinitarian structure that further explicates the divine revelation of God as Father, Son, 
and Spirit. Thus, as the linear argument proceeds to show that God is a triunity of 
persons—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—it simultaneously reinforces the unique attributes
and properties of each divine person.6 In books I-II, for example, Richard makes the case 
6 The tradition of appropriating certain properties to specific persons is a common one, dating back 
to the patristic period and is therefore not unique to the 12th century or Richard in particular. For more on 
appropriation of properties to divine persons, see esp. Dominique Poirel, Livre de la nature et débat 
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for the Divine being one substance. He does this by arguing from supreme power, 
wisdom, and essence; but in the process he provides individual associations with each 
person of the Trinity. So while the one true God is omnipotent and omni-wise,7 and these 
divine properties are identical with the divine substance, supreme power is uniquely 
appropriated to the Father, supreme wisdom to the Son, and supreme goodness to the 
Spirit. And this is just one among many allusions Richard makes throughout the work. 
When one stands back to ponder the level of craftsmanship and care with which this 
work was written, one cannot help but delight in its artistry and intricacy—even more so 
in its design as formative literature. And if we imagine readers taking the same care in 
reading De Trinitate as Richard took when composing it, then it’s not too farfetched to 
see how these subtle trinitarian dimensions might strike the reader with a love for the 
work that propels him further into it. Like the sudden discovery of rare coins on grains of 
sand might compel an explorer to seek out further treasures beneath, these added 
dimensions to Richard’s treatise on the Trinity surely invited further study; and upon 
further study, functioned to reinforce its main subject matter in newly discovered ways.
So when we approach a work like Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate and a thesis 
delineating the trinitarian dimensions with which it was constructed, we are not simply 
providing some general thoughts about the relation of style to substance; we are rather at 
the heart of theology itself—where Christian formation, discipleship, and devotion to 
trinitaire au XII
e
 siècle: Le “De tribus diebus” de Hugues de Saint-Victor, Bibliotheca Victorina, 14 
(Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2002), and n. 383 of this work.
7 While ‘omni-wise’ is not Richard’s, it adequately captures what Richard means when he 
distinguishes between the Wisdom unique to Divinity and the wisdom in which man participates: 
“sapientiam summam,” “sapientiam ipsam,” “plenitudinem sapientiae.” Richard, De Trinitate II.13. My 
thanks to Dr. Dennis Martin for coming up with this term during our weekly Latin readings.
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God are the governing framework from which and by which theology is read and written.
It is written with a vow to maintain fidelity to the Scriptures as the divinely inspired 
Word of God as well as to those church Fathers who handed them down; and it is crafted 
in a way that exercises and “sustains” the soul in its ascent toward a bona fide divine 
encounter. It is written with a desire to make the incommunicable communicable: to 
bring the holiness—the uniqueness—of the Divine into the common; and by doing so, to 
make the common “special.” In return, learning brings the communicable to the 
incommunicable in a way that “extends” through all the multidimensionalities of visible 
and invisible things to the outer realms of reason, imagination, devotion, and study, 
propelling the soul of the novice toward beatitude—of union with God—creator with his 
Creator. It brings theology full circle, returning God’s Word and oneself to Him full 
rather than void and empty (Isaiah 55). Richard constructs the theology in De Trinitate 
with a view to celebrating rather than challenging these traditions. Like the solemn walls 
of the faithful monk’s cell, they provide a glorious freedom and silence within which to 
hear the Word of God, to be transfigured by it, and to bring that “apocalypse” to the page 
in a way that draws oneself and others into conformity with its brilliance. 
Survey of Literature on Method and the Organization of this Work
The literature on Richard of St. Victor can be divided into four categories. Early 
work on him focused on whether he was more a mystic than a scholastic.8 Subsequent 
8 Authors emphasizing Richard’s mysticism: Jean Châtillon, Trois opuscules spirituels de Richard 
de Saint-Victor: Textes inédits accompagnés d’études critiques et de notes (Paris: Etudes augustiniennes, 
1986) [not read], Michael W. Blastic, “Condilectio: Personal Mysticism and Speculative Theology in the 
Works of Richard of Saint Victor” (Ph.D. diss., Saint Louis University, 1992) [not seen], Steven Chase, 
Angelic Wisdom: The Cherubim and the Grace of Contemplation in Richard of St. Victor, Studies in 
Spirituality and Theology Series, 2 (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995); Works 
emphasizing Richard’s scholastic acumen with little attention to his spirituality noted by den Bok: Heinz 
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work sees a blend of both in Richard with the emphasis on his sources and influences 
determining which of the two is given greater weight. Steven Chase, for example, sees a 
strong Dionysian influence at work in Richard’s Mystical Ark9; whereas Nico den Bok 
sees more influence from Augustine and Anselm and downplays Dionysian influence.10 
Aside from scholarship focused on Richard’s spirituality, his trinitarianism is receiving 
greater attention, with some claiming it is the most important trinitarian theology between
Augustine and Aquinas.11 This high esteem for Richard is based on the view that he 
provides a robust social trinitarianism. Nico den Bok deals with the question as to 
whether the social trinitarian reading of Richard is warranted and concludes that it is 
not.12 He argues that while leaning more in this direction, Richard offers a more “‘Mono-
Wipfler, Die Trinitätsspekulation des Petrus von Poitiers und die Trinitätsspekulation des Richard von St. 
Viktor: Ein Vergleich, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Theologie des Mittelalters, 41, 1 (Münster i.W.: 
Aschendorff, 1965) [not read], Joseph Ebner, Die Erkenntnislehre Richards von St. Viktor, Beiträge zur 
Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 19, 4 (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1917) [not read]; Works that
attempt to harmonize these two aspects of Richard: Gervais Dumeige, Richard de Saint-Victor et l’idée 
chrétienne de l’amour, Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine, 1 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1952), Nico den Bok, Communicating the Most High: Person and Trinity in the Theology of 
Richard of St.Victor (ca. 1173): A Systematic Study, Bibliotheca Victorina, 7 (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 
1996), Dale M. Coulter, Per visibilia ad invisibilia: Theological Method in Richard of St. Victor d. 1173, 
Bibliotheca Victorina, 19 (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2006).
9 Chase, Angelic Wisdom, 28. On Dionysian influence in Richard’s De Trinitate, see nn. 178 and 360 
of this work.
10 Den Bok, 163 n. 53. Dumeige sees Richard using Dionysius for illustration rather than as 
inspiration for his own thought. Coulter, 177. Cacciapuoti argues against the retrieval of Dionysian 
apophasis in Richard. Pierluigi Cacciapuoti, “Deus existentia amoris”: Teologia della carità e teologia 
della trinità negli scritti di Riccardo di San Vittore (†1173), Bibliotheca Victorina, 9 (Turnhout, Belgium: 
Brepols, 1998), 106-7 [not read]. Den Bok concurs, noting if true, the “distinction between imago and 
veritas collapses.” Den Bok, 134 n. 162. Boethius is also relevant as an alternative or complementary 
source for these ideas. See nn. 322 and 360 of this work.
11 “Kasper and von Balthasar join the positive judgment passed on Richard by Albert Stohr. Michael 
Schmaus, for one, had followed Stohr much earlier.” Den Bok, 91. Yves Congar shares this assessment, 
seeing a move from essentialism to personalism. Yves Congar, I Believe in the Holy Spirit, Milestones in 
Catholic Theology (New York: Herder & Herder, 1997), 87.
12 Den Bok’s concern is that contemporary interpreters misrepresent Richard’s thought by 
anachronistically projecting their modern conceptions of person, freedom, relationality, individuality, 
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Personal’ Trinitarianism.” That is, the relationship of God-to-man remains that of Person-
to-person and not that of God-to-society/mankind nor one divine person to one human 
person.13 Other works situate Richard within his Victorine context. These focus on 
specifics such as exploring the liturgical sequences used and adapted by the Victorines14 
or detailing the hermeneutical practices of various Victorine writers.15
Richard composed in Latin, and not all of his work can be found in an English 
translation.16 His Benjamin minor (under the title Twelve Patriarchs), his Benjamin 
major (under the title Mystical Ark) and book III of his De Trinitate can be found in 
society, etc. into the Trinity, subsequently appealing to this Trinity as a “Perfect-Society” in order to 
prescribe those modern utopian ideals. See den Bok, 88-89, 189 n. 150, 190 n. 154, 314 n. 126, and esp. 
477-87. I share den Bok’s concern, but for matters related to the textual history of Richard’s De Trinitate 
(see Appendices A-B of this work) and Richard’s quid/quis distinction, I believe there is a non-
anachronistic social trinitarianism in Richard that den Bok’s thesis precludes. See esp. nn. 323 and 457 of 
this work.
13 Den Bok, 460.
14 Margot Fassler, Gothic Song: Victorine Sequences and Augustinian Reform in Twelfth-Century 
Paris, Cambridge Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Music (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1993). Her second edition is forthcoming.
15 Beryl Smalley, Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1964). Michael A. Signer, “From Theory to Practice: The De doctrina christiana and the 
Exegesis of Andrew of St. Victor,” a chapter in Reading and Wisdom: The De doctrina christiana of 
Augustine in the Middle Ages, ed. Edward D. English, Notre Dame Conferences in Medieval Studies (Notre
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 84-98.
16 Works of Richard’s that have yet to be translated into English include Ad clamat ex seir, 
Carbonum et cinerum, Causam quam nesciebam, De comparatione Christi ad florem et Mariae ad virgam, 
De concordia temporum vegum conregnantium super Iudam et Israel, De differentia peccati mortalis et 
venialis, De differentia sacraficii Abrahae a sacraficio beate Mariae virginis, De Emmanuele, De 
eruditione hominis interioris, De exterminatione mali et promotione boni, De judicaria potestate in finali et
universali judicio, De meditandis plagis quae circa finem mundi evenient, De missione Spiritus sanctii, De 
potestate ligandi et solvendi, De quaestionibus regulae sancti Augustini solutis, De sacrificio David 
prophetae, De spiritu blasphemiae, De statu interioris hominis, De superexcellenti baptismo Christi, De 
templo Salominis ad litteram, De tribis de personis appropriatis in Trinitate, De verbis apostoli, 
Declarationes nonnularum difficultatum Scripturae, Elemosina patris erit in oblivione, Expositio 
difficultatum suborientium in expositione Tabernaculi feoderis, In Apocalypsin Joannes, In Ezechielis 
visionem, In illa die, Liber exceptionem, Misit Herodes rex manus, Nonnullae allegoriae tabernaculi 
foederis, Quomodo Christus ponitur in signum populorum, Quomodo Spiritus Sanctus est amor Patris et 
Filii, Sermones centum, Super exiit edictum seu de tribus processionibus.
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Grover Zinn’s book published as part of the Classics of Western Spirituality series. Clare 
Kirchberger provides English translations of some of Richard’s works, including various 
of his sermons on the Psalms, selections from Mystical Ark and Twelve Patriarchs, as 
well as Four Degrees of Violent Love.17 The only full English translation of Richard’s De
Trinitate is soon to be published by Brepols and translated by Chris Evans.18 Currently, 
the work is only accessible in a French translation by Salet,19 a German translation by 
von Balthasar,20 and in Danish by Rydström-Poulsen.21 The only critical Latin edition of 
Richard’s work remains that of J. Ribaillier.22 Chris Evans graciously provided an 
advance copy of his forthcoming English translation of De Trinitate, and in what follows,
we rely mostly on his translations. Where further analysis of the Latin is required, we use 
Ribaillier’s critical edition. 
The most recent works specifically to treat the topic of structure and method in 
Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate have been Dale Coulter’s Per visibilia ad invisibilia, 
and Nico den Bok’s Communicating the Most High. Coulter focuses more broadly on 
Richard’s Mystical Ark and De Trinitate, arguing for a theological method of 
17 Clare Kirchberger, trans., Selected Writings on Contemplation (London: Faber & Faber, 1957).
18 Chris Evans, trans., Richardus de Sancto Victore, De Trinitate (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 
forthcoming).
19 Gaston Salet, La Trinité: texte latin, introduction, traduction et notes. Sources chrétiennes, 63 
(Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1959). [Not read].
20 Richard von Sankt-Victor, Die Dreieinigkeit, trans. Hans Urs von Balthasar (Johannes Verlag, 
2002). [Not seen].
21 Aage Rydström-Poulson, Richard af Saint-Victor: Om Treenigheden. Introduktion og oversættelse 
(København, C.A. Reizels Forlag, 1986). [Not seen].
22 Jean Ribaillier, ed., De Trinitate: Texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables, Textes 
philosphiques du moyen age, 6 (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1958).
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contemplative ascent from visible to invisible things.23 He sees the former work as a 
prerequisite for undertaking a study of the latter. Nico den Bok focuses mainly on 
Richard’s De Trinitate and argues for the pseudo-Athanasian creed—the Quicumque—as 
the starting point for an inquiry based on finding “necessary reasons” for the truths it 
inscribes.24 To that extent, den Bok sees Richard’s method following Anselm’s fides 
quaerens intellectum where this is understood as taking those things already held and 
believed by faith and seeking further and more “fitting” or “certain” reasons for believing
them to be true. 
The thesis put forward in this work situates itself very near Coulter and den Bok. 
We agree with den Bok that Richard takes the Quicumque as his main starting point for 
his trinitarian reflections, and that Richard primarily seeks necessary reasons along the 
lines of an Anselmian fides quaerens intellectum, but we argue further that Richard 
deliberately incorporates these arguments as part of triadic structures with formative 
aims.25 As a result, we see Richard’s amazing philosophical clarity and consistency 
matched by an equally amazing organizational skill—a dimension to Richard’s treatise 
that has yet to be fully appreciated. The thesis, likewise, falls in line with Coulter’s 
23 Coulter, 19. Coulter argues for the harmony of the scholastic and mystical dimensions of Richard 
by rooting it in an overarching framework—per visibilia ad invisibilia—that sees them as complementary 
dimensions of a contemplative ascent to the face of God.
24 Commentaries on the Quicumque became common in the 12th century. For sources, see den Bok 
156 n. 26.
25 This formative aim in Richard’s compositions has not gone unnoticed. See, e.g., I. Van ‘T Spijker, 
“Learning by Experience: Twelfth-Century Monastic Ideas,” a chapter in Centers of Learning: Learning 
and Location in Pre-Modern Europe and the Near East, eds. Jan Willem Drijvers and Alasdair A. 
MacDonald (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1995), 197-206. What we wish to highlight in this work is 
how this dimension manifests itself in Richard’s De Trinitate, a work that might be judged more by its 
philosophical abstraction than for its formative aims. Furthermore we tailor our analysis to the specific way
Richard designs his work with triadic structures in order to use them for this purpose.
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analysis of seeing contemplation within De Trinitate as an ascent from visible to invisible
things. But where Coulter sees Richard harmonizing opposites, we argue that opposing 
terms in De Trinitate are more often part of a triad. In De Trinitate, Richard usually 
searches for a third, and this third creates triadic forms and structures that underly 
Richard’s entire treatise. In addition, we add further context to Coulter’s Per visibilia ad 
invisibilia by filling out the Augustinian heritage from which Richard draws all of the 
major pieces for his De Trinitate. Per visibilia ad invisibilia is one among several 
Augustinian margins within which Richard lives and composes his work.
Our thesis uncovers an added dimension to Richard’s treatise on the Trinity, and 
attending to this dimension helps us appreciate, understand, and read Richard’s De 
Trinitate in a proportionately deeper way. For as we discern the intricacies of Richard’s 
compositions we become further enriched by them. As Richard himself says:
Certainly, the more fully, the more firmly something is learned, the 
more richly the mind will be enlarged for holding larger and deeper 
things. But nevertheless, it seems evident that whatever skill has 
been obtained by instruction is strengthened, enlarged and perfected 
by use and exercise. Again: What does it mean that in one and the 
same effort in which we are instructed and are exercised we see 
now more subtly, now more clearly, unless it means that 
enlargement and sharp-sightedness of the mind increase according 
to the mode of attention?26
We claim that Richard constructs his De Trinitate with trinitarian forms and 
structures for the purpose of sustaining the hearts and shaping the minds of his readers 
with the contemplation of the Trinity. Richard gives the content of his work a Trinitarian 
form that has the power to transform his reader in ways it cannot if it is ignored.
26 Richard, Mystical Ark V.3; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 313.
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This work is divided into six chapters. Chapter 4 lays out the main thesis, showing 
that Richard argues for the Trinity “trinitarianly” for the formation of souls. But to situate
that thesis properly, we must provide some appropriate context and explain the major 
theological influences Richard drew upon for composing his work (Chapter 1). Likewise, 
it is helpful to understand life at the abbey where he composed the work and the 
relationship the treatise has with some of his other literary compositions (Chapter 2). We 
also must proceed with caution concerning the role of reason in theological 
contemplation for Richard, lest we restrict ourselves to our modern and narrow view of 
this term and misunderstand him. This corrective helps us see the highly favorable but 
limited role reason plays in Richard’s views on theological contemplation (Chapter 3).
With that context in mind, we focus on our thesis: the trinitarian way Richard 
structures his De Trinitate and how he uses these structures for formative purposes. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the structural elements of the thesis, making the case that Richard 
deliberately crafts his treatise with triadic forms. Chapter 5 deals with the formative 
implications of these structures and determines how they edify the individual reader as 
well as the Christian community.
Finally, we look at the chief objections that might be raised against our thesis and 
provide adequate rejoinders to them (Chapter 6). We then conclude with a fitting 
summary of our findings and some insight on what Richard’s De Trinitate teaches us 
about “constructive theology” (Conclusion).
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CHAPTER ONE
THE INFLUENCE OF AUGUSTINE AND ANSELM
See and ask for the ancient paths . . .
The sources and influences on Richard of St. Victor are as vast as any in the 12th 
century, and so rather than get caught up in detailing all of them we confine ourselves to 
those who are the most frequently cited by him in his treatise on the Trinity: Augustine 
and Anselm.27 
The Heritage of Augustine
We begin with Augustine—and appropriately so—for between the two, Richard 
cites Augustine forty-three times more than Anselm.28 This is to be expected given that 
Augustine’s works were the most frequently read at the abbey of St. Victor and that the 
Victorines, like many other canons regular in the 12th century, looked to his writings 
(and his Rule) for constructing their lives in accordance with the “common life.” The 
canons regular and Richard’s life as one will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2. For
now it is only important to point out that as a canon regular, living in Paris, Richard was 
27 In narrowing our focus to Augustine and Anselm we do not deny the many other sources and 
influences on Richard’s thought but only highlight the two primary theologians he draws upon in De 
Trinitate. As is clear from the Victorine reading-cycle, Richard knows Gregory the Great and Origen. He 
also builds on Boethius for his taxonomy of properties in II.25 and his definition of ‘person’ in bk. IV. 
There are also traces of Pseudo-Dionysius, Hugh of St. Victor, Achard of St. Victor, and others. But 
Anselm of Canterbury and Augustine—particularly their works on the Trinity—are the primary influences 
on Richard as he composes De Trinitate.
28 Congar, 87.
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the most familiar with Augustine’s writings, memorized large sections of them, and 
prized them above all. In Richard’s world, Augustine’s corpus would take second place 
only to the Scriptures.29 Augustine, therefore provides the primary margins within which 
Richard composes his De Trinitate. 
For brevity we limit our treatment of Augustine to the work he devoted to the 
Trinity. Richard cites it most in his own treatise because he too is writing on the Trinity. 
This focus provides the opportunity for some direct contrasts between these two works. 
But because our thesis deals with how Richard writes with a view to the formation of his 
readers, we further confine our analysis to the formative dimensions of Augustine’s De 
Trinitate with a view to how these are used by Richard. This proves just as fruitful as a 
more comprehensive treatment of Augustine’s corpus because Augustine’s De Trinitate 
is a mature work—written in his later years.30 As a result, it takes up many of the central 
29 “We are fortunate in having for the Victorine community a list that identifies a substantial number 
of works assigned for reading during meals. Found in chapter 48 of the Liber ordinis [sancti Victoris 
Parisiensis] under the title ”De lectione mensae,” the list shows that at mealtime, which was one of the few 
times outside of a chapter meeting or the daily round of liturgical celebrations when the canons gathered as 
a group, they listened to the lector reading from a prescribed sequence of works, mostly patristic, that 
tended to be homilies or biblical commentaries. Among the authors whose works are specifically 
mentioned in this list is Augustine of Hippo, whose homilies and biblical commentaries comprise a 
significant portion of the yearly cycle of readings. In this distinctive, communal reading and hearing, 
Augustine was present for the canons in a way set apart from the regular liturgy and periods of instruction 
or study, each of which also offered numerous opportunities to encounter Augustine’s writings.” Grover A. 
Zinn, Jr. “The Influence of Augustine’s De doctrina christiana Upon the Writings of Hugh of St. Victor,” a
chapter in Reading and Wisdom: The De doctrina christiana of Augustine in the Middle Ages, ed. Edward 
D. English, Notre Dame Conferences in Medieval Studies (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1995), 48. And also, “ . . . one-fourth of the [Victorine] year was dedicated to Augustine, slightly less
to Origen, and about one-sixth to Gregory.” Ibid., 50. In the context of required Scripture reading, see Hugh
of Saint Victor, The Didascalicon of Hugh of Saint Victor: A Guide to the Arts, trans. Jerome Taylor (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 104.
30 Most date Augustine’s De Trinitate to the decade prior to his death in 430. The ideas were already 
part of Augustine’s thought in ca. 399 when he likely began the work, but not completed until he was in his
late sixties. Allan D. Fitzgerald, Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia (Grand Rapids, Michigan: 
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1999), s.v. “De Trinitate.” 
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themes and concepts from his other writings. Moreover, the theology of the Trinity is the 
core of Christian orthodoxy itself. It is the source and end of all theology—the nexus in 
which everything true and right and good coheres. Augustine’s De Trinitate thus forms a 
developmental and theological apex from which we can see some of the main contours of
his thought and discern some key foundations upon which subsequent trinitarian 
reflection would be constructed.
We begin where Augustine began his treatise on the Trinity: with the Scriptures. He 
cites Scripture plentifully but one verse focuses our thoughts on De Trinitate’s formative 
dimensions: 1 Corinthians 13:12.31 In this one verse, and the chapter that surrounds it, we
discern the major themes Richard picks up on in Augustine’s theology. The verse states, 
“Now we see in a glass (speculum) darkly, but then we shall see face-to-face.”32 It was 
probably part of a collection of theophanic texts (i.e., those that deal with a visitation 
from God and/or the desire to encounter God in some more direct way).33 
31 Augustine, De Trinitate, I.1, 8, 10, 13; II.17; III.4; V.1, 10; VI.10; VIII.4; IX.1, 3; X.3, 9; XII.14; 
XIII.20; XIV.2, 17, 18, 19; XV.2, 8, 9, 11, 16, 17, 18, 21, 23, 24. Note the higher frequency in XV where 
Augustine consummates the journey to the “face-to-face.” All citations of Augustine are taken from Nicene
& Post-Nicene Series: On the Trinity, Enchiridion, Faith and Creed, Catechising, ed. Philip Schaff. Nicene
Fathers, 3 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark Publishers, 1980). On the importance of 1 Corinthians 13:12 to 
Augustine’s thought see Frederick van Fleteren, “Per speculum et in aenigmate: The Use of 1 Corinthians 
13:12 in the Writings of St. Augustine,” Augustinian Studies 23 (1992): 69-102.
32
 Videmus nunc per speculum in enigmate tunc autem facie ad faciem nunc cognosco ex parte tunc 
autem cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum.
33 See, e.g., how Augustine connects this ‘mirror’ (speculum) with the ‘watchtower’ (specula) 
Moses is placed in before he is permitted to see God’s glory: Augustine De Trinitate II.16-18 (cf. Exodus 
33:22). Given the basic Christian desire for direct encounter with God, and its priority within monasticism, 
catenas of scriptures pertaining to encounters with the Divine were an early part of the inherited Christian 
tradition. See esp. Bogdan G. Bucur, “Theophanies and Vision of God in Augustine’s De Trinitate: An 
Eastern Orthodox Perspective,” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 52:1 (2008): 67-93. 1 Corinthians 
13:12, however, seems to have become a gathering point for them, providing a central place for their 
collective contemplation. In 2 Corinthians 3:18 Paul, alluding to Exodus 33:22, introduces a theology of 
participation and illumination that contains key elements in Augustine’s thought: face, mirror, glory, 
reformation in the image of God. Augustine pulls all of this together in his use of 1 Corinthians 13:12.
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We will treat the specific wording of this verse in detail later, showing a play on the 
Latin wording for ‘mirror’ that connects with Richard and Anselm, but for now the 
context of this verse demands our attention. 1 Corinthians 13 is primarily about the 
priority of love above everything else. Without love, speech loses the ability to provide 
true knowledge. As the apostle Paul says, to “ . . . speak in the tongues of men and of 
angels, but have not love . . . ” is to be a “clanging gong or cymbal.” Further, love is the 
greatest of those things that remain when all else fails: “And now these three remain: 
faith, hope, and love. But the greatest of these is love.” And what kind of love is the 
greatest of all? It is divine love; a love that is one-of-a-kind. Such love is “patient, kind, 
and not envious or boastful or arrogant or rude. It does not insist on its own way; it is not 
irritable or resentful; it does not rejoice in wrongdoing, but rejoices in the truth. It bears 
all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things.”34 It is the love God has
for his children; and the love He rightfully asks of them in return—a love that overflows 
toward God and neighbor. This love plays a prominent role throughout Augustine’s 
writings. Indeed, it is hard to find a single work where it does not turn up. And where it 
does turns up in Augustine, it is often prioritized. De doctrina christiana, for example, a 
work Richard heard read frequently at St. Victor,35 is conceived as a journey from fear to 
love. In the same work love is the regula fidei that governs scriptural exegesis and 
34 1 Corinthians 13:4-7. Paul’s description dovetails with the description God gives to Moses in 
Exodus 34:6: “Then the LORD passed by in front of [Moses] and proclaimed, ‘YHWH, YHWH-EL, 
compassionate and gracious, slow to anger, and abounding in lovingkindness and truth . . . .” Paul picks up 
on all of these allusions to the Hebrew ‘dRsRj’ for “lovingkindness” throughout the Torah, Prophets, and 
Psalms: God’s faithfulness and lovingkindess endure forever, a divine love that “cries out” (~a!rVqˆ¥yÅw) for 
human imitation and reciprocation.
35 “De doctrina christiana by Augustine and Moralia on Job by Gregory the Great were regular 
mealtime reading at St. Victor.” Coulter, 227 n. 6. See also n. 29 above.
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homiletic preaching.36 Likewise, this love plays an important role in Augustine’s De 
Trinitate and Johannine homilies,37 and its prominence may have led Richard to give it 
focused treatment in his own argument for the Trinity of divine persons. As Augustine 
writes in his main section devoted to love in his De Trinitate:
No other thing, then, is chiefly to be regarded in this inquiry, which 
we make concerning the Trinity and concerning knowing God, 
except what is true love, nay, rather what is love. For that is to be 
called love which is true, otherwise it is desire; and so those who 
desire are said improperly to love, just as they who love are said 
improperly to desire. But this is true love, that cleaving to the truth 
we may live righteously, and so may despise all mortal things in 
comparison with the love of men, whereby we wish them to live 
righteously.38 
This love also becomes important in the later sections of Augustine’s De Trinitate where 
it is incorporated with triads designed to elevate the mind toward further levels of 
righteousness and rest in the contemplation of the Trinity.39
The second element in 1 Corinthians 13 is the move from what is partial and 
imperfect to what is complete and perfect. As we see later, this distinction is the fulcrum 
36 Augustine, De doctrina christiana III.
37 I think especially of Augustine’s tenth homily on the 1st Epistle of John: “I have seen the end of 
all perfection.”
38 Augustine, De Trinitate VIII.7. Bk. VIII begins Augustine’s movement into love: love with 
respect to he-that-loves, that-which-is-loved, and love. He refines the triad in the subsequent books. Two 
points of connection with Richard’s De Trinitate are (a) Augustine’s precedent for using triads in his 
articulations of the Trinity and (b) these triads are drawn out from the concept of Love.
39 Augustine’s love triads in De Trinitate: faith-hope-love (VIII.4); he-that-loves, that-which-is-
loved, and love (VIII.10); myself, that-which-I-love, and love (IX.2); memory-understanding-will/love 
(X.1ff.); remember-understand-love (XV.28). As David Bell points out, Augustine articulates his goal in 
Sermon 52.16-17: “Look in the creature, and see if it be possible to find something there ‘by which we 
might demonstrate that some three things are shown forth separately, and [yet] operate inseparably.’” 
Quoted in David N. Bell, The Image and Likeness: The Augustinian Spirituality of William of St. Thierry, 
Cistercian Studies, 78 (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Cistercian Publications, 1984), 34-35. 
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upon which Richard’s entire treatise rides.40 Now we see the Divine only partially, dimly,
in a dark glass41; but then, we shall see fully, completely, face-to-face. For now, 
knowledge of the Divine comes through glimpses, from prophecies, from tongues, but 
then we shall behold—in a never-ending, and everlasting glimpse—the eternal face of 
God. For now we think and reason as children, maturing in knowledge and faith: We still 
see only partially. All of this is the scriptural background to the quest for true knowledge 
rooted in faith and that underlies the theological method of Augustine, Anselm, and 
Richard. This desire to take what is imperfect and partial toward its perfection and 
wholeness motivates them to write on the Trinity as they do. Augustine writes:
But that is the right purpose which starts from faith. For a certain 
faith is in some way the starting-point of knowledge; but a certain 
knowledge will not be made perfect, except after this life, when we 
shall see face to face. Let us therefore be thus minded, so as to 
know that the disposition to seek the truth is more safe than that 
which presumes things unknown to be known. Let us therefore so 
seek as if we should find, and so find as if we were about to seek.42
Third, we see the ‘mirror’ of 1 Corinthians 13:12 as a “gathering point,” a ‘collatio’ 
used by Augustine to bring together allusions to similar wording and parallels with other 
biblical texts. In doing so, he constructs the move from partial to perfect as a journey—an
40 The concept of ‘plenitudo’ (e.g., fullness, completion, perfection) plays the most significant role 
in Richard’s argumentation for the Trinity of persons in bk. III and often forms the third element of his 
triadic structures (e.g., Highest-Best-Fullest). As shown in chapter 3 of this work, it is the primary principle
Richard uses to decorate the margins of Augustine and Anselm on the Trinity. See esp. n. 79 and n. 171 of 
this work.
41 “Given the nature of medieval mirrors the image is apt. They were made of polished metal and 
gave at best a fuzzy and somewhat dim reflection. Subject to tarnishing, the accumulation of dirt and other 
vicissitudes of use, they needed careful attention to be useful. So it is with the soul. Only by continual 
attention to discipline can the mind become still, as it were, and begin to experience a new reality, divine 
showings . . .” Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 20-21.
42 Augustine, De Trinitate IX.1.
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ascent—along three lines. First, it is an ascent from immaturity to maturity, from 
formation to re-formation: “When I was a child, I reasoned like a child; when I grew up I 
put childish things aside.” Here we note the pedagogical dimensions of Augustine’s 
treatise on the Trinity where he starts with “first things”—Scriptures pertaining to the 
Trinity and the proper way to understand and reconcile them.43 But he subsequently 
moves on to “second things”—adult things—things that demand the identification and 
use of that chief thing within man that sets him apart in the material created order: his 
soul, his mind, his reason. It is to discover that one has been created in the image of 
God44 and that the proper ordering and use of that image—in mind, understanding, and 
will/love—properly prepares one’s soul for a direct encounter with God: the promise of 
seeing Him face-to-face.45 
Augustine, like the Victorines, gave great weight to the letter of Scripture,46 even to 
43 In general, the first part of Augustine’s De Trinitate focuses more specifically on scriptural 
exegesis to both provide evidence for the divinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and to resolve difficulties
in their interpretation. The latter part shifts into a meditative reflection on the image of God in man. 
44 On the specific nuances of the term ‘image’ and its interpretation in the Christian tradition, see 
Gerhart B. Ladner, The Idea of Reform: Its Impact on Christian Thought and Action in the Age of the 
Fathers, Harper Torchbooks, 149 (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 58 n. 49. 
45 Augustine’s inspiration for connecting the soul to God came from listening to bishop Ambrose. 
Augustine writes, “I noticed, repeatedly, in the sermons of our bishop . . . that when God is thought of, our 
thoughts should dwell on no material reality whatsoever, nor in the case of the soul, which is the one thing 
in the universe nearest to God” (emphasis mine). De beata vita I.4. Quoted in Peter Brown, Augustine of 
Hippo: A Biography, Revised Edition with a New Epilogue (Berkeley, California: University of California 
Press, 2000), 75.
46 On the new Victorine emphasis on the ‘literal sense’ of Scripture: “One of the most interesting 
developments in the exegesis especially of Ezekiel’s temple vision during the later Middle Ages is the 
effort to literalize its text. In the later twelfth century Richard of St. Victor, a major visionary writer 
himself, commented on Ezekiel specifically to refute the assertion of Bede and Gregory that the plan of the 
temple citadel was irreducibly incoherent, literal non-sense, and thus only to be read ‘spiritually’ and as 
metaphor (including synecdoche, ekphrasis, metonymy, and so on). As Beryl Smalley said of this 
literalizing effort, ‘a scientific movement is really afoot,’ a movement to objectify and de-trope the 
ekphrasis, understanding it less as an instance of rhetorical allegoria and more as the linguistically 
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the point of emphasizing the significance of prepositions. One such preposition exploited 
by Augustine was ‘ad’ in ad imaginem Dei (i.e., to the image of God).47 Man is not 
simply created in the image of God; through sin, that image is marred and has to be 
restored. Thus man, though created in the image of God, must still be restored to that 
image. That ‘ad’ begins the ascent to God and requires both intellective and affective 
control as one seeks to be restored in full accordance with that image. And in a play on 
the Latin wording that becomes commonplace after Augustine, that ‘mirror’ (speculum) 
also becomes the ‘watchtower’ (specula)—the place in the house of God (domus Dei) 
one ascends, keeps a lookout, and awaits a visitation from the Lord.48 
But Augustine also frequently glosses 1 Corinthians 13:12 with two important 
scriptural allusions. These glosses further establish the contours of his theology and 
become foundational to Richard’s as well. The first is Romans 1:20 and the second is 
2 Corinthians 4:18. In Romans 1:20, it states that “the invisible qualities of God have 
been made plain to men through those things which have been made so that men are 
without excuse.” Thus through visible things one comes to discern the invisible qualities 
of God. As Augustine writes:
But indeed all these visible and sensible things are, as we have 
often said, exhibited through the creature made subject in order to 
signify the invisible and intelligible God, not only the Father, but 
also the Son and the Holy Spirit, “of whom are all things, and 
‘transparent’ description of an object.” Carruthers, The Craft of Thought, 184.
47 Giles Constable, Three Studies in Medieval Religious and Social Thought: The Interpretation of 
Mary and Martha, the Ideal of the Imitation of Christ, the Orders of Society (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 166-167.
48 See the picture of Godefroy of St. Victor in the ‘watchtower’ in Fassler, 338-339. For Richard’s  
use of the term, see Mystical Ark, V.3; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 313; De Trinitate V.6, 21; VI.23.
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through whom are all things, and in whom are all things”; although 
“the invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are 
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His 
eternal power and Godhead.”49
That Augustine understands this trajectory of visible to invisible with the mirror 
(speculum) of 1 Corinthians 13:12 is demonstrated by the fact that he continues in II.16 to
speak of Moses’ desire to see God plainly; but it is not until God places Moses in the 
‘watchtower’ (specula) that he will be able to see His glory; that is, his divine substance:
Assuredly he knew that he saw corporeally, and he sought the true 
sight of God spiritually . . . the Lord afterward said to Moses, 
“Thou canst not see my face: for there shall no man see my face, 
and live.” And the Lord said, “Behold, there is a place by me, and 
thou shall stand upon a rock: and it shall come to pass, while my 
glory passeth by, that I will put thee into a watch-tower of the rock, 
and will cover thee with my hand while I pass by: and I will take 
away my hand, and thou shalt see my back parts; but my face shall 
not be seen.”50
Thus the “ascent” from the imperfect to the perfect, from the partial to the complete 
vision of God, also consists of moving from the visible to the invisible (per visibilia ad 
invisibilia).51 One discerns by means of visible things what one ought to think about God,
because God, in providing them, makes this possible.
49 Augustine, De Trinitate II.14.
50 Augustine, De Trinitate II.16. Augustine goes further in II.17 to connect the watchtower-rock 
within which Moses stands to behold God’s glory with the Church. And he is clear that this “vantage point”
is reached not merely by intellectual acumen but spiritual discipline. If the contemplative is to see the 
incorruptible substance of Divinity, he must put corruptible things aside. As he says, “. . . the more pure the
more it rises to spiritual things; and it rises the more to spiritual things the more it dies to carnal things.”
51 Coulter’s book by the same name argues that the movement in Richard’s thought from visible to 
invisible is based on Romans 1:20. Here we only wish to add the Augustinian heritage of this principle and 
show how intricately it was associated with the exegetical history of 1 Corinthians 13:12; an exegesis both 
Anselm and Richard knew well.
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And this leads us to the second gloss. What is visible also changes. Visible things 
come to be and cease to be, but invisible things are eternal; and God is the most eternal of
all.52 2 Corinthians 4:18 states, “while we look at the things which are not seen; for the 
things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal.” The 
context of 1 Corinthians 13:12 makes clear that the contrast between what is partial and 
what is complete is not just a question of what is lacking that might be fulfilled, but 
also—and this is the point of emphasis in the passage—a question of what lasts when 
everything else fails: “And now these three remain: faith, hope, and love” (emphasis 
mine). What is eternal remains, lasts, and abides. What is temporal does not. So what is 
eternal? In the final analysis, only God is eternal. But God is Truth and God is Love,53 
and thus to seek God is to seek the Truth and Love in the way of truth and love. These are
the rails that mark the journey. They are what fix the lines of movement toward God. And
that movement, that passion, ends with its eternal destination. It is where the soul, 
remaining in love, remains with Him and in Him as its fixed and eternal resting place. As 
Augustine says in his Confessions: “Thou hast formed us for Thyself, and our hearts are 
restless till they find rest in Thee.”54
These themes do not offer a comprehensive survey of Augustine’s theology or his 
own De Trinitate, but they do represent major contours of this thought. Many of them 
coalesce around the ‘mirror’ of 1 Corinthians 13:12. But that mirror and these themes 
52 See esp. Augustine, De Trinitate XIV.1, where he summarizes the structure of bks. XII-XIV. 
53 John 3:33; 1 John 4:7-8; 2 John 3; Wisdom 3:9.
54 In Augustine’s De Trinitate, this ‘rest’ is associated with (a) full vision or contemplation (of God): 
I.10, XI.5-6; (b) the house of the Lord: II.17; and (c) the satisfaction of a contented or holy will: VIII.7, 
IX.9, IX.12, XII.1, XV.26.
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provide the margins of subsequent trinitarian articulation and reflection in the 
Augustinian tradition. And as we will see, Richard also writes within them.
The Guidance of Anselm
The second most cited author in Richard’s De Trinitate is St. Anselm of 
Canterbury.55 Anselm lived just a generation prior to Richard, but Anselm’s works were 
well known to him. This is for two reasons. First, a good bit of Anselm’s compositions 
and ecclesiastical involvement focused on debate about the Trinity, some of which was 
fueled by one of his early works: De Grammatico. Second, two of Anselm’s greatest 
works on the Trinity—his Monologion and Proslogion—became popular and were 
widely published before Richard’s time. 
Anselm became part of a new cycle of trinitarian polemics with one of his early 
writings: De Grammatico—a treatise laying out some basic principles for predication. 
Among the things Anselm considered in this treatise was the question of whether a white 
substance is a white substance proper or a substance that is white. In the process Anselm 
used the Trinity as an illustration. But this rather innocuous illustration was made a 
controversy. Roscelin accused Anselm of leaning towards a tritheistic conception of the 
Divine based on this distinction.56 This prompted Anselm’s response which he took up in
55 As Feiss notes, “. . . of Richard’s works the De Trinitate and the Ad clamat are the two most 
influenced by Anselm in spirit, aim, and method.” Hugh Feiss, “Learning and the Ascent to God in Richard
of St. Victor,” (Ph.D. diss., Pont. Athanaeum of Sant’ Anselmo, 1979), 122. This is noteworthy given that 
Anselm had much less influence on Richard’s predecessor, Hugh. Ibid., 26. Ribaillier further notes, that 
despite the overlap of vocabulary with Achard’s De unitate and the fact that both Richard and Achard 
follow the general outline of the Monologion, Richard is more faithful to Anselm’s ‘supreme Good’, 
Achard developing his from ‘supreme Beauty’. Ribaillier, 29-31.
56 Brian Davies and G. R. Evans, eds., Anselm, St. Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works, Oxford 
World’s Classics (Oxford University Press, 2008), xiv-xv.
26
his On the Incarnation. But Anselm’s trinitarian reflections continued, and his treatment 
would reach its most sublime form in his Monologion and Proslogion. These two works, 
along with an added dialogical exchange with Gaunilo who responds “On Behalf of the 
Fool,” were some of the most copied and published of Anselm’s works. The Monologion 
was written under the promptings of some of Anselm’s pupils; the Proslogion was 
written later as Anselm’s thoughts further coalesced to form a single argument for the 
existence of God. The writings became so popular, in fact, that Anselm sought the advice 
of his mentor, Lanfranc. Lanfranc’s only corrective was that Anselm cite his authorities 
rather than merely quote them. After these writings Anselm attended the Council of Bari 
(1098)—a council that had as one of its chief objectives to reconcile East-West rifts with 
respect to whether the Holy Spirit was sent from both the Father and the Son or from the 
Son alone. Anselm was a major representative of the former view and defended it in an 
attempt to persuade those who held to the latter. As a result of that debate, Anselm wrote 
On the Procession of the Holy Spirit.57 
Thus a generation prior to Richard of St. Victor there had been quite a bit of activity 
clarifying and better articulating theological contemplation of the Trinity. Much of the 
debate and contours of trinitarian thought at the time were given shape by Anselm’s 
thought and writings.58 Given the popularity of Anselm’s Monologion and Proslogion, it 
57 Ibid.
58 The intervening years between Anselm of Canterbury and Richard contain many other historical 
developments and figures we pass over here. While these establish the more proximate, Parisian context of 
Richard’s thought (e.g., William of Champeaux, Hugh of St. Victor, Abelard, Peter Lombard, Bernard of 
Clairvaux, William of St. Thierry, etc.) we forgo this broader analysis in order to devote more space to the 
specific structural and formative connections Richard’s De Trinitate has with Anselm’s Monologion. The 
choice of Anselm also locates our analysis within the general consensus of Richardian scholarship that De 
Trinitate and Ad clamat ex seir are the most influenced by Anselm’s thought and method. For Feiss and 
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is not surprising that Richard would have known them and incorporated some of their 
elements into his own work on the Trinity.
Anselm likewise fits within the Augustinian tradition but his connection with  
Augustine becomes explicit in his Monologion; for despite Lanfranc’s admonition to cite 
his sources, the only author Anselm explicitly mentions is Augustine.59 As we will see, 
Richard works very closely with Anselm’s Monologion. We therefore have at least prima
facie grounds for seeing the new fullness Richard develops on the Trinity as the fruit of 
an Augustinian-Anselmian trajectory. Moreover, our analysis bears this out, highlighting 
that Richard develops formative as well as logical aspects of his predecessors’ thought. 
We divide our treatment of Anselm along three lines. First, because our thesis pertains to 
how Richard structures his own treatise on the Trinity with formative aims, we look at the
structure and formative aims of Anselm’s Monologion. Here we see that Anselm 
structures his meditatio according to the Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad popular in the 
11th and 12th centuries.60 In addition, we note that the flow, in the last two sections of 
his work, moves from right thinking to right doing—taking up the Augustinian maxim of 
being perfect in “word and deed.”61 Second, we are interested in Anselm’s understanding
of ‘reason’ (ratio) and “necessary reasons” (rationes necessariae) as they pertain to 
Ribaillier, see n. 55 of this work. Cf. Den Bok, 163 n. 53. For the 12th century Parisian context, see Poirel.  
59 For further evidence of Anselm’s dependence on Augustine’s De Trinitate, see Frederick van 
Fleteren, “The Influence of Augustine’s De Trinitate on Anselm’s Monologion,” a chapter in Viola, 
Coloman and Frederick van Fleteren, eds. Saint Anselm: A Thinker for Yesterday and Today (Lewiston, 
New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990). 
60 On the history of the Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad and its use in the 12th century, see Poirel.
61 Augustine, Exposition of the Psalms, 92.5, 92.14; 105.2. Reply to Faustus the Manachean, 22.27, 
22.76. Confessions X.4. Concerning Faith of Things Not Seen 7. 
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theological contemplation. This sets up the proper historical context for Richard’s own 
use of reason and its role in his writings. Thus the treatment of reason and necessity in 
Anselm initiates some correctives to be developed in more detail in chapter 3 that 
broaden our understanding of the term and its use in the 12th century. In addition, we also
find that Richard picks up on Anselm’s distinction of what is “above and beyond” reason 
and the important, but limited, role reason has for Trinitarian contemplation. Third, and 
finally, we look to those key Augustinian principles and ideas Anselm identifies and 
builds upon that are so central to Richard’s own work on the Trinity. This prepares us to 
see how the “heritage of Augustine” and the “guidance of Anselm” fuse together into a 
new fullness Richard gives them in his own articulation of the Trinity.
Two main structural elements deserve highlighting in Anselm’s Monologion, and 
both of them pertain to his intended triadic organization of the treatise. The first concerns 
the basic structure that Anselm himself explicitly points to with his own words. In 
Monologion 29, Anselm writes that chapters 1-28 pertain to “properties” of the supreme 
nature, whereas what follows pertains to the supreme nature’s “verbalization.” As he says
in 29, “So far, following reason’s lead, I have been working through the properties of the 
supreme nature. It is now, I think, the right moment to investigate, if I am able, the 
supreme nature’s verbalization, through which all things were created.”62 Anselm first 
considers God in God’s-self (i.e., God considered by Himself apart from creation). 
Created things are spoken of in 1-28 only for the sake of human understanding and 
speaking; but here God is considered primarily as what He is apart from the created 
62 Anselm, Monologion 29; Davies and Evans, 45.
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order, as God in se. What follows in the second section, from 29-65, is a consideration of 
the processions (i.e., what proceeds within God that is not the created order: God ad 
intra). Finally, in the third section, 65-80, Anselm moves to the highest element in the 
created order—Man, created in the image of God—and proceeds to spell out the 
restoration of man according to that image. As he says: 
It is now clear that one cannot get to see anything about the 
supreme nature by means of what is proper to it. Rather, one must 
work through something other than it. And hence, it is certain that 
what one gets closest to knowledge of it through, is that which most 
closely resembles it. And the more a creature resembles it, the more 
excellent its nature must be. So such a thing has a double effect: its 
close resemblance helps bring the inquiring mind closer to the 
supreme truth, and the excellence of its created nature teaches the 
mind what to think about its Creator. And the greater the 
resemblance and excellence, the more it helps and teaches.63
The transition from the second to the third section of the Monologion is also a move 
from “word” to “deed”—another Augustinian maxim. It is where man—in contemplation
of the trinitarian God—undertakes, with God’s help, the reformation of his soul en route 
to God. Here theological meditation brings moral integrity to the rational soul as it 
ultimately seeks what is above and beyond it: the face of the Divine. As Anselm says: 
To strive to give, therefore, expression to this impressed image; to 
strive to actualize, by an act of will, this, nature’s potential: such, 
above all, is, in consequence, the debt that the rational creature 
owes its Creator. A debt above and beyond the very fact that it 
exists. To be able to be conscious of, understand and love the 
supreme good is its most momentous ability (emphasis mine).64
 And this transition in Anselm—like we see also in Richard—marks the end of the visible
63 Anselm, Monologion 66; Davies and Evans, 72. Cf. Augustine, De Trinitate VI.8 and n. 45 of this 
work.
64 Anselm, Monologion 68; Davies and Evans, 73.
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footprints and vestiges of the Divine within the created order that man’s graced mind and 
reason are able to discern. The trail to the fact of God does not end here, but where one 
steps next in the ascent is “above and beyond” reason. As Anselm says: “This seems to 
me to be a sublime mystery, which stretches well beyond the horizon of human 
understanding.”65 Here the sandals of reason are set aside and one treads cautiously in the
footsteps of Christ to reform the soul in accordance with His image.
But there is a second triadic pattern to notice in the Monologion—and this triad 
most reveals that the objective of Anselm’s Monologion is a formative one. This is the 
Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad that many writings on the Trinity (including Richard’s) in
the 11th and 12th centuries draw upon. What interests us about the triad in Anselm is the 
unique—and reverse!—way he implements it in the Monologion. Among the three 
elements of this triad, power is usually attributed to the Father, wisdom to the Son, and 
goodness to the Spirit.66 The primacy of the Father generates the Son in wisdom and the 
Spirit in goodness. So one might expect a straightforward analysis of each element of this
triad starting first with Power, and then subsequently with Wisdom and Goodness, as 
many writers on the Trinity do. But this is not what Anselm does. In fact, he does just the 
opposite. Rather than start with Power and proceed to Wisdom and Goodness, he starts 
with Goodness, then Wisdom, and ends with Power. These elements correspond, roughly,
with the three sections of the Monologion given above: 1-28 with Goodness, 29-65 with 
Wisdom/Word, and Power in 80.
65 Anselm, Monologion 64; Davies and Evans, 70.
66 See, e.g., Richard, De Trinitate VI.15 where he incorporates from his De tribus personis 
appropriatis in Trinitate. Ribaillier, 11-12, 247-248.
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What is the reason for this? The clue most helpful for making sense of this reverse 
order of the Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad comes from the pen of Anselm himself. 
Shortly after Anselm wrote the Monologion, he wrote his Proslogion where he explicitly 
delineates his method in composing the former work. In the prologue to the Proslogion, 
he writes that he crafted the Monologion “as an example of meditation on the meaning of 
faith from the point of view of one seeking, through silent reasoning within himself” 
(emphasis mine).67 Thus although metaphysically, ontologically—according to the order 
of being—the order of the triad is Power —> Wisdom —> Goodness, reflecting the order
from God-to-man, Anselm picks the triad up with respect to the first point of contact man
has with God: an experience of his participation in the supreme Goodness that permeates 
all good things. For man must first encounter and inhabit this Goodness in order to be 
illuminated with its light and, by means of it, behold the inaccessible light of the glory of 
God. One then verbalizes the verbalization of God, approximating with words in the 
mind the perfect Wisdom and Word of God completely exemplified in the Christ. Jesus, 
the divine Word of God is the most sublime manifestation of the supreme Wisdom of 
God. As one longs for and seeks the face of God by means of that Wisdom—
approximating one’s own “silent reasoning” to that heavenly Reasoning, of one’s internal
and temporal word to that eternal Word—one comes closer to glimpsing the supreme 
essence. 
But this imitation and approximation of the Word—‘righting’ one’s own 
verbalization (and hence, comprehension) of divine Wisdom—cannot stop at words 
67 Anselm, Proslogion, Prologue; Davies and Evans, 82.
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alone. For chiefly in deed (ultimately, in power) one discovers God in Godself. One must 
serve and worship the Lord (Dominus)—as Augustine’s maxim made clear—in word and
deed. It is to extend the ‘righting’ of words to the ‘righting’ of power.68 And this 
integration of word and deed in the soul of the seeker forms the apex of the third section 
of Anselm’s Monologion: the restoration of man in accordance with the image and 
likeness of God. As that ‘re-flection’ properly imitates and approximates—through its 
holy efforts and thoughts—the supreme Power-Wisdom-Goodness of God, the closer it 
comes to seeing God face-to-face (i.e., as He truly is). Here one encounters the supreme 
essence of God without mediation, above and beyond reasons and similitudes. The 
rational and devout soul finally reaches, in its earnest longing, the summit of the Most 
High God. 
This leads Anselm to conclude with a chapter on the supreme and primal power of 
God, by means of which come the generation of the Son, the procession of the Spirit, and 
the creation of man in accordance with the image of God. Before the supreme power of 
God, man finds himself—despite reaching the summit of God—still kneeling in worship 
at His footstool. There is one God; there is no other. As Anselm says: 
For the supreme essence alone is that through which anything good 
is good, without which nothing is good, and out of, through and in 
which all things exist. So then, since it, alone, is not just a good 
Creator, but is also the superlatively powerful master and the 
68 Here Anselm perceptively captures another key element in Augustine’s De Trinitate that likely 
serves as the basis for the word-to-deed order of the reformation of the image of God material in the last 
two sections of his Monologion. For it matches the order by which Augustine said men should imitate 
Christ in conquering the devil, by putting righteousness before power: “it pleased God, that in order to the 
rescuing of man from the grasp of the devil, the devil should be conquered, not by power, but by 
righteousness; and that so also men, imitating Christ, should seek to conquer the devil by righteousness, not
by power. Not that power is to be shunned as though it were something evil; but the order must be 
preserved, whereby righteousness is before it” (emphasis mine). Augustine, De Trinitate, XIII.13-14.
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superlatively wise controller of all things, it is superlatively clear 
that this is the only thing that all other natures ought, with all their 
might, to love and worship (emphasis mine).69
Some may object that this Goodness —> Wisdom —> Power reversing of the 
Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad is merely a coincidence; however, we have even further 
support for it. At the very end of the Monologion, Anselm also reverses the Augustinian 
triad of Faith-Hope-Love in the direction of Love —> Hope —> Faith.70 Taken together, 
these two reversals combine with Anselm’s own explicit statement in the prologue of the 
Proslogion to make a strong case that he has deliberately ordered these triads for 
formative aims. He writes, starting with the encounter of the Triune God “from the point 
of view of one seeking,” and thus the journey begins from love to hope to faith—and 
from goodness to wisdom to power.71
This suffices to show some of the formative structure and aims in Anselm’s 
Monologion—structures inspired by Augustine that are picked up and used by Richard of
St. Victor. Yet Augustine also sowed some seeds in the form of key principles. These 
principles were further cultivated by Anselm and eventually harvested by Richard. What 
were they? More specifically, which principles laid down by Augustine and built upon by
Anselm led to Richard’s main line of argument for the Trinity of persons in book III of 
69 Anselm, Monologion 80. Davies and Evans, 81.
70 Anselm, Monologion 74: “But how are we to tell unambiguously which souls love and will enjoy 
what they are created to love . . .”; 75: “But the soul could not even attempt such a project, if it thought it 
could never complete it. Hope, therefore, is as necessary as determination is effectual . . .”; 76: “But love 
and hope are impossible without belief . . .” (emphasis mine). Davies and Evans, 77-78.
71 Human participation only extends to goodness and wisdom. Since the power described in the last 
chapter of Anselm’s Monologion emphasizes God’s ‘primal’ power, such power is not something man 
participates in. Or, to put it another way, while humans may participate in God’s power they do not 
participate in God’s omnipotence. Cf. Richard, De Trinitate II.11-14.
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his work? For brevity we limit our analysis to the key principles that led to the genesis of 
Richard’s argument for the Trinity of persons in book III. This focus both refines our 
awareness of the contributions made to his thought by Augustine and Anselm and 
increases our appreciation of Richard’s originality in providing a new fullness to them. 
For as he points out at the opening of book III, this will be his “bold undertaking,”72 
where he seeks necessary reasons for things he has read but has not seen proven.73 
One of the starting points for Anselm’s articulation of the Trinity was a principle 
found in Augustine’s treatise on the Trinity. Augustine writes that “God is/consists of 
whatever it is better to be than not to be.”74 We can call it Augustine’s “Principle of 
Perfection.” He means by it that of all of the many good things we come to know and 
love, God lacks none of them. It is better to be just than unjust, therefore God is just. It is 
better to be eternal than temporal, therefore God is eternal. It is better to be loving than 
non-loving, therefore God is loving, etc. Anselm picks up this Augustinian “Principle of 
Perfection” and gives it a more “optimal” form. For Anselm, God is not merely the better 
of what is better or worse; but God is the best of all. Augustine would agree, but Anselm 
72 Richard, De Trinitate III.1: Nam, ut verum fatear, ad tentandi ausum non me quidem tam scientia 
elevat quam aestuantis animi ardor instigat. Quid si non detur pervenire quo tendo? 
73 Richard, De Trinitate I.5.
74 Augustine, De Trinitate V.1: “Certainly we find nothing of [outlines of forms, or brightness of 
colors, or greatness of space, or distance of parts, or extension of size, or any movements through intervals 
of place] in that, than which we find nothing better in our own nature, that is, in our own intellect, by which
we apprehend wisdom according to our capacity. What, therefore, we do not find in that which is our own 
best, we ought not to seek in Him who is far better than that best of ours; . . . Whoso thus thinks of God, 
although he cannot yet find out in all ways what He is, yet piously takes heed, as much as he is able, to 
think nothing of Him that He is not.” Augustine states the principle in VI.8: “For in those things which are 
not great by bulk, to be greater is to be better.” In XIV.8 he writes, “the image of that nature than which 
none is better, is to be sought and found in us, in that than which our nature also has nothing better.” And in
V.10 and XV.4 Augustine gives the short list of predications of divine perfection, concluding that “the 
Creator lives in the highest sense.”
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elaborates the idea further and allows it to play a more prominent role in his thought. 
Indeed, with respect to Anselm’s Proslogion—a work he prized most of all for its 
conciseness and rational perspicuity75—Augustine’s “Principle of Perfection” is the 
cornerstone on which the entire work is based. The chief difference in Augustine and 
Anselm on this point is that Anselm took the principle to its highest level. For Anselm 
God is not just perfect, but maximally so. God is the being-than-which-none-greater-can-
be-thought.76 Thus God is not merely just as opposed to unjust, but the most just of all. 
God is not merely loving as opposed to unloving, but the most loving of all, and so on. In 
brief, Anselm takes Augustine’s “Principle of Perfection” and turns it into the “Principle 
of ‘Maximal’ Perfection.”77 Doing so gives him much of what he needs in his 
Proslogion. For because God is maximally perfect—the being-than-which-none-greater-
can-be-thought—He must also exist in actuality and not simply as an idea in the mind 
alone. For if the being-than-which-none-greater-can-be-thought exists in the mind alone, 
one can still imagine a greater being; namely, one that exists in actuality and not as an 
idea in the mind alone. Therefore, if God is the being-than-which-none-greater-can-be-
75 Anselm, Proslogion, Prologue; Davies and Evans, 82.
76 Similar language is found in Seneca’s Quaestiones Naturales, a work that was in the library at 
Bec in the 12th century. Whether Seneca is the inspiration for Anselm’s thought is hard to say. Anselm 
does not—as he had Augustine—name Seneca as a source, but the verbal affinity is noteworthy. See 
Richard W. Southern, St. Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), 129. 
77 This language of ‘maximal greatness’ for describing God in Anselm’s Ontological Argument has 
become standard in analytic philosophy since Alvin Plantinga reinvigorated the debate by defending the 
argument’s logical soundness. Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, Clarendon Library of Logic and 
Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 196-221. Plantinga further clarifies that maximal greatness 
does not consist in merely being the most perfect being in the actual world but also the most perfect being 
in every possible world. In short, no matter what world God creates, there is no world in which God could 
be greater. His maximal greatness entails His having every possible perfection in every possible world.
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thought, he must exist in actuality and not in the mind alone. His maximal perfection 
entails this.
Richard of St. Victor sees what Anselm has done with Augustine’s “Principle of 
Perfection” by making it the “Principle of ‘Maximal’ Perfection” and makes two further 
moves that give him his argument for the Trinity of persons. First, like Anselm, he looks 
to what is maximally perfect; but unlike Anselm, he narrows his focus to target the 
greatest virtue of all: Love (caritas). So where Anselm focuses on greatest being, Richard
focuses (at least for book III of his work) on greatest virtue. If God is maximally perfect, 
then highest among the goods of his supreme Goodness must be the virtue of love.78 And 
if God is love, then . . . . This brings us to the second thing Richard does in fusing 
Augustine and Anselm’s principles of perfection. Richard turns his attention to the 
fullness of this perfection. Where Augustine turned to melius (better) and Anselm to 
optimum (optimal), maximum (maximal), and summum (highest), Richard turns to 
plenitudo caritatis (i.e., the fullness of perfect love).79 It is his desire to articulate the 
Trinity more “fully” that motivates him. For if God is love, God is perfect love; and if 
perfect love, this is both the highest love (summe caritatis) as well is the fullest and most 
complete (plenitudo et perfectio).80 Yet perfect love, the fullest and most complete, 
78 Richard freely varies among amor, dilectio, caritas as he proceeds throughout De Trinitate. Thus 
the adjectives that modify them are a better indication of the aspect of the love he is drawing attention to.
79 Richard, De Trinitate III.2. The development of thought from Augustine-Anselm-Richard moves 
along the lines of melius-summum-plenitudinem (i.e., better-highest-fullest). ‘Summa’ plays the most 
prominent role in Anselm’s Monologion, modifying bonitas, essentia, iustitia, magnitudo, natura, 
pulchritudo, ratio, salus, substantia, and vita. It is important to notice that Richard focuses on ‘plenitudo’ 
with Anselm’s ‘summa’ for its foundation. This dependence becomes especially clear in chapter 4, Fig. 4.2.
80 Richard, De Trinitate III.2.
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cannot be a private love (privatus amor) contained by one person alone. Such love 
requires a multiplicity, and ultimately, a Trinity of persons. Perfect love entails at the 
least, a mutual love among equals; and at the most, a third who shares in the love of the 
other two.81
Consequently, we can see that Richard’s work builds upon two of his theological 
predecessors: Augustine and Anselm. We discovered that the major contours of Richard’s
theology come from Augustine and center around the love found in 1 Corinthians 13 and 
its quest to see God face-to-face in verse 12. That quest is conceived as an ascent from 
what is partial and imperfect to what is complete and perfect. The movement from man to
God, the movement to the image of God is a movement from childhood to adulthood, 
from immaturity to maturity. And with the glosses of Romans 1:20 and 2 Corinthians 
4:18, that ascent becomes a way of traversing from visible to invisible things, from what 
is seen to what is unseen, from what is transitory to what is eternal, from what fades away
to what endures forever. Ultimately, it is an ascent from faith to love. Likewise, Anselm 
builds on this Augustinian heritage and guides it further upward. In Anselm we find 
Augustine’s “Principle of Perfection” becoming the “Principle of ‘Maximal’ Perfection,” 
where the God who is always the better of whatever-it-is-better-to-be-than-not-to-be 
becomes the God-who-is-the-best-of-all. He is the being-than-which-none-greater-can-
be-conceived. Secondly, we find Anselm constructing his Monologion with the Power-
Wisdom-Goodness triad and arranging it from the “point of view of one seeking” to 
81 Richard, De Trinitate III.15. Further detail of Richard’s argument for the Trinity of persons is 
provided in chapter 4 of this work. Here we only highlight that the main principles upon which Richard’s 
argument is based come from this fusion of thought he inherited from Augustine and Anselm.
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better suit his formative aims. Like Anselm, we will see Richard using the Power-
Wisdom-Goodness triad as an essential structural guide in the crafting of his De Trinitate.
And like Augustine, we will see Richard continuing to perfect that “mirror” and 
“watchtower” of 1 Corinthians 13 in order to raise the hearts and enlarge the minds of his
readers with “a full and perfect contemplation of the Trinity.”
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CHAPTER TWO
THE ROAD TO RICHARD’S DE TRINITATE
…where the good way is…
Richard of St. Victor lived in the 12th century about a generation after Anselm of 
Canterbury. His life is marked by the major historical shifts that were taking place at the 
time. Among those shifts was a growing movement of monastic reform that was, in its 
most basic sense, a desire for a purer form of the religious life. And if we are to properly 
appreciate Richard’s attention to detail in De Trinitate we would do well to see how it fits
within some of these larger historical trajectories. Situating Richard within this context 
provides two important insights. First, it relates the intricacy with which De Trinitate was
written to the moral refinement of the Victorines’ religious life and educational program. 
Second, it helps us discern the formative relation De Trinitate bears to Richard’s other 
literary works and thus the prerequisites of soul for properly undertaking its study.
The Canons Regular
The Victorines fit within the broader movement of the canons regular. Shortly after 
the Lateran council of 1059 granted legitimacy to the order, the canons regular grew in 
large numbers in the 11th century and reached their high point in the 12th.82 Early on 
82 Grover Zinn, “The Regular Canons,” a chapter in Christian Spirituality: Origins to the Twelfth 
Century, ed. Bernard McGinn (Belleville, Michigan: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1987), 218. Colin 
Morris, The Papal Monarchy: The Western Church From 1050 to 1250, Oxford History of the Christian 
Church (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 259-260: “Another very powerful influence was that of the 
regular canons. Karl Bosl has even suggested that 1124-1159 should be envisaged as the ‘canonical period 
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they drew their customs from catenas of patristic and conciliar authorities in the Aachen 
Institutes and adopted Benedictine observances for various aspects of their daily life.83 
As a result, and as is well known, sharp distinctions are notoriously difficult to draw 
between canons regular and the monastic orders.84 In the early part of the 12th century, 
however, canons regular in France took the Rule of St. Augustine as their manifesto.85 
Among its primary tenets was the renunciation of personal property. As the author of the 
Libellus de diversis ordinibus et professionibus qui sunt in aecclesia,86 a canon regular 
himself,87 writes about Augustine:
of papal history’, and it is true that, even if the number of regular-canon popes has been exaggerated, they 
were influential in the curia. Their members can be found in almost every important area of the church’s 
life: they were scholars (Hugh of St. Victor), radical reformers (Gerhoh of Reichersberg) or revolutionaries 
(Arnold of Brescia), and canonists (Ivo of Chartres, Gratian). Their total impact has to be assessed as 
greater than the Cistercians.”
83 John Compton Dickinson, The Origins of the Austin Canons and Their Introduction Into England 
(London: S. P. C. K, 1950), 164.
84 Ibid., 196; Caroline W. Bynum, Docere verbo et exemplo: An Aspect of Twelfth-Century 
Spirituality, Harvard Theological Studies, 31 (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1979), 3-4; Zinn, “The 
Regular Canons,” 219. On the ambiguity and rapid change of the meaning of ‘apostolica vita’ see M.-D. 
Chenu, “Monks, Canons, and Laymen in the Search for the Apostolic Life,” a chapter in Nature, Man, and 
Society in the Twelfth Century, ed. and trans. Jerome Taylor and Lester K. Kittle, Medieval Academy 
Reprints for Teaching, 37 (University of Toronto Press, 1997), 204-219. In addition, the situation is 
complicated by the transitions made from one order to another. By the end of the century some canons had 
migrated through various orders and forms of religious life and some houses did not live up to the ideals 
they claimed as their own. The abbey at St. Victor, however, stands out as one place where word and deed 
seem to have made the connection. If the reception of the Liber ordinis sancti Victoris Parisiensis is any 
indication, it eventually eclipsed the popular custumals of the abbey of St. Quentin at Beauvais and 
influenced the customs of the Trinitarians and those of the Val des Ecoliers. Dickenson, 170.
85 On the influence of the Rule of St. Augustine for the canons regular, see Zinn, “The Regular 
Canons,” 219; Dickinson, 62-72, 177; Ladner, 356ff.
86 The author is anonymous. He makes numerous comparisons between reformed Benedictines and 
reformed canons. His two main goals, as summarized by Fassler: (a) “to promote ecclesiastical unity, 
especially through adoption of common rules of life”; and (b) “to encourage religious to demonstrate 
through their lives what their conversion means.” Fassler, 201. It was written in the second quarter of the 
12th century, probably in the Diocese of Liège. Giles Constable, The Reformation of the Twelfth Century 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 47. Chenu suggests Raimbaud, provost of the collegiate 
church of Saint-Jean, as its author. Chenu, 205.
87 Evidence for the author of the Libellus de diversis ordinibus being a canon regular consists of the 
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From the fact that he instituted near the city of Hippo a church of 
brothers “according to a rule established at the time of the holy 
apostles,” he is justly called the father of those who are near men; 
from the fact that when he lived in the bishop’s house he lived 
communally with his brothers, he is properly said to be the father of 
those who live among the people with a bishop or under a bishop. 
There are sermons of his on the clerical way of life, where it 
appears that they who lived with him before he became a bishop, 
and they who lived with him when he was a bishop, lived in a 
similar manner, communally according to a rule.88
The “discovery” of the Rule of St. Augustine resulted in the conviction that it provided the
key to living the apostolic life as described in Acts 4:32-35. The canons regular studied it 
in detail and looked to Augustine as one of their greatest sources of authority.89 
But movements that gain momentum require not only the possibility for expansion 
(as allowed by the Lateran council of 1059) but also the acuteness of certain conditions to
which that movement reacts. Historians recognize that the 12th century was a time of 
population growth, expansion of towns, increased trade, and rapid growth in 
sophistication both at court and in the schools.90 Against this backdrop it might be easier 
way he ends his work with a focus on the canons regular—a structure found in monastic literature 
demonstrating the humility of the monastic author in putting others before himself. Fassler, 192 n. 132. 
Furthermore, he often employs the second person plural when he turns to a description of them. Ibid., 195.
88 Fassler, 196.
89 This is not to limit the canons regular to Augustine. They looked to many patristic sources for 
their authority and brought Augustine’s thought into dialog with many others. Likewise it is not to limit 
Augustine to the canons regular. Augustine’s influence in the 12th century was widespread. At least one of 
Augustine’s works could be found in almost every library. He was as familiar to Cistercians and other 
monastic orders as he was to the canons regular. But because Augustine was the source of the canons’ 
Rule, he was given pride of place among their other holdings. And the Victorine reading cycle bears this 
out. See n. 29 of this work.
90 Chenu, 207. Three further themes become of central importance to the abbey of  St. Victor: (a) the 
physical separation of the south bank of the Seine that left it (esp. Mont-St. Geneviève) outside the practical
jurisdiction of the chancellor of the cathedral of Notre Dame. Richard W. Southern, Scholastic Humanism 
and the Unification of Europe: Foundations, vol. 1 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 219; (b) the 
exponential commercial growth on the north bank of the river that supported the influx of the royal house-
hold (on the whole, mostly supportive of the abbey) as it secured a permanent place on the Île. Ibid., 200.
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to see how this new order of priests arose: one that was monastic in its ascetic discipline 
and commitment to personal poverty but quasi-monastic in its schedule, allowing more 
time for study and service to the Church. This is an oversimplification and there are many
different motives for specific canons regular.91 But the main point is this: At a time when 
their secular counterparts had grown comfortable with the new prosperity, the regular 
canons renounced personal property to pursue the contemplative life lived in common 
with friends of the sort Augustine was said to have prized above all.
Conditions such as these likely motivated William of Champeaux to give up 
teaching at the cathedral school of Notre Dame and move to an abandoned hermitage 
dedicated to St. Victor on the left bank of the Seine.92 We have two documents written 
shortly after William left to found the abbey that say as much. One is a letter from 
Hildebert of Laverdin commending William on his decision. The other is a letter from 
one of William’s students who indicates just how rapidly William’s school attracted large
numbers of students. Because our focus is on the text of Richard’s De Trinitate we do not
have the space to look at Hildebert’s letter in too much detail. Here we highlight those 
aspects of the milieu Hildebert commends William for reacting against. He speaks 
commendably of William’s “putting aside ecclesiastical advancement,” preferring instead
91 Dickinson, 200. PL 213.827. The status of canons regular was widely debated and the source of 
great controversy after the order had been granted official conciliar approval in 1059 and 1063, ibid., 197. 
It is further worth noting the wide variety of opinion held at the time and the contexts and motives for 
which one might accept or deny the label ‘ordo monasticus’. Thus in 1156, the author of Dialogus inter 
Cluniacensem monachum et Cisterciensam calls canons regular ‘monachi’ because “to be cenobitical 
monks is nothing other than to be brethren dwelling in community,” whereas Ivo of Chartres would deny 
the attribution altogether, claiming to belong to the ordo canonicus. See Dickenson, 198-201, 206-208; 
Bynum, 19.
92 Fassler, 201.
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“the lowest place in the house of your God to living in the tents of the unrighteous.”93 He 
tells of William’s giving up “the hawking of pedagogy (lectionem)” and hating “ambition
and its prerequisites.”94 He likewise makes reference to Diogenes, saying that he “feared 
no man’s power because he hoped for no man’s reward” and that being “devoid of hope 
as he was of fear, transformed his poverty into riches.”95 Positively, this is assessed by 
Hildebert as a true and fuller philosophy. He states that “Hitherto you were but half a 
philosopher since in the school of the wise you had only the slightest apprehension of the 
perfection of moral beauty. Now indeed you have extracted from it, like sweet honey 
from its comb, the formula of the good life” (emphasis mine).96
Here we see some of the themes espoused by the canons regular and the Rule of St. 
Augustine that increasingly became their guide at the beginning of the 12th century. 
Hildebert commends William for seeking the common life. Furthermore, that life is 
commendable for what it rejects: ecclesiastical advancement, hawking pedagogy, vain 
ambition, worldly riches. But Hildebert is careful not to leave it there; he further coaxes 
William not to give up his teaching vocation, but to relocate it in this purer form of the 
religious life. With full knowledge that William had recently been humiliated by Peter 
Abelard, who was on a mission to claim William’s teaching post at the cathedral school 
at Notre Dame, Hildebert sympathetically encourages William to renew his commitment 
93 Dickinson, 190.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid., 191.
96 Ibid., 190.
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to teaching at a time when William may have been the most downtrodden.97 He writes 
further, “Take good care therefore not to deprive your brethren of the founts of living 
water, but as Solomon says ‘pour out the springs and spread their waters abroad’ (Prov. v.
15).”98 And William seems to have heeded these exhortations. For in less than 20 years, 
St. Victor had become renowned for its scholars who gave a full articulation to their 
Augustinian ideals and brought them into dialogue with a vast range of patristic, 
classical, and contemporary resources. Even less than a year after William leaves to 
found the abbey, a German student of William’s writes to his patron back home:
I am now in Paris in the school of master William, who, though he 
was archdeacon and one of the chief advisors of the king, gave up 
all he possessed to retire last Easter to serve God in a poor little 
church. There, like Master Manegold of blessed memory, he offers 
his teaching to all comers free of charge, and he now directs a 
school of secular and sacred learning larger than any I have ever 
heard of or seen in my time anywhere in the world.99 
In less than 50 years, Paris becomes the major center of monastic education—
unrivaled throughout all of Europe. Small grammar schools with, at best, one great 
master attracting more than the average number of students (as Lanfranc had Anselm of 
Canterbury), gave way to a bustling city with a panoply of students who could now easily
97 In this respect, it is easy to see Abelard representing something of the ethos Hildebert commends 
William for reacting against. For Abelard’s views of William’s departure, see PL 178.120.
98 Dickinson, 191.
99 Quoted in Southern, Scholastic Humanism, 202. This also indicates, as Van Liere points out, that 
the school at St. Victor was an ‘open school’, making education available to those outside the abbey as well
as to its novices for whom it was primarily intended. F. A. van Liere, “Andrew of St. Victor (d. 1175): 
Scholar Between Cloister and school,” a chapter in Centers of Learning: Learning and Location in Pre-
Modern Europe and the Near East, eds. Jan Willem Drijvers and Alasdair A. MacDonald (Leiden, 
Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1995), 189. For noteworthy visitors to the abbey, see n. 119 of this work.
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move among a variety of great masters of rhetoric, grammar, and theology.100 The 
springs that flowed from Laon eventually reach Paris, and pupils of Anselm of Laon, like 
William, take root en masse there. St. Victor was uniquely positioned at what was soon to
become the future training grounds for the next generation of scholars and administrators.
This would have been enough to afford it great influence in the 12th century, but the 
quality of that influence, enriched as it was by the common life, and graced as it was with
some of the greatest minds of the age—became a shining example of the Augustinian 
ideal of teaching by word and deed. In what follows, we divide our treatment of the 
Victorine canons regular into these respective categories before we place Richard’s De 
Trinitate beside his other literary works. 
The Religious Life of the Victorines
Three things are relevant to our treatment of Richard’s De Trinitate that connect 
with religious life at the abbey of St. Victor: (a) language in the “From the Root of 
Charity” sequence that connects with formative themes in Richard’s work, (b) the extra 
care the Victorines gave to the composition and ordering of their liturgical rites, and (c) 
how this rich, liturgical dimension of Victorine life overflowed in service to others. This 
focus reminds us that Richard composed in this setting, daily reciting the trinitarian 
formulas found in the Quicumque, and using various melodies and associations to link 
together his thoughts on the Trinity. At various places in De Trinitate we discover 
Richard making allusions to these communal experiences in his language and 
100 This is persuasively demonstrated by Southern as he traces the evidence through the lives of 
Peter Abelard, Otto of Friesing, William of Tyre, and John of Salisbury. See Southern, Scholastic 
Humanism, 204-221.
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illustrations. For attentive Victorine, such language provided rich motifs that stirred their 
souls with a holy longing for the face of God.
The “Ex radice caritatis” (“From the Root of Charity”) sequence was sung on the 
feast of the translation of the relics of St. Victor and therefore had special significance for
the Victorines.101 As a result, we can look to it as something important for understanding 
Victorine identity and their shared vision for the common life. It is given here in its 
entirety to help us inhabit something of the liturgical ambience within which Richard 
lived and composed De Trinitate. It reminds us that Richard’s treatise was inspired by—
and written with attention to—these communal experiences. But to fully understand this 
dimension of Richard’s life requires imaginatively entering into it, of identifying (at least 
provisionally) with the manner and spirit evinced by their celebrations. Here we walk the 
halls and enter the chambers of the abbey at St. Victor. We steady our souls and stand 
with Richard and his brethren as they honor their patron saint, and ascend with them from
the root of charity to the summit of joys.
101 In addition to the special significance this sequence had for celebrating their patron saint, it also 
connects them with the same thought in Gregory the Great, who in turn drew from Augustine. See esp. 
Straw, 92, n. 12. As noted there, Augustine wrote, “radix omnium bonorum est caritas” in Sermo 350.1. 
Augustine also writes in his seventh homily on 1 John, “let the root of love be within, of this root can 
nothing spring but what is good.” 
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I
From the root of charity
from the state of piety
let this church sing;
let it sing with the heart,
let it sing with the mouth
and let the household of Victor
rejoice in Victor.
II
The part of that saint given to us
was brought by faithful men
from the city of Marseilles;
first we enjoyed his spiritual presence,
but now we enjoy
his bodily presence.
III
This is the summit of joys;
let us enlarge the innermost sanctuary
of our souls;
the relics of the martyr
are the subject of praise and gladness
for us.
IV
The organ of our heart,
the drum of our flesh
are diverse from one another;
let harmony temper
and unite to each other
with suitable consonance.
V
With our choirs singing together,
let the modulation be one
in our customs;
harsh is the clash
of dissimilar voices,
of diverse customs.
VI
From diverse things
the sound will be disordered
unless the finger of God
first adjust the strings
with sweet instruction;
unless the sweetness of the spirit
touch the heart of the marrow,
the noise of the sound and the exultation of the
flesh
tastes nothing deeply.
VII
This sweetness is not felt
in dividings of minds
nor is it ageeably found
in the land of the living;
may the unity of the faithful
taste this sweetness,
and foretasting, thirst
until it may seize it fully.
VIII
Let us foretaste with the mouth of the heart,
so that by internal savor,
we may be recalled
from the seductive love of the world;
this is the wholesome taste,
this is the unique taste,
through which forgetfulness of worldly care
advances by degrees.
IX
So that this world may grow bitter,
let the odor of Christ become very sweet;
may this sweetness ever grow
in the wine cellar of the heart;
where such a fragrance breathes forth,
spiritual fervor increases
and love of temporal life
grows cold.
X
Victor, triumphant soldier,
special martyr of Christ,
preserve us from the evils of the world,
that worldly love
not drown us in sins;
with one voice, with like mind,
with singular honor,
we are zealous to worship you
while we are tossed in this sea,
confer your assistance.
XI
May you not permit those for whom you are able
to plead
to be deceived in their hope:
make us to be presented to Christ
so that we may contemplate Him
with you in glory;
to your honor, Christ,
this choir has sung repeatedly
the praise of your fighter
in whose presence let nothing sad
disturb our joys. Amen.102
102 Fassler, 318-319.
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A few elements in this sequence are worth highlighting. First we notice the focus on 
the “root of charity.” Charity is the fountainhead of all of the virtues, with a rich history 
extending all the way back to antiquity. For Richard it is the virtue of virtues he uses to 
find necessary reasons for the Trinity of persons in book III of his work. Second, we note 
the “summit of joys” and “advancing by degrees.” Richard uses the summit of joy to 
speak of the order and ardor of a love that can only be shared by those who are supreme 
and love each other supremely. The summit also reminds us of the language of “ascent” 
in Richard, where advancing in theological contemplation took place daily and by 
degrees. But the highest joy is, as the sequence says, to be made “presented to Christ so 
that we may contemplate Him with you in glory.”103 That contemplation, though it takes 
place by degrees, reaches its highest form, as Richard demonstrates, in the contemplation 
of the Trinity. Moreover, this divine gaze must take place by fortifying one’s soul as a 
watchtower for contemplation. The military language of the “triumphant soldier” and 
“special martyr” of Christ reminds us that one’s religious pilgrimage at this time was 
viewed as a real battle—a matter of life and death.104 Like others of their day, the 
Victorines saw themselves as special warriors—spiritual warriors—living the common 
life as a way of fortifying a place on the left bank of the Seine with the true 
contemplation of God. Finally, and most importantly, we see their vision for the common
life: forsaking property and the special refinements of secular life105; and with St. Victor, 
103 Compare Richard, De Trinitate, Prologue.
104 The notion of the saint as warrior was common in the Middle Ages. Even rhetoric was taught as 
a form of military training. See Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 106.
105 Property-possession was one source of reform sought by canons regular in reaction to their 
secular counterparts. The Rule of Aix adopted under Louis the Pious in 816 permitted canons to possess 
property and eventually led to abuses. Morris, 92. As a result, “. . . cathedral chapters such as Notre-Dame, 
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we see them seeking “one voice, like mind, and singular honor.”106
There were also three major processions during the church year that structured 
Victorine life: (a) Feast of Purification, (b) Palm Sunday, and (c) Ascension.107 Fassler 
summarizes Richard’s description of the first in his Super exiit edictum: 
. . . this feast [of the Purification of the Blessed Virgin] was 
distinguished by one of the three major processions of the Church 
year, during which the participants carried recently blessed and 
lighted candles throughout the church to the singing of the antiphon 
“Lumen ad revelationem gentium.” The candles recall the words of 
the aged Simeon, who, present at the temple when Mary arrived 
with her child, recognized the baby as the Christ and called him a 
“light to enlighten the nations.”
The feast commemorates the story recounted in Luke 2:22-38, 
of the Blessed Virgin submitting to the rites of purification after 
birth, and presenting her child in the temple.108
These three processions divided the Victorine year in accordance with these significant 
moments in salvation history. They anticipated them. They looked forward to them. Their
day-to-day activities were undertaken and understood as part of them; and their readings 
of Augustine, Origen, and Gregory the Great were sequenced on the basis of them.109
Their services were also very intricate and required great effort at sustained focus 
and contemplation. And while such liturgical artistry was not unique to the Victorines, 
Paris, grew rich on house rents and market tolls. The churches were inescapably involved in all the 
complexities of feudal tenure and commercial finance . . .” Ibid., 394. By contrast, the Rule of St. Augustine
forbade personal property. Ladner, 359.
106 Fassler, 319.
107 Fassler, 330. Richard explains these three processions allegorically in Super exiit edictum seu De 
tribus processionibus. See also Coulter, 28.
108 Fassler, 330. Marian liturgical sequences at St. Victor increase during Richard’s tenure and 
become more pronounced with Godefroy and Walter. For more on this, see ibid., 321-34 and Richard’s 
sermon “Ave maris stella.”
109 Zinn, Reading and Wisdom, 49-50.
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the care with which they structured and ordered their theological compositions was a 
mindfulness they suffused throughout every endeavor they undertook, as we can see in 
the attention they gave even to conduct upon receiving guests. As it states in the Liber 
ordinis sancti Victoris Parisiensis:
We enjoin that all these things [the welcoming ritual] should be 
scrupulously carried out, because those who come from outside are 
especially to be received with great kindness and humanity from 
the first moment of reception . . . so that from their first impressions 
of the outside they form an estimate of the things concealed 
within.110
 Such attention to detail was a direct extension of their commitment to purify all 
aspects of their religious life. As Fassler writes:
The matins service at St. Victor was lavish and carefully 
ordered, even more than might be expected of Augustinian canons 
during this period . . . At the opening of the night office (or matins), 
all the brethren were ordered in the middle of the choir, opposite 
the step in front of the altar; all bowed low toward the altar. There 
they said three prayers; after each of these they prostrated 
themselves. Subsequently, they took their seats and there said the 
fifteen Gradual Psalms, with a Kyrie and Pater noster after each. 
After every group of five, they prostrated themselves again . . . . 
During the office psalmody immediately following this opening 
section, the brethren rose and sat in alternation as each new psalm 
was sung. Hence half of the entire group got to rest physically half 
of the time, although all continued to sing antiphonally throughout 
the entire service.
Periods of respite may have been necessary: The Victorine 
Office was known in the Middle Ages as being sung very slowly, 
with long pauses at the middle and close of each psalm verse.111
This attentiveness in the reciting of their liturgies was further matched by a proportional 
110 C. Stephen Jaeger, “Humanism and Ethics at the School of St. Victor,” a chapter in The Envy of 
Angels: Cathedral Schools and Social Ideals in Medieval Europe, 950-1200 (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 252.
111 Fassler, 261-262.
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mindfulness in composing them. As Fassler’s thesis makes clear, the Victorines adapted a
number of liturgical sequences with novel arrangements of their own. One of the most 
significant is the “Laudes crucis,” a sequence about the cross the Victorines enriched by 
extending its melody to other sequences. The melody functioned for the Victorines as a 
mnemonic aid in calling to mind a rich harmony of parallels and contrasts with other 
sequences they knew.112  
These liturgies were a rich source for contemplation and inner renewal, a renewal 
that would go with the Victorines as they served others in their community. Indeed, 
service of others seems to have been a hallmark of Victorine spirituality in the 12th 
century—an emphasis that distinguished them from both the older and new monastic 
orders of their day. As Bynum writes: 
The contrast of Victorine life with that of the older and newer 
monastic orders may be precisely in the way the Augustinian 
Rule—or rather the Victorine interpretation of it—brought an 
emphasis to edification verbo et exemplo that was not found in the 
Benedictine orders where “service” was seen positively in the role 
it played in the individual monk’s solitary quest for God but 
negatively in the practical requirements entailed by “love of 
neighbor”.113
Like many of the new monastic orders, the Victorines shared a commitment to the 
apostolic life. Where they tried to distinguish themselves was in how well they lived the 
Rule of St. Augustine and served their community with purity, humility, and grace. In this
way they helped sanctify their thoughts and their deeds with the goal of calling others to 
repentance and the full contemplation of God. 
112 Fassler, 76-77.
113 Bynum, 137. 
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The Educational Program at St. Victor
We have seen something of the “deeds” of the Victorines in their liturgies and 
service to others. We now turn to the source of their preaching and “words.” As the 
author of the Libellus de diversis ordinibus says, monks should “. . . convert others to 
their way of life through both example and preaching.”114
As we have seen, the formation of the educational program at St. Victor began with 
its founder, William of Champeaux. In 1108, he eventually acquiesced to the growing 
antagonism of his pupil, Abelard, on the nature of ‘universals’115 and abandoned his head
teaching position at the cathedral of Notre Dame.116 Though he had no desire to return to 
his teaching or of founding a new order, he did so under pressure from his friend 
Hildebert of Lavardin who had great regard for William’s teaching and saw him as 
someone who offered a positive contrast to what was happening in the schools.117 
William headed the education at the abbey from its inception in 1108 until 1113 when the
114 Fassler, 193.
115 Lauge Nielsen, “Peter Abelard and Gilbert of Poitiers,” a chapter in The Medieval Theologians: 
An Introduction to Theology in the Medieval Period, ed. G. R. Evans, The Great Theologians (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 104. 
116 Kirchberger, 15. According to Bautier, Gilbert succeeded William as head of the cathedral 
school until he became Bishop of Paris in 1116 and gave the position to William’s pupil, Abelard. Fassler, 
202.
117 Kirchberger, 16. For Hildebert’s letter to William, see n. 123 of this work. Walter of St. Victor’s 
Contra quattuor labyrinthos franciae, written four years after Richard’s death, indicates that the differing 
spirit and methods of the school and the cloister only increased between 1108 and 1178. See Margaret T. 
Gibson, “The De doctrina christiana in the School of St. Victor” a chapter in Reading and Wisdom, 41-47. 
And by 1185, Godefroy of St. Victor could write in his Microcosmos, “In any case, let us [monks] 
(claustrales) leave this question, which holds very little interest for us, to the disputations of the scholastics,
and devote our attention to other things.” Jean Leclercq, The Love of Learning and the Desire for God: A 
Study of Monastic Culture, trans. Cathrine Misrahi (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), 3.
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charter of the abbey was granted and he was asked to become the Bishop of Châlons.118 
Nevertheless, the spirit William left at the abbey—of pursuing education in relative quiet 
and peace from the city, and of making prayer and contemplation priorities in one’s 
theological education—remained a heritage the abbey would continue to enrich and 
enjoy. 
It was Hugh of St. Victor, though, who would broaden and deepen the educational 
program at St. Victor and make it a center of learning that attracted some of the best 
minds of the age.119 Two keys made this possibility a reality: increased financial support 
and greater political stability. As confessor to King Louis VI, Abbot Gilduin was able to 
secure both.120 This helped Hugh carry on the vision, begun by William, of broadening 
the number of resources the abbey needed to expand knowledge of the liberal arts, as well
as enriching and deepening the methods by which they studied them. Hugh’s 
Didascalicon gives an indication that the approaches taken at St. Victor were seen as an 
alternative to those of the secular schools.121 Though the subject matter extended to both 
118 Fassler, 202.
119 Noteworthy scholars and visitors at the abbey: Clarenbald of Arras and Lawrence of Westminster 
who speak of studying with Hugh of St. Victor, Marcia L. Colish, Peter Lombard, Brill’s Studies in 
Intellectual History, 41 (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1994), 19; Bernard of Clairvaux commended Peter
Lombard for study at the abbey in a letter to Gilduin, prior of St. Victor (1134-36), ibid. 16 (see Epistola 
410) and Peter Lombard resided there for over a decade, Fassler, 202 n. 91; Robert of Melun under the 
tutelage of Hugh, Coulter, 239-40; Otto of Freising, Fassler, 202 n. 91; Maurice of Sulley, Bishop of Paris 
(1160-1196) takes residence at St. Victor in 1170, Coulter, 251. Others like Peter Comestor, chancellor of 
Notre Dame and Stephen of Garland retire there. Ibid., 253.
120 Fassler, 201. These favors increase when Stephen of Senlis takes over as the Bishop of Paris in 
1123 and, with the help of others, persuades King Louis VI to assign “. . . revenues and privileges from 
prebends of eleven churches in and around Paris to St. Victor.” Ibid., 203.
121 “The Victorines saw themselves setting out on a more refined course of study in the liberal arts. 
Hugh of St. Victor’s Didascalicon for example makes allusions to contrasts with the secular masters.” 
Fassler, 202; cf. Hugh, Didascalicon III.14 (PL 176.773D). In his treatise to novices Hugh writes “You, 
brothers, who have entered the school of discipline, you ought to seek first in the lectio divina that which 
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practical and theoretical arts, the main disciplines the Victorines were to master consisted
of three that would extend throughout them all: Grammar, Dialectic, and Rhetoric. 
Grammar is “knowledge of how to speak without error”; Dialectic is “clear-sighted 
argument which separates true from false”; and Rhetoric is the “discipline of persuading 
to every suitable thing.”122
Also noteworthy is the focus on the moral dimension of learning.123 The purpose of 
expanding one’s knowledge did not have as its governing concern to fill oneself up with 
new information; rather, every source from which knowledge could be obtained was put 
in the service of the spiritual purity of the individual. The purity of the subject matter 
being studied mattered little in comparison to the inner purity of the soul undertaking the 
study. As Augustine said, “. . . a picture’s value lies not in the image itself but in the 
cognitive and ethical use someone makes of it, the quality of what we think and think 
about, using the picture as our instrument.”124 Thus at St. Victor, even non-theological 
works were studied in such a way as to refine one’s own knowledge of the truth and 
sharpen one’s own moral and spiritual proclivities: e.g., How might the errors in this 
work refine my own knowledge of the truth? How might the vanity and perversions of 
instructs your morals to virtue, rather than that which sharpens your sense toward subtlety, more to be 
informed by the precepts of Scripture rather than impeded by Questions . . .” Quoted in Paul Rorem, Hugh 
of Saint Victor, Great Medieval Thinkers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 47. De institutione 
389-393.
122 Hugh, Didascalicon II.30; Taylor, 82.
123 Hildebert of Lavardin gives some indication that this focus on the moral life may have been the 
distinctive focus of the school at St. Victor. He clearly sees William’s efforts as a way of rooting 
theological education in the pure contentment secured by the common life, unburdened as it is by the need 
for property, possessions, and fame. Dickinson, 190-191; PL 171.141A-3A. 
124 Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 210. 
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this work sharpen my own resolve to live a holy life before God and develop my soul in 
accordance with virtue? This “inner purity” was in the service of the richer goal of 
developing a soul that was, as Richard says, “to a full and perfect purity.”125 And thus 
under the guidance of Gilduin and Hugh, the abbey enjoyed a period of broadening their 
library with new resources and filling it with new compositions of their own. Thus the 
“widening” of their educational program was also matched by a proportional effort at 
“deepening” the focus of their pedagogy around divine contemplation and inner purity.
This period of broadening and deepening the educational program at St. Victor 
comes as a result of the consistent leadership of Hugh and Gilduin as well as the royal 
favors the abbey had due to Gilduin’s political connections. But when Richard arrives at 
St. Victor, this period of blessing comes to an end. Richard comes to the abbey about 
seven years after the death of Hugh. His knowledge of Hugh would come through a 
careful study of his writings and continuing Hugh’s educational reforms with the help of 
Hugh’s pupils. The Bishop of Paris, Stephen of Senlin, who was one of the Victorines’ 
staunchest allies in supporting their efforts at reform, also dies one year after Hugh. And 
the founding abbot, Gilduin, dies five years after Richard arrives in 1155. Thus Richard 
arrives at a point when both the external political favor the abbey had enjoyed and the 
internal constancy of vision conceived of by Hugh and Gilduin were “up for grabs.” 
Achard takes up the abbacy for the next six years before leaving in 1161 to become the 
125 “However, if anyone should undertake to gird himself for this work and should strive to cover 
over his ark with gold, nothing prevents him from borrowing the gold of knowledge from external 
knowledge and secular disciplines provided that he knows how to cleanse himself from all the dross of 
falsity or vanity and to purify himself in the innermost part to a full and perfect purity, such as the dignity 
of these works requires.” Richard, Mystical Ark II.10; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 188. The Victorines 
read the behaviors and dispositions of others in the same manner, imitating what was good and reforming 
what was bad. Jaeger, 259.
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Bishop of Avranches. Richard becomes prior of the abbey the next year, at the same time 
the community elects Ernisius to be abbot in 1162; an appointment that soon proves to be
a source of great irritation for Richard. Where Richard would look to the inherited 
spiritual and financial prosperity of his predecessors with a view toward furthering their 
efforts at continual reform, Ernisius would squander these hard-won luxuries with what 
Richard took to be a spirit of laxity and worldliness the order had been founded to 
counter. Despite successfully involving the Pope in admonishing Ernisius, Richard 
endures a decade of Ernisius’s complacent leadership at the abbey until Ernisius is finally
deposed in 1172 and Guarin is elected to serve as abbot. Richard, sadly, dies less than a 
year later.
So on both sides of Richard’s arrival at St. Victor around 1150 lie the death of the 
head of the educational program and the founding abbot. However little we know of 
Richard it is clear that he came to the abbey at a time when the treasures of its founders 
were the most pristine. It would need the guidance of those who could salvage and be 
good stewards of this heritage, and in ways that would further enrich the kind of reform 
espoused by the abbey’s founders. Richard’s writings indicate he came to have an 
increasing role in the educational program at the abbey.126 The question is to what extent 
Richard saw the immediate heritage of Hugh as the margins within which he would cast 
the future of the Victorine agenda, or whether he would seek, with good intentions, to 
improve upon the legacy of his predecessor. The answer to that question involves a very 
126 Tractatus super quosdam psalmos et quarumdam sententias scripturarum, an earlier work 
Richard’s Mysticae admotationes Psalmum is based upon, refers to Richard as “magister.” Coulter, 41 n. 
80. Though as noted by Southern the term also had the more generic connotation of “teacher” or a term of 
respect.
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careful, comparative analysis of Richard’s Twelve Patriarchs-Mystical Ark with Hugh’s 
Moral and Mystical Ark treatises.127 And while we don’t have the space to undertake this 
here, we do want to highlight what this comparison reveals about an important distinction
shared by Richard and Hugh and how this helps us understand the “formative 
chronology” of Richard’s main body of written works.
The Road to Richard’s De Trinitate
With a sense for the rich life of the Victorines in their liturgies, their service to 
others, and their vision for the educational program at the abbey, we now turn our 
attention to Richard’s main literary works in an attempt to see something of the formative
framework his De Trinitate shares with his other treatises. 
Richard wrote a number of other works besides De Trinitate. His works consist of 
his Liber exceptionum, a work that expands on Hugh’s Didascalicon. It similarly lays out 
the main lines of study in the liberal arts with a focus on how to study the Scriptures. 
Subsequently Richard also wrote two books of Allegories based on selections taken from 
the Old and New Testaments. Throughout Richard’s time at St. Victor he also gave 
numerous sermons, and some of his works likely evolved out of them.128 There is some 
evidence that De Trinitate itself may have begun as a collection of sermons or 
127 Patrice Sicard has noted the lack of manuscript support for the Migne rendering of the titles of 
Hugh’s ark treatises (e.g., De arca Noe morali and De arca Noe mystica; PL 176.617-618 and 681-704), 
preferring instead De arca Noe (“Ark of Noah”) and Libellus de formatione arche (“Booklet on the Making
of the Ark”). But for reasons that will be made clear in what follows, I retain the traditional titles for 
Hugh’s work.
128 As Coulter notes, “De statu interioris hominis was composed in response to a question regarding 
the interpretation of Isaiah 1.5-6. Still other treatises were produced from Richard’s oral teaching or 
preaching. This is certainly true of his Sermones centum, the Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmum, Super 
exiit edictum, and the De Trinitate.” Ibid., 23. This movement from oral to written work is also found in 
other Victorines. On Andrew of St. Victor, see Van Liere, 190-192.
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discussions Richard later developed into the form that we now find the treatise today.129 
His works of tropology and rich symbolism consist of his Twelve Patriarchs, Mystical 
Ark, and De exterminatione mali et promotione boni. The first is a tropological 
interpretation of the twelve patriarchs where each one symbolizes a virtue to imitate. The 
second uses the Ark of the Covenant as a way of tempering the soul in its ascent to the 
full contemplation of God. It is where Richard provides his religious epistemology in rich
detail, laying out theological contemplation in six stages. In De statu interioris hominis 
Richard expounds the text of Isaiah 1:5-6 with the triad of Power-Wisdom-Goodness. 
The treatise delineates the three wounds of the soul along with their divine remedies. In 
De tribus appropriatis personis in Trinitate Richard likewise expounds on the same triad 
where each pertains to a particular person of the Trinity and the work of salvation. Ad me 
clamat ex seir is the human side of this triad where humans come to see that their pride, 
ignorance, and malice need to be reformed in accordance with divine power, wisdom, and
goodness. De exterminatione mali et promotione boni consists of a movement from the 
land of servitude in Egypt to the promised land with an emphasis on the transition that 
takes place at the Jordan river. And De quator gradibus violentae caritatis describes four 
grades of love, from a selfish love to a divine love for others in imitation of Jesus Christ.
Do we have any indication of the chronology of Richard’s works? Most Richardian 
scholars agree that Richard’s literary works span a very short period of composition, 
probably no more than a decade or so. As a result, Richard’s theology exhibits a 
129 See especially “Sed . . . dicis” in Richard, De Trinitate I.14, III.2, IV.7, IV.25, V.8, V.15, V.24, 
VI.12, VI.13, VI.19, VI.22. And “audis vel legis” in III.9, IV.19; and “audire” in III.10, IV.17, IV.20 , 
VI.17. and “loquamur” in VI.14, VI.20.
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consistency across his works, making the evolution of his thought more difficult to 
discern. Nevertheless, there is growing consensus on the order of his three main works: 
Twelve Patriarchs, Mystical Ark, and De Trinitate. Feiss, for example, sees a progressive 
optimism in each one for the role of reason in the pursuit of eternal truths.130And Coulter,
den Bok, Zinn, and others see the chronology of these works in that order.
While we cannot be certain with respect to Richard’s chronology,131 it is possible to 
see these three works with respect to their intended ‘formative order’; and we point to 
some specific internal evidence from these works that suggest this is the order Richard 
expected them to be read. This is important because it indicates that De Trinitate is best 
understood as a culmination of theological insight and training Richard lays out in his 
other works; a culmination that reveals an “ancient road”—a well-worn pathway to the 
“heavenly Jerusalem”—where those trained in discernment enter its temple and commune
with God face-to-face.
Three things are needed to establish the formative chronology of Richard’s main 
works. First is to recognize a moral-mystical duality in the writings of Hugh and Richard.
Second is to see that this duality is also a sequence from moral to mystical. And third, is 
130 “«Nam quedam ex his que credere jubemur, non modo supra rationem, verum etiam contra 
humanam rationem esse videntur, nisi profunda et subtilissima indagatione discutiantur, vel potius divina 
revelatione manifestentur.» Cf. the description of the role of reason as characterized in [Twelve Patriarchs],
[Mystical Ark], and [De Trinitate] respectively by Feiss, 120-6. Feiss is right in observing that in this order 
these works seem to be slightly more optimistic about the possibility of success for rational investigation in 
trinitarian theology. Yet, the differences appear to be very small, there are more similarities than Feiss 
observes, and even within [De Trinitate] there is some differentiation with respect to this theme too.” Den 
Bok, 195 n. 174.
131 On dating De Trinitate, a number of Richardian scholars share the view that it is a mature work, 
perhaps composed shortly before his death in 1173. Ribaillier, 9; Coulter, 15; Chase, Angelic Wisdom, 
227-228 n. 49; John Bligh, “Richard of St. Victor’s «De Trinitate»: Augustinian or Abelardian?” Heythrop 
Journal I (1960): 127.
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to establish that Richard viewed the contemplation involved in De Trinitate as a 
culmination of this sequence.
Discovering a Moral-Mystical Duality
We begin with the case for the moral-mystical duality. We look first to Richard’s 
Twelve Patriarchs which consists of a tropological reading of the sons of Jacob (i.e., 
“Israel”) by Rachel and Leah. Three clues in Twelve Patriarchs alert us to this moral-
mystical duality. First, Richard makes a distinction between the “grace of discretion” and 
the “grace of contemplation.” As he writes: 
By this Joseph the soul is continually instructed and at times is 
led to full knowledge of itself, just as by his uterine brother 
Benjamin it is at times lifted up to the contemplation of God. For 
just as we understand grace of discretion by Joseph, so we 
understand grace of contemplation by Benjamin. Both are born 
from this same mother because knowledge of God and of self are 
learned from reason. Benjamin is born long after Joseph because 
the soul that has not been practiced over a long time and educated 
fully in knowledge of self is not raised up to knowledge of God. In 
vain he raises the eye of the heart to see God when he is not yet 
prepared to see himself. Let a person first learn to know his own 
invisible things before he presumes that he is able to grasp at 
invisible divine things. You must know the invisible things of your 
own spirit before you can be capable of knowing the invisible 
things of God. If you are not able to know yourself, how do you 
have the boldness to grasp at those things which are above you? 
(italics mine)132
Any careful analysis of Twelve Patriarchs confirms that the main concern Richard 
has in that work is to impress upon the young Victorine the foundational virtue of 
“discretion.”133 This is accomplished by walking in the ways of the virtues each of the 
132 Richard, Twelve Patriarchs lxxi; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 129. Cf. Fig. 3.1 of this work.
133 Richard shows intimate familiarity with the monastic practice of discretio. See, e.g., how 
intricately he collates various aspects of discretio in Twelve Patriarchs lxx; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main 
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sons of Jacob alludes to. Learning discretion consists of learning to recognize and curb 
the affections that drag the body down in its immoral desires; discretion means keeping 
one’s attention pure in its relationship to carnal desires. Second, the manuscript tradition 
of Richard’s Mystical Ark also went by another name: “On the Grace of 
Contemplation.”134 When we look to this second treatise, we notice it is concerned with 
an entirely different domain: a mystical one focused on the contemplation of God by 
means of a creative, tropological crafting of the Ark of the Covenant. And whereas 
Twelve Patriarchs was concerned with attention in its relationship to bodily affections, 
the goal being “discretion,” Mystical Ark is concerned with attention in its relationship to 
mental distractions, contending with that mental vice of ‘curiositas’. The goal of the 
latter work is the mystical contemplation of God. So we see both works have a shared 
concern for refining and purifying the soul on its way to God: the former with 
purification of the moral dimension—of creating pure discretion on one’s own invisible 
things (e.g., bodily affections); and the latter with purification of the mystical 
dimension—of creating pure focus on the invisible things of God.
The relationship between “ecstasy” in Twelve Patriarchs and Mystical Ark reveals a 
similar distinction: the difference between “knowledge of self” and “knowledge of God.” 
In Twelve Patriarchs Richard writes:
Lest the labor of the journey and the difficulties of the ascent 
terrify you and draw you back, hear and give attention to what the 
Works, 128. For a helpful survey of these aspects as well as a comparison of discretio in Richard and 
Bernard of Clairvaux, see Mark A. McIntosh, Discernment and Truth: The Spirituality and Theology of 
Knowledge,  (New York: Crossroad Publishing Co., 2004), 43-54.
134 Richard’s Mystical Ark went by the title Benjamin major in the Migne edition with the subtitle 
De gratia contemplationis (i.e., “On the Grace of Contemplation.”). Chase, Angelic Wisdom, xxv.
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result of the arrival is. On the peak of this mountain Jesus is 
transfigured; on it Moses is seen with Elijah and each is recognized 
without a sign; on it the voice of the Father to the Son is heard. 
Which of these is not marvelous? Which of these is not desirable? 
Do you wish to see Christ transfigured? Ascend this mountain; 
learn to know yourself. Do you wish to see Moses and Elijah and 
recognize them without any sign? Do you wish to understand the 
law and the prophets without a teacher, without an interpreter? 
Ascend this mountain; learn to know yourself. Do you wish to hear 
the mystery of the Father’s secrets? Ascend this mountain; learn to 
know yourself. For he descended from heaven when he said: gnw !ti 
seauto\n; that is, “Know yourself.” Do you see how much the 
ascent of this mountain is effective, how useful full knowledge of 
self is? (italics mine)135
This moral-mystical duality was a cornerstone of the Victorine educational program from
its inception, for we find the same in Richard’s predecessor Hugh of St. Victor. He too 
devotes a separate treatise to each of these domains: his Moral Ark of Noah and his 
Mystical Ark of Noah. Hugh took up the first in a response to questions among the 
brethren “that they might be shown the cause of these unstable movements in man’s 
heart, and . . . particularly begged to be taught if such a serious evil as this could be 
countered by any skill or by the practice of some discipline.”136 The focus of the treatise 
is on external distractions and bringing order and integration to one’s soul before entering
the ark. As Hugh writes:
We have now . . . shown sufficiently clearly the origin of the 
infinite distraction of our thoughts from which we suffer—that is, 
from the world and from the lust of it, from the works of creation. 
Again we have shown by what means our thoughts can be 
reintegrated—that is, by the works of restoration. And because . . . 
135 Twelve Patriarchs, lxxviii; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 136. “Ecstatic” contemplation is 
similar in Twelve Patriarchs and Mystical Ark. The difference has more to do with the directedness 
(intentio) of ecstatic contemplation. In the first treatise, the focus is upon full “knowledge of self”; in the 
latter, on full “knowledge of God.”
136 Quoted in Rorem, 130; PL 176.617-618.
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there can be no order where there is no limit, it remains for us now, 
having left the work of creation behind us, to seek out the order of 
our thoughts where they are bounded—that is, in the works of 
restoration. For this is the matter that we previously proposed for 
our investigation—namely, what the order of our thoughts should 
be, if they are to enable us to build in ourselves the spiritual house 
of wisdom (emphasis mine).137
Hugh also concludes his Moral Ark of Noah with an indication of the formative 
distinction it bears with his Mystical Ark of Noah: 
And now, then, as we promised, we must put before you the pattern 
of our ark. Thus you may learn from an external form, which we 
have visibly depicted, what you ought to do interiorly, and when 
you have impressed the form of this pattern on your heart, you may 
rejoice that the house of God has been built within you (emphasis 
mine).138
This indicates that the Victorines viewed the task of ridding oneself of vices and 
inculcating virtues as one task, and the task of rising up to mystical contemplation as 
another—each one deserving of its own treatise. One deals with eliminating external 
distractions from contemplation (e.g., carnal desires, passions); the other with eliminating
internal ones (e.g., mental fornication, curiositas, wandering attention, etc.).139
To summarize, Richard makes a distinction between the “grace of discretion” and 
137 Quoted in Rorem, 140-141. Indeed, the movement in Hugh’s Ark treatises is from the 
cosmological whole to the center and then from that “sanctified” center back out to the cosmological 
whole. The ark is the Church, but everything is held together and must lean upon its stable center, who is 
Christ. Hence once one follows Hugh from the world to Christ and his Church, Hugh can pick up the 
pictura where he left off: “First, I find the center . . . .”
138 Ibid., 143; Hugh, De archa Noe morali, IV.9. The passage is not found in the PL edition. To be 
sure, Hugh’s Mystical Ark of Noah, as Sicard notes, is more accurately a description of drawing out the 
dimensions of the ark such that it became a meditative aid for mystical contemplation. Thus “Libellus de 
formatione arche” is a more accurate title for the “external form” of Hugh’s second treatise; yet “De archa 
Noe mystica” still describes the formative utility of the treatise. In short, the interiorizing of the external 
Libellus de formatione arche furnishes the soul with the ability to write the interior De archa Noe mystica.
139 On the role of ‘curiositas’ in monastic meditation, see Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 82, 94-101.
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the “grace of contemplation.” He devotes two of his literary works to each of these 
respectively. The latter of these works, Mystical Ark, also went by the name of “On the 
Grace of Contemplation” in the manuscript tradition. And while Twelve Patriarchs did 
not go by the title of “On the Grace of Discretion” in the manuscript tradition, it is 
consistent with the content of the work and the relationship it bears to Richard’s Mystical 
Ark. Finally, we noted that Richard’s predecessor, Hugh, also retains this duality by 
devoting a separate treatise to each of these domains. Next we discover that this moral-
mystical distinction was seen as a moral-to-mystical sequence with very ancient roots in 
the Christian mystical tradition.
Seeing the Moral-to-Mystical Sequence
It is clear, then, that there was a moral-mystical distinction in the educational 
program at St. Victor. We now ask whether there was an order to them. Our first hint that
there is an order between the two is the distinction between knowledge of self and 
knowledge of God mentioned above. One has to know oneself first—know oneself in a 
way that rids the soul of vices and inculcates virtues—in order to make the journey 
toward the knowledge of God. We remember that the Victorines were diligent students of
Augustine. And when we look to Augustine, we also find that this moral-mystical duality 
expresses the equilibrium he sought to maintain between the active and the contemplative
life.140 Speaking of Augustine’s understanding of the active and contemplative 
dimensions in the reformation of the soul, Ladner writes:
140 This moral-mystical duality and its ascent from moral to mystical further corroborates Coulter’s 
thesis that the active-contemplative were two main dimensions of ascent in Richard. Coulter, 17. What we 
add here is that this distinction was part of their Augustinian heritage; and specifically that it relates to an 
Augustinian architectural mnemonic both Richard and Hugh use as a framework for their compositions. 
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. . . because two virtues are set before the human soul, one active, 
the other contemplative, the first the road, the second the goal, and 
because though the first one toils so that the heart is purified for the 
vision of God and in the second he is at rest and sees God: 
[therefore] the first is contained in the precepts for the practice of 
the temporal life, the second in the doctrine of sempiternal life 
beyond. And therefore the first [kind of virtues] works, the second 
rests, because the former consists in the purgation of sins, the 
second in the light of the purified. And therefore in this mortal life 
the first exists in the working out of good habits (in opere bonae 
conversationis), the second rather in faith and, in a very few, in 
some partial vision of the unchangeable truth as “through a glass in 
a dark manner” (1 Corinthians 13:12).141
That Richard saw this moral-mystical distinction as a sequence from moral to 
mystical, and that it was connected with the active and contemplative life, is clear from 
his Super exiit edictum where he speaks of the transition from the Hebrew to the 
Galilean: “the active life produces a Hebrew, but the contemplative life a Galilean.”142 
When one surveys the literature before and after Richard, one finds a rich heritage and 
practice of dividing attention between the two tasks of integrating wayward desires and 
then preparing the soul for contemplation. Subsequent to Richard we find it in 
Bonaventure, for example. Bonaventure’s Lignum vitae focuses on the moral dimension 
using the “Tree of Life” as its guiding metaphor, and his Itinerarium deals with the 
mystical dimension, picking up on and summarizing themes developed in Richard’s 
Mystical Ark. Prior to Richard one finds the same two-step sequence in Gregory,143 and 
141 Ladner, 334. Augustine lays out a pathway here “like a road for our return home.” Augustine, De 
Trinitate XII.10. Hugh and Richard, like many others before them, follow this two-fold path toward God: 
to seek the purgation of sins (i.e., ridding oneself of dangerous attachments to bodily affections) and the 
light of the purified (i.e., the mystical contemplation of God).
142 Quoted in Coulter, 29.
143 “Gregory sees conversion as a two-stage process of reform that requires a dual sacrifice to God 
. . . . For Gregory, reform focuses around compunction, the emotions first of fear and sorrow, and then of 
joy and love that inspire this two-part sacrifice. As the soul progresses toward perfection, it moves from a 
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going all the way back to the Desert Fathers (e.g., Evagrius Ponticus, Diodachus, and 
John Cassian).144
So the tradition and sequence of moving from moral-to-mystical contemplation is 
an ancient one the Victorines inherited as a foundation for their spiritual reforms. But 
what we wish to highlight in Richard’s case is how, at least in the Augustinian tradition, 
this sequence developed into a “spiritual topography” with distinct “places” (loci) that 
map the chronology of Richard’s main works. Beyond the immediate horizon of 
Richard’s De Trinitate lies a pathway with clear divisions and places that help us “locate”
his other works. Understanding where those places are, and the formative relationship 
they bear to one another, helps us understand the spiritual journey Richard expects his 
reader to travel before stepping up to the “entrance” (introitus) of his De Trinitate.145 To 
that end, there seems to be a distinct set of mental places Augustine develops in his 
theological program; and it is likely this very schema the Victorines picked up on as a 
guide for ordering their own theological compositions. As Marry Carruthers writes:
For a living human being here (“in hac terra”), who is seeking 
God in the context of a pilgrim-church, the “way” lies from outside, 
wandering in error, through “the place of the Tabernacle,” to the 
ascent up to “the home of God.” There are thus three distinct 
locations in Augustine’s structure, three mnemonic loci: outside, 
lower, outward, carnal compunction of fear to a higher, inward, spiritual compunction of love.” Carole 
Straw, Gregory the Great: Perfection in Imperfection, Transformation of the Classical Heritage, 14 
(Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1991), 214.
144 For Evagrius, see Evagrius’s Praktike in Evagrius Ponticus. Praktikos, Chapters on Prayer, 
trans. John Eudes Bamberger, Cistercian Studies, 4 (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Cistercian Publications, 1980). 
For Diodachus, see Diadochus of Photiki, On Spiritual Knowledge and Discrimination, Vol. 1, The 
Philokalia, trans. G. E. H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard, Kallistos Ware (London: Faber and Faber, 1983). For 
Cassian, see John Cassian, The Conferences, trans. Boniface Ramsey, Ancient Christian Writers (New 
York: Paulist Press, 1997).
145 Richard, De Trinitate I.3. 
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Tabernacle, and domus Dei (a common phrase in the Psalms, but 
one that in this context particularly resonates, recollectively, with 
Ezekiel 43:10). 
Entering the place of the Tabernacle, Augustine invites us to 
look around and walk about with him: the verbs used here 
repeatedly are various forms of ambulare and admirari  and 
specere and ire, walk, gaze upon, look, go. And in the Tabernacle 
he sees grouped figures of just men, showing their various 
attributes (here the verb is ostendere), the various virtues disposed 
in loci of the building. And then, having made his inspection of the 
whole place, he walks across (“transibo,” “I will walk over”) from 
it to the next place, ascending to the domus Dei. At this point, 
Augustine shifts without explanation from first to third-person, and 
joins his own vision with the experience of the Psalmist, as they 
move with one soul through the “place of the Tabernacle.”146
Anyone as familiar with the Scriptures as Augustine, Hugh, and Richard also knows 
of the identification of the physical temple of God with the human body. This is true with
respect to Jesus speaking of the Jerusalem temple being torn down and rebuilt in three 
days: “the temple he was referring to was the temple of his body” (John 2:21). It is also 
true with respect to the Pauline teaching in 1 Corinthians 6 when Paul admonishes the 
Corinthians about their bodies: “Do you not know that your body is the temple of the 
Holy Spirit who is in you?”147 One can easily see, therefore, how those who walked in 
these exegetical traditions could take the notion of geographically walking up to the 
temple in Jerusalem to also think of it allegorically with respect to the body and soul. As 
one enters the “temple of God” the soul becomes purified and ascends to the Holy of 
146 Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 253. Cf. Augustine, Exposition of Psalms 41. Richard’s works 
seem to fit this Augustinian schema that begins with traveling to the temple of the Lord, then thinking of 
that temple as the temple of one’s body (as in 1 Corinthians 6), and then ascending through the inner 
chambers of the Temple, and by means of the image of God in the soul of man, of finally seeing God face-
to-face. “Richard of St. Victor’s meditation on the Tabernacle, The Mystical Ark, is summarized by its 
author in terms of a three-fold scheme of “places” very like the one Augustine uses here. My thanks to 
Grover Zinn for pointing this out to me.” Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 355, n. 81.
147 1 Corinthians 6:19. See Augustine, De Trinitate I.6; VII.3.
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Holies in which one comes to see God face-to-face. Thus, not surprisingly, when we look
at the final line of Hugh’s Moral Ark we see him interpreting the house of the Lord in 
precisely this way where he speaks of the “house of God formed in you.”148
Richard also confirms this identification of the soul with the temple of God in his 
sermon on Psalm 28: 
For if by the temple of God we understand the heart of men, we 
shall soon find who are those who give thanks to God in this 
temple. For the thoughts of the mind and the affections of the heart 
are the inhabitants of this temple . . . . She is wholly gathered 
together within herself and is raised above herself and fully 
absorbed by the full tide of spiritual happiness . . . and then it is 
fulfilled, which is said: “And in his temple all shall speak of his 
glory.”149
148 Fassler, 218. In fact, Hugh plays with the etymologogy of ‘ecclesia’ in a way that shows the 
movement between his two Ark treatises, from the restless world to the inner chambers of the Church: 
“And in this fashion [the first man] was spread (diffusus) through the four parts of the world and was 
dispersed (dissipatus). When he is gathered and called together (colligitur et revocatur), first from the four
parts of the world he approaches (accedit) the Ark (ad arcam), which is the Church (ad Ecclesiam), and 
ascending upward from there he gathers himself into a whole (in unum colligit) little by little, until he 
reaches the highest point (ad summum perveniat) (emphasis mine).” De arche Noe mystica VIII.21, quoted 
in Jessica Weiss, trans., “Hugh of St. Victor, A Little Book About Constructing Noah’s Ark,” a chapter in 
Jan M. Ziolkowski and Mary Carruthers, eds., The Medieval Craft of Memory: An Anthology of Texts and 
Pictures (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 61. See also Achard of St. 
Victor’s “Sermon for the Dedication of a Church” where he utilizes similar themes, taxonomies, and 
ordering devices as Hugh and Richard and has three houses of stone, wood, and gold converge into the one 
house that is the perfected human soul. Hugh Feiss, Achard of Saint Victor: Works, 201-253. Charts 
comparing Victorine authors use of the temple-soul symbol can be found in Steven Chase, Contemplation 
and Compassion: The Victorine Tradition, Traditions of Christian Spirituality (Maryknoll, New York: 
Orbis Books, 2003), 73-81. 
149 Kirchberger, 239. See also Hugh of St. Victor, De institutione novitiorum 12, where the themes 
of “drawing one’s wits together within oneself” and then “climbing above oneself” offer the same moral-
mystical sequence. See also strophe III of the “Ex radice caritatis” sequence in chapter 2 of this work: “This
is the summit of joys: let us enlarge the innermost sanctuary of our souls . . .” Gregory the Great also 
follows this sequence, and speaks of falling “below oneself” as a way of describing the state of the soul 
when it loses its footing on the road to divine contemplation. Straw, 80. This is also intricately related to 
the two kinds of “going out” Richard describes in Mystical Ark 5.8, Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 
320-321. The history of the two directions of knowledge goes back to Plato, but was given clear 
articulation by Augustine (esp. in his De Trinitate), and “renewed with vigor by Hugh of St. Victor.” See 
Bernard McGinn, The Golden Chain: A Study in the Theological Anthropology of Isaac of Stella, Cistercian
Studies, 15 (Washington D.C.: Consortium Press, 1972), 173.
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When we look further to the ordering schema of Augustine’s De doctrina 
christiana, it follows the same architectural pattern of pilgrimage and ascent. Carruthers 
refers to this as the ‘ductus’ of a work; that is, the way or the path that leads a reader to 
the main goal, to its skopos. She writes, 
. . . it is in Augustine’s writings that rhetorical ductus and the 
meditational “way” most closely connect . . . [It] is central to his 
notion of “conversion” as a procedure of changing orientation and 
way-finding, as though within a topography of locations among 
which there is a variety of routes . . . . [This] notion of ductus also 
informs how Augustine writes about meditation in his work De 
doctrina christiana (“On Teaching Christianity”), modeling it as a 
“turning” (of direction) in fear, and then climbing through 
emotional stages on a mental ladder from fear to joy to 
tranquility.150
She then goes on to cite Augustine’s description of each meditational stage of the 
journey:
Above all the work [of reading Scripture] requires that we be turned 
by fear of God toward knowing His will . . . this fear may both 
inspire in us thought about our mortality and our inevitable future 
death, and, as our flesh begins to crawl [lit. our flesh looking as 
though it had broken out in prickles], may affix all the wrigglings 
of our pride to the wood of the cross. . . . [The second step is piety, 
the third knowledge, the fourth strength, the fifth mercy, and then] 
he ascends to the sixth step, where he cleanses that eye by which 
God may be seen, as much as He can be by those who die to the 
world insofar as they can. . . . And now however much more certain 
and not only more tolerable but more joyful the sight of a [divine] 
light may begin to appear, nonetheless still darkly and in a mirror it 
is said to be seen, for it is approached more by faith than by sight 
when in this world we make our pilgrimage, although we have our 
conversation in heaven.
The seventh step of this ladder is wisdom, and “from fear to 
wisdom the way extends through these steps.”151
150 Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 80.
151 Ibid.
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If we look at the first five steps on the one hand and the sixth and seventh on the 
other, they parallel Richard and Hugh’s moral-to-mystical pattern. It is the sixth step by 
which the eye of the soul is cleansed and enabled to see God and the seventh step that 
becomes a ladder extending to the goal—the skopos—to the full wisdom of God. That 
sixth step is where the body is conceived as the “temple of the Holy Spirit,” where, with 
intellective and affective control, one consecrates that temple and reforms the image of 
God imprinted there. It is that untarnishing of the ‘mirror’ of the soul understood as 
God’s temple, where the religious moves from outside to inside and then begins that 
ascent to the full wisdom of God within the “house of God.”152 Speaking of man’s 
spiritual journey, and drawing on Augustine, Gregory the Great wrote that “God alone 
was his proper place (locus), in whom man found his true self and homeland (patria).”153
Strikingly, when we look at Richard’s Mystical Ark, it is the cherubim who rest above the
ark of the covenant who symbolize the “full wisdom of the triune God.” If Twelve 
Patriarchs travels with the sons of Israel to bring one to the house of God conceived as 
the righteous soul, Mystical Ark is where one enters its most holy of places and ascends 
to full knowledge, where one seeks the Divine face-to-face. Hugh and Richard’s Mystical
Ark treatises, therefore, may be fuller articulations of the sixth and seventh stages found 
in Augustine’s De doctrina christiana.
152 Notice in Twelve Patriarchs that when Richard reaches the final ascent of the mountain (esp. 
lxvii-lxxxii), he transitions to the change in the “garments” of Christ, alluding to consecration and the 
“priestly vestments” required of those in the “inner courts” of the Temple. These, too, mark the transition 
from earthly things to celestial things: “earthly truth in the valley, heavenly truth on the mountain.” Ibid., 
138.
153 Straw, 78. Moralia on Job 8.19.35 (CCL 143, 406); Augustine Confessions 1.18.28; 3.6.11; 
5.2.2; 7.10.16.
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So we see that the moral-mystical dualism Hugh and Richard use in their own 
literary works has its root in the father of their educational ideals: St. Augustine himself. 
And we see that Augustine has developed an “architectural mnemonic” for taking a 
mental journey through the places of the “biblical world” in order to bring them up to the 
holy hill of the Lord. Then, through the “sanctuary” of their own soul, they seek that still 
and silent place within by which they might see God face-to-face. This Augustinian 
schema of Outside-Tabernacle-House of God, as a pathway one can mentally walk 
through as one seeks the face of God, was therefore very familiar to the Victorines and 
likely served as the “spiritual topography” Hugh and Richard used to guide the 
composition of their works and structure the educational program at St. Victor.154  
The “Formative” Order of Richard’s Main Works
With this moral-to-mystical road to Jerusalem in mind, we can look to the main 
literary works of Richard and see, as Nico den Bok appropriately says, “. . . what human 
beings, according to Richard, need in order to be able to travel, build, and climb.”155 This
travel-build-climb schema is exactly the relationship of Richard’s three major literary 
works: Twelve Patriarchs, Mystical Ark, and De Trinitate. Twelve Patriarchs consists of 
traveling with the sons of Israel to the mount of transfiguration. This mount is likely the 
“mystical location” for Augustine, Hugh, and Richard where it was equated with mount 
Sion, or the heavenly Jerusalem. As Augustine says in his exposition of Psalm 74:
154 Zinn also notes this Augustinian precedent for beginning the spiritual journey in fear and ending 
in love and its relation to the pattern of Hugh and Richard’s works. Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 15; cf. 
Richard, Mystical Ark II.17, ibid. 202; Twelve Patriarchs lx, ibid. 117.
155 Den Bok, 107.
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Yet even Mount Sion can be otherwise understood. “That one 
which Thou hast dwelled in the same.” In the place where the 
People was aforetime, where the Temple was set up, where the 
Sacrifices were celebrated, where at that time were all those 
necessary things giving promise of Christ.156 
Richard brings the meditations of his readers in Twelve Patriarchs up to the house 
of the Lord associated with the place where Jesus transfigured before his apostles.157 
Twelve Patriarchs consists of traveling, of walking in the ways of the Lord. Mystical Ark 
consists of building, of mentally constructing the intricacies of the Ark of the Covenant, 
of tempering one’s soul, and rising to the pure understanding of God. The former work, a 
purgation of external distractions (e.g., affections, carnal desires); the latter, a purgation 
of internal ones (e.g., mental fornication, curiositas). The former follows the earthly 
teachings of Christ “according to the fleshly manner”158 until He is transfigured in glory; 
the latter follows the celestial teachings of Christ “as the fullness of Wisdom” until one 
beholds the Triune God in the fullness of His glory. For only the final two stages of 
contemplation in Richard’s Mystical Ark provide trinitarian reflections of the Divine. 
Thus Twelve Patriarchs and Mystical Ark combine to bring moral integrity to the soul 
and fix its mystical gaze as preparation for the highest of meditations. Here we reach the 
“crown” of Richard’s contemplative work: his De Trinitate. 
156 Augustine, Exposition of Psalms 2.5, 3.4, 11.1, 43.4, 46.5, 46.11, 48.2-5, 51.22, 68.19-20, 74.4, 
88.9, 99.11 15.1, esp. 78.34 where Mount Sion is allegorically interpreted as a “looking out.” Letters of 
Augustine XCIII.29; Civitas Dei X.32, XI.1, XVIII.30, Reply to Faustus the Manichean 16; Ten Homilies 
on 1st Epistle of John 1.
157 Richard, likewise, explicitly identifies the two mountains. Having brought the disciples with 
Jesus up the mount of transfiguration, he writes, “On this mountain the Lord taught and Moses learned 
about the construction of the tabernacle.” Twelve Patriarchs lxxxiii; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 142.
158 See n. 346 of this work for Augustine’s use of this phrase and relevance to Richard.
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Richard makes very few explicit connections to his other written works in De 
Trinitate. The genre of De Trinitate is noticeably different and is primarily attributable to 
the fact that necessary reasons and proofs form a more explicit part of its textual 
fabric.159 Nevertheless, Richard clearly intended Trinitarian reflection to come at the end 
of a spiritual journey of purification. And this purification consisted of learning the 
straight and narrow way of the Lord: of dispensing with vices and inculcating virtues. 
Daily, and by degrees, one would ascend the holy hill of the Lord, up to the place of the 
high priest before the Ark of the Covenant. One would rise with the purest of desires and 
ardor of love, from the visible things to the invisible things of God, and finally to the 
triune God Himself. Formatively, therefore, one does not attempt to undertake Trinitarian
contemplation without meeting these moral and mystical prerequisites of soul. As 
Richard says in his Twelve Patriarchs:
Let him ascend this mountain if he wishes to receive those things, if 
he wishes to know those things which are above human sense. Let 
him ascend above himself through himself; to knowledge of God, 
through knowledge of himself. Let a person first learn in the image 
of God, let him learn in his similitude what he ought to think about 
God. The ascent of the mountain, as has been said, pertains to 
knowledge of self. the things that happen upon the mountain lead on 
to the knowledge of God. . . . On this mountain the Lord taught and 
Moses learned about the construction of the tabernacle. What is 
understood by the tabernacle of the covenant except the state of 
perfection? Therefore he who ascends the mountain, who gives 
heed diligently, who seeks for a very long time, who discovers at 
last what sort he is—it remains that he learn from divine showing 
what sort he ought to be, what sort of edifice of the mind he ought 
to prepare for God, and by what obediences he ought to appease 
159 I attribute this to two things: (a) that Twelve Patriarchs and Mystical Ark are full compositions. 
They were likely either prepared as a series of sermons or as final drafts to be read from start to finish. De 
Trinitate, on the other hand, emerges out of dialogical exchange and, as will be shown later, consists of a 
method of inserting new material; (b) that in De Trinitate Richard seeks “necessary reasons” for the Trinity 
whereas in Twelve Patriarchs and Mystical Ark, he presupposes them as part of their contemplative ascents.
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God. Therefore, when do you think a mind that still is spread out 
through various desires, that is dragged this way and that by various 
thoughts, will be worthy to receive this grace? If it is unable to 
gather itself into a unity, if it does not know how to enter into itself, 
when will it be able to ascend by contemplation to those things that 
are above itself? (italics mine)160
This pattern of Richard’s works has also been discerned by other Richardian 
scholars. As Nico den Bok suggests: 
There is a sequence in Richard’s œvre which resembles a pervasive 
scriptural (in fact, Old Testament) framework . . . 
. . . these latter works themselves show a special convergence 
and cumulation, like a pyramid the top of which is, enlarged, 
another pyramid that, enlarged in turn, appears to be a third 
pyramid. De exterminatione describes man in three-staged 
transformation of his entire affective and cognitive life, whereas 
[Twelve Patriarchs] concentrates on the positive outgrowth of this 
twofold life; [the] final stage is contemplation (represented by 
Benjamin, or the ark of the covenant). The [Mystical Ark] is in fact 
a close-up of this final stage, for which the earlier stages are 
necessary preliminary steps. In contemplation man resumes the 
three-staged pattern just described in mente; its third stage, in turn, 
is contemplating the trinitarian God. In De Trinitate this 
contemplation is envisaged.161
What we see, then, in Richard’s three main works is a formative pattern; a pattern that 
follows the sequence from moral to mystical contemplation, and that pays attention to the
spiritual topography laid down by Augustine (Fig. 2.1).
160 Richard, Twelve Patriarchs lxxxiii; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 141-142. When Richard 
speaks of gathering the wanderings of the mind together into a fixed and holy resolution for moral purity, 
he refers to the need for both affective and intellective control (e.g., controlling desires and thoughts as well
as intentions and wills).
161 Den Bok, 103-104. Coulter concurs: “It may well be that De Trinitate represents the culminating 
vision of Richard’s journey to know God and to see God face to face.” Coulter, 35.
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Fig. 2.1 Relation of Augustine’s Three Mnemonic Loci to the Formative
Chronology of Richard’s Main Works
It is important for us to keep this in mind as we turn to a detailed analysis of Richard’s 
De Trinitate. For it is not a meditation one takes lightly. When we see the relationship 
Richard’s De Trinitate bears to these other written works it is clear that he expected a 
great deal of previous soul-work to be done before embarking on its study.162 Here 
Richard’s apprentice, “Now distanced from the world . . . ‘collects’ the attention scattered
on worldly delights and withdraws to the inner world of his conscience, the ‘citadel’ and 
‘courtroom’ of his mind.”163 With a disciplined and collected soul,164 crafted in 
162 My research therefore corroborates Coulter’s view that “the techniques and skills communicated 
in [Richard’s Mystical Ark] are necessary for [De Trinitate]’s success.” Coulter, 225.
163 Straw, 213. On ‘self-collection’ in Gregory the Great, see esp. n. 6 of that work.
164 Ibid., 131.
76
accordance with the “brilliance” of the Ark of the Covenant, he now stands ready for the 
most sublime contemplation of God.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE ROLE OF REASON IN THEOLOGICAL CONTEMPLATION
There I will meet with you…
Richard’s fides quaerens intellectum a plenitudine ad plenitudinem
We have already alluded to some of the elements Richard gains from Augustine and 
Anselm. Both Augustine and Anselm are seeking the face of God, and Richard joins them
in that ascent with a few contributions of his own. Richard opens his De Trinitate with 
1 Corinthians 13 and this inherited understanding of how one must take oneself and one’s
readers from a state of imperfection to perfection. One must put childish things behind, 
un-tarnish the mirror of the soul, and embody the kind of love that prepares the soul for 
an encounter with the Divine. Here we add that Richard also shares the religious 
epistemology of his theological predecessors: the fides quaerens intellectum (i.e., faith 
seeking understanding).
The basis for this is found in the one scripture reference all three of them draw 
upon: “Unless you believe, you will not understand” (Isaiah 7:9). Consistently, all three 
of these authors start with the things already believed by faith and seek further reasons 
for believing them. Thus the view is not that one seeks reasons in order to believe, but 
rather one already believes the things of faith and seeks further reasons for believing 
them. As Chenu notes with special reference to the 12th century:
Revelation provided more than an external corrective to mistakes in 
philosophical speculation; it inspired men of faith to produce a 
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frame of reference which served them in their rational constructions 
no less than in their art or culture. Neither the essential disparity 
between philosophy and religion nor the transcendence theology 
assigned to faith limited the possibilities of a Christian exercise of 
reason, without faith in any way supplanting reason or perverting 
the workings of the rational process.165
This “faith seeking understanding” is not, therefore, some sort of Pascalian wager 
for the unbeliever; it is, rather, the meditative process of the believer who seeks a full 
understanding of what he already believes. In short, the movement is not from unbelief to
belief, but from belief to vision. The goal is to ground that original knowledge with even 
greater perspicuity. For some of the things of faith are difficult to believe in the absence 
of good reasons. Faith is enough to believe them on the basis of reliable tradition and 
authority, but faith still seeks the “evidence of things unseen” (Hebrews 11:1).166 This is 
what Augustine, Anselm, and Richard of St. Victor are after: further evidence for the 
things of faith.167 As Augustine writes, “If, then, when sought, He can be found, why is it
said, ‘Seek ye His face evermore?’ Is He perhaps to be sought even when found? For 
things incomprehensible must so be investigated . . . .”168 This is even more the case for 
the most inscrutable of mysteries: the Holy Trinity.
165 Chenu, 234. 
166 “These difficulties were actively sought for the challenge they offered the devout: ‘. . . for 
monastic composition the ‘difficult tropes’ and schemes of the Bible were particularly important, what 
Augustine called obscuritas utilis et salubris, ‘productive and health-giving difficulty’.” Carruthers, Craft 
of Thought, 116.
167 This method of fides quaerens intellectum and its basis in Isaiah 7:9 was also common to other 
theologians of the 12th century. See, e.g., Abelard, Theologia Christiana III.51.
168 Augustine, De Trinitate XV.2.
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But Richard plans to decorate the margins of his theological predecessors, and he 
indicates at the outset of his treatise the principle by which he will offer a fuller 
articulation of the Trinity than either of them. He states in his prologue that faith is both 
the “beginning” (initium) and the “foundation” (fundamentum) of the good.169 But he 
goes further, stating that one moves from faith to knowledge to perfection. He writes:
But just as the beginning of all the good is in faith, so the 
consummation and perfection of all the good is in knowledge. And 
so, let us press on toward perfection, and, to the extent we are able 
to advance toward perfection, let us make haste from faith toward 
knowledge; let us be diligent insofar as we are able, so that we may 
understand what we believe (emphasis mine).170
 This notion of pressing on toward ‘perfection’ is so central to Richard’s project that 
it can rightly be said to be the golden thread that runs through the treatise from beginning 
to end.171 Whether Richard makes an argument for the Trinity of persons or describes the
prerequisites of soul for divine contemplation, he enriches his thought with plenitude 
(plenitudo) and perfection (perfectio).172 And this is a common theme in the Christian 
169 The terminology is a clear indication that Richard envisions De Trinitate beginning at the fifth 
and sixth levels of contemplation he provides in his Mystical Ark. The fullness of human ratio becomes the 
foundation upon which man, at the height of his dignity and rationality, ascends with divine grace into 
Trinitarian contemplation. Cf. Richard’s use of initium and fundamentum in Fig. 3.1. 
170 Richard, De Trinitate, Prologue: Sed sicut in fide totius boni inchoatio, sic in cognitione totius 
boni consummatio atque perfectio. Feramur itaque ad perfectionem, et quibus ad profectuum gradibus 
possumus, properemus de fide ad cognitionem; satagamus, in quantum possumus, ut intelligamus quod 
credimus.
171 The pursuit of perfection is a common theme in the Christian spiritual tradition; indeed, every 
theologian from Augustine onward seeks the end of faith in understanding (intellectus). But what seems 
especially true in the case of Richard is how often ‘plenitude’ serves as the governing rationale for his most
important arguments. Whether it be the ‘plenitude’ of love in bk. III or the ‘plenitude’ of power in bk. I, it 
is the main concept Richard employs throughout De Trinitate. Its mention by him in his introduction, 
therefore, is not incidental, but an early indication of the tool and the method he uses to develop earlier 
theological tradition. A rough search of terms yields the following statistics: fullness / plenitudo (165x), 
highest / summa (20x), integrity / integritas (11x).
172 For more on the “principle of plenitude” in Richard, see den Bok, 283-302.
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spiritual tradition; indeed, every theologian from the apostle Paul onward seeks the end of
faith in perfection. But Richard not only shares this quest for fullness, he actually 
incorporates it as a premise in his most important arguments. This perfection becomes an
essential principle for drawing out “new fullness” from inherited theological tradition. Its 
mention by him in his introduction, therefore, is not incidental, but an early indication of 
the tool and the method by which he will develop his trinitarian theology. So where 
Richard “fits” within the heritage of his theological predecessors is within the 
Augustinian-Anselmian tradition of the fides quaerens intellectum. But as we will see, his
most original work comes when he applies the concept of fullness to true Divinity. 
Earlier we showed how Augustine and Anselm establish necessary reasons for God 
as the Most High God; but Richard goes further. He finds necessary reasons to show how
this Most High God must also be the Fullest and Most Complete (i.e., a Trinity). In book 
V Richard provides the clearest articulation of his main goal when he speaks of “a fully 
formed contemplation of the truth” (omniformem veritatis contemplationem). He then 
qualifies this in the next sentence as “complete plenitude” (omnem plenitudinem).173 
Without this complete plenitude, without this fully formed contemplation of the truth, 
Richard says, one does not have true Divinity (non habet . . . veram divinitatem). Richard
therefore glosses the parameters of the theological quest, turning fides quaerens 
intellectum into fides quaerens intellectum a plenitudine ad plenitudinem (“faith seeking 
173 Richard also alludes to various aspects of his project with words such as ‘soli’, ‘omni’, 
‘plenitudo’. For example, he addresses the imperfection of Boethius’s definition of ‘person’ by first noting 
that it does not apply to persons alone (soli) and subsequently that it does not apply to all (omni) persons 
(noticed by den Bok, 226 n. 115). This ebb and flow pervades the work: from one to all, from singularity to
multiformity, from defect to perfection, from lack to fullness. But ‘plenitude’ becomes his preferred way of
perfecting existing tradition with new fullness, as he does with Boethius’s definition of ‘person’ in book 
IV. See esp. n. 322 of this work.
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understanding from fullness to fullness.”) Richard shares the desires of his theological 
predecessors for a full and perfect contemplation of the Trinity, but he goes beyond them 
in how he argues for it.174 For as we will see, he not only pursues the Trinity to the full, 
he also uses ‘fullness’ itself to lay out its reasons.
For all of Richard’s works, learning begins with reading (legere) in order to seek the 
full and free contemplation (contemplatio) of those things. The summit is the 
contemplation of God, but the ascent, as we have seen, requires following a certain 
pathway to get there. In Twelve Patriarchs it begins by walking with Jacob’s sons and 
wives in an attempt to purge one’s soul of vices and ready oneself for seeing the glory of 
God on the Mount of Transfiguration. It continues with the Mystical Ark by approaching 
and building the Ark of the Covenant and tempering one’s soul for an ecstatic flight in 
the contemplation of God. In both treatises the journey begins with reading from the 
Scriptures, being familiar with its narratives, and learning how to rise to contemplation 
with allegorical and tropological insights. Richard’s De Trinitate likewise begins with 
reading aimed at contemplation. But the starting point and the tools for the journey differ 
from his other treatises.
The starting point for Richard’s De Trinitate is the Quicumque: the Pseudo-
Athanasian creed the Victorines were in the habit of reciting daily. Richard is interested 
in how the propositions embodied in this creed might be proved. As den Bok notes:
In De Trinitate I Richard starts his quest by saying that reading 
(«legere») the assertions of the Quicumque he does not recall 
174 This is also in keeping with Richard’s triadic epistemology where imagination (imaginatio), 
reason (ratio), and understanding (intelligentia) correspond respectively to things (i) visible and created, 
(ii) invisible and created, and (iii) invisible and uncreated. Den Bok, 120.
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reading how they are demonstrated («probare»). There are many 
authoritative texts confirming them, yet not as many arguments 
proving them, nor experiential evidence confirming them. 
Believing them to be true he intends to give reasons for their 
truth.175
Thus in De Trinitate, there is an important probare between lectio and contemplatio. As 
Ribaillier points out, one of the things Richard seeks in De Trinitate is the rational 
demonstration of dogmatic formulas one already has good grounds for believing176; and 
the primary tool for this endeavor is ‘reasoning’ (ratiocinando).177 Thus if we are to 
properly understand this work we must be clear about the role of reason in Richard’s 
project and how it fits with the mystical ascent to Trinitarian contemplation.
Approaching Richard with an understanding of ‘reason’ as that faculty by which 
one derives deductive proofs for the existence of God is a more constricted conception 
than was current in the 12th century: the semantic range of ‘ratio’ was much broader. Its 
most basic sense was to devote the mind to the basic principles of things. The continuum 
of meaning for ‘ratio’ moves from simply attending to some physical object through the 
senses to offering necessary reasons for faith in God. Nevertheless, this has not kept 
contemporary readers of Richard from judging his work with the more modern 
175 Den Bok, 195. As den Bok notes in his own translations of Richard, ‘demonstration’ here has the 
broader sense of a ‘showing’ and not the strict sense of a formal, logical demonstration. In what follows, 
we use ‘demonstration’ with this broader meaning.
176 “Il veut, en effet, fournir une démonstration rationelle du bien fondé des formules dogmatiques.” 
Ribaillier, 19. Further evidence for this is seen in Richard’s discussion of other traditional formulas, as in 
VI.15ff. 
177 In this respect, Richard’s De Trinitate is like Anselm’s exemplum meditandi. It is more a 
meditation even though contemplation is its main goal. As Richard writes, “Contemplation is a penetrating 
and free gaze of a soul extended everywhere in perceiving things; but meditation is a zealous attention of 
the mind, earnestly pursuing an investigation concerning something.” Mystical Ark I.4; Zinn, RSV’s Three 
Main Works, 157.
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conception.178 Consequently, the attraction or antipathy one has when reason is observed 
offering ‘proofs’ for the truths of God often matches the attraction or antipathy one has 
for Richard’s project in De Trinitate. On one side are those who are suspicious of any 
attempt to ‘prove’ the mystery of the Trinity lest the mystery dissipate and theological 
contemplation and wonder give way to a sapless set of theological inferences and 
conclusions. On the other side are those who are suspicious of philosophical incoherence,
inconsistency, or ambiguity in what they take as a bona fide ‘proof’ for the Trinity with 
‘reason’ in the full, modern sense of that term. But with a modern preconception of 
reason, Richard’s theology simultaneously becomes a success and failure for both sides. 
For if Richard succeeds in proving the Trinity by means of reason in this sense he fails to 
preserve the mystery of trinitarian faith. Faith no longer seeks because it has already 
found. There is no mystery left to discover. On the other hand, if Richard succeeds in 
preserving the mystery of the Trinity, he does so only by failing to prove the Trinity with 
modern standards.
Our analysis has to be faithful to Richard’s understanding of reason (ratio), which is 
broader than the modern and more narrow sense, but also show that he is clearly 
comfortable offering necessary reasons for belief in the Trinity.179 These are not the only 
178 This modern divide between the clarifying quest of rationalism and the mystery-preserving 
desires of anti-intellectualism partly explains the rational vs. mystical emphases Richard receives in Chase 
and Nico den Bok. While Chase’s Dionysian thesis may be consistent with Richard’s theology, Richard’s 
understanding of ‘ratio’ is more in the tradition of Augustine and Anselm. And while den Bok’s ‘Mono-
personal’ trinitarianism keeps Richard within Augustine’s hesitant “Quid tres?” (Augustine, De Trinitate, 
V.9, cf. XII.6-7), as I make clear in the appendices, the textual development of De Trinitate suggests a 
greater optimism on the social trinitarian dimensions of Richard’s thought. See den Bok, 377.
179 As Ribaillier notes, despite differences with Abelard, Richard shares a confidence in finding 
necessary reasons “. . . non seulement à la connaissance de Dieu, mais à celle du Dieu trinitaire.” Ribaillier,
20.
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reasons, but they are the primary reasons he seeks in De Trinitate.180 We probably will 
not satisfy both sides, as coming up with what is clearly the “middle-way” makes those 
on both sides unhappy with the distance from their respective views. But these are 
contemporary views. Richard, by contrast, stands at the cross-roads of a nascent 
scholasticism and an incredibly rich monastic tradition. It thus comes as little surprise to 
see in Richard both the mystic and the scholar, showcasing in one person how the best of 
both need not require the separation of the school from the cloister.181
Richard’s Objective: ‘Necessary Reasons’ (rationes necessariae)
Richard looks for not just any kind of reasons for the contemplation of the Trinity, 
but necessary reasons. Thus if we are to properly understand him we must know what he 
means by its two main concepts: ‘reason’ and ‘necessity’. What we discover is Richard’s 
“high” confidence in reason, comparable to many of the scholastics of his day and 
beyond. This may surprise some who wish to see him as more a mystic than a rationalist; 
but as we will see, Richard not only has the highest regard for reason in proving the 
fullness of true Divinity, he clearly prefers it with respect to the certitude it brings to 
beliefs held by faith.182 At regular transitions of argument and illustration in his treatise, 
180 Nico den Bok provides the fullest and most persuasive case for this. See esp. 184-194.
181 Indeed, as we have seen in chapter 2, the founding of St. Victor and the distinctive focus of its 
educational program may have been motivated by the desire to keep this division from happening. See esp. 
nn. 117 and 123 of this work. Leclercq originated a distinction but not the separation between monastic and
scholastic theology in the 12th century. Here we merely locate Richard within that context when these two 
were integrated aspects of the religious life. See Leclercq, Love of Learning, 191-235. See also Bernard 
McGinn, “Love, Knowledge, and Mystical Union in Western Christianity, Twelfth to Sixteenth Centuries,”
Church History 56 (1987), 7-24.
182 Richard’s confidence in reason does not preclude other sources for religious belief and 
presupposes the authority and verity of Catholic teaching and Scripture. Necessary reasons for religious 
belief do not circumvent but undergird these other sources of belief and devotion to God.
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those that provide “necessary reasons” provide deeper reasons for religious belief. 
Nevertheless, we will also see that despite Richard’s high regard for reason, it is only part
of the contemplative journey; it is reason, but not reason alone that provides the 
justifications he seeks. And this reminds us that unlike others who would eventually 
pursue proofs for their own sake, Richard embarks on a journey—and takes his readers 
on a journey—that goes well beyond this. He, like his theological predecessors and peers,
seeks the face of God. And that journey, while it may require the use of reason, 
eventually sets foot on holy ground where those sandals must be taken off: where one 
stands in the presence of God and longs for the encounter of face-to-face. It is because 
this journey goes “above and beyond” the plateau of reason that reason has its limits for 
Richard. But it is still a critical part of the movement from visible to invisible things as he
makes clear in his Mystical Ark. Indeed, among all modes of attention and investigation, 
ratiocinando permeates almost every stage of the ascent. And even where reason is 
surpassed in the higher stages of Divine contemplation, it is still consulted subsequent to 
receiving truths revealed by divine grace.
Second, we must be clear on what Richard means by ‘necessity’. Two kinds of 
necessity pervade Richard’s De Trinitate. One we term “logical necessity” and the other 
“fitting necessity.” The first kind has to do with forms of logical entailment or 
conclusions derived by deductive reasoning. These deductive arguments take many 
forms, but the one Richard employs the most frequently in De Trinitate is the reductio ad
absurdum—a favorite among philosophers and rhetoricians.183 Here we point out the 
183 Philosophers, because it provides the highest justification for a belief; rhetoricians because once 
its truth is demonstrated, one’s opponent either has to accept its truth or admit to believing a contradiction.
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logic that underlies this style of argument to distinguish it from Richard’s arguments 
from “fitting necessity.”184 Consider two mutually exclusive propositions, P and not-P. 
Because P and not-P are contradictory (i.e., the truth of one entails the falsity of the 
other), without a doubt only one of the two can be true. As a result, we can take the 
opposite of the proposition we wish to prove, assume its truth, and see if—together with 
other known facts—it results in an absurdity or contradiction. If so then the proposition 
cannot be true because, when supposed true, it leads to a contradiction. But if that 
proposition cannot be true, then the other must be true; for only one of P or not-P can be 
true. In other words, if we suppose P to be true and then demonstrate that P combined 
with other known facts leads to an absurdity or contradiction, then P has to be false. And 
if P is false then not-P must be true. And this is not just true, but necessarily true. It has 
to be true; and one can be certain that it is true. Truths like this are necessarily true and 
their reasons are “necessary reasons.” This reductio ad absurdum forms the vast majority
of Richard’s method of argument throughout his work and affords him with many 
“necessary reasons” for believing God is one substance and three persons.185 
In addition to the logical necessity described above, there is also a kind of “fitting 
necessity” that Richard employs. It has to do with optimal consistency (i.e., how well 
things “fit” together). This can apply equally to truths that are to be believed as well as 
184 Here we situate the “logical necessity” of the reductio ad absurdum within the context of 
Richard’s other two methods of theological inquiry (e.g., fitting necessity, similitudes). For a specific 
example of the reductio ad absurdum, see p. 122 of this work.
185 The reductio ad absurdum is Richard’s preferred form of argument for securing “necessary 
reasons” in his De Trinitate. When Richard uses non-reductio-ad-absurdum arguments, he regards the 
conclusions as persuasive and probable, but not strictly necessary.
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the relations that obtain between substances or beings.186 With respect to beliefs, fitting 
necessity has to do with the harmony, consistency, and coherence of these beliefs. It is 
one thing to hold beliefs that are true, but it is a bonus when these beliefs have an added 
consistency and harmony with one another. It is what makes our set of beliefs not only 
true but also beautiful to hold and behold. With respect to substances or beings, Richard 
argues for example, that where Divinity consists in a plurality of persons in a unity of 
substance, and humanity consists in a plurality of substance (e.g., corporeal-incorporeal) 
in a unity of persons, there is an ontological gap between these two. And in order for 
there to be optimal consistency—not merely in thought, but also in actuality—there must 
exist an intermediate kind of being between the above two. So there is that angelic 
property that resembles Divinity in that it never possesses a plurality of substance in a 
unity of persons (e.g., angels, unlike humans, have only incorporeal substance) and it 
never possesses a plurality of persons in a unity of substance (e.g., angels, like humans 
but unlike Divinity, have as many substances as persons). Hence the angelic property 
forms the missing piece that finishes the picture, as it were, and is necessary if that 
picture is to be perfectly ordered and beautiful. The logic involves three kinds of 
substance, A, B, C. If one has grounds for believing only A and C from other known facts
but lacks evidence for B, one can argue on the basis of the optimal consistency that 
would be lacking between A and C if there were not some third B that exists as an 
intermediary between them. Thus in addition to “logical necessity” there is also this 
186 These parallel Coulter’s categories for Richard, ‘metaphysical criterion’ and ‘aesthetic criterion’. 
Coulter, 219. While distinct, they should be seen as part of one principle of “fitting necessity,” a principle 
that Richard applies to each of these domains; one with respect to “things” the other to the “knowledge of 
things.”
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“fitting necessity” Richard uses to argue for the truth of his conclusions. He regards both 
as “rationes necessariae.”187
We therefore have these two kinds of necessity in Richard’s treatise. Richard has a 
higher regard for “logical necessity” but he uses both as needed to seek the reasons for 
belief. He is not exclusively committed to one or the other but uses both in a symbiotic 
fashion throughout his work to persuade his readers.188
The best place to see the difference between Richard’s two kinds of necessity and 
the relationship between them is in book V where he delineates the divine processions. In
book IV, Richard begins with Boethius’s definition of ‘person’ (i.e., “an individual 
substance of a rational nature”) which is both ascertainable and sufficiently applicable to 
all persons. But Richard wants to go further; he wants to refine the definition and make it 
more perfect and complete. As he writes, “In order for a definition to be perfect 
(perfecta), it is necessary for it to cover the entire reality (rei esse comprehendat) and 
only the reality of the object being defined.”189 The definition must extend to the entire 
realm of the things to which it refers, and it must be an interchangeable proposition (i.e., 
the word ‘person’ must be able to be applied to different things to which its definition 
appropriately pertains). The solution Richard comes up with is that every person has a 
187 “So only these reasons that are derived from aseity, immutability, and simplicity are called 
‘necessary reasons.’” Den Bok, 192; see also 190 n.154 of that work, where den Bok notes that Richard 
seems to equate indubitability with ‘necessary’ at some points in his treatise where modern scholars—with 
stricter definitions—see a distinction between the two. 
188 It is this focus on persuasion that forms the intention of Richard’s treatise; it is as much a work 
of rhetoric as a philosophical treatise. Den Bok, likewise, points to De Trinitate IV.9 as proof that Richard 
uses probabilis and necessarium in the sense of the rhetoric tradition. Den Bok, 192 n. 162; 193 n. 177.
189 Richard, De Trinitate IV.21.
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“rational being from an incommunicable property.”190 But because Divinity lacks 
differentiation due to its aseity, the question remains how there can be any plurality of 
persons in one Divinity. In other words, how is it possible to apply the definition of 
‘person’ to three things if there is only one thing? Since ‘person’ requires an 
incommunicable property, there must be something that distinguishes the divine persons 
despite the fact that each one of them is identical to the divine substance. The solution is 
that each divine person has a different “causal” origin. One is from himself, one is from 
another, and a third is from the other two. 
Next, in book V, Richard inquires about the properties of each divine person and 
provides a particular characteristic of each one.191 But what is his method? He says we 
already know that the three persons in the Trinity are differentiated by certain properties 
(i.e., differences with respect to their original cause), but that those properties applicable 
to them individually have not yet been “discovered through reasoning (ratiocinando).”192
He states further that the goal is to support via an “attestation of demonstrative certitude 
(demonstrativae certitudinis) what we hold by faith.”193 Here we see him in the pursuit of
fides quaerens intellectum, and his method is to find more certain reasons.
His first move is to employ an argument based on “fitting necessity.” He has 
already shown that there is plurality within Divinity in book III; but now Richard asks 
which of two kinds of plurality is the more beautiful and hence applies to true Divinity. Is
190 Richard, De Trinitate IV.20: “rationale esse ex incommunicabili proprietate.”
191 On the appropriation of specific properties to each of the divine persons, see n. 6 of this work.
192 Richard, De Trinitate V.1.
193 Ibid.
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it “a plurality that is differentiated by a most ordered variety of properties and unified in a
most appropriate manner of proportions through a marvelous reason?”194 Or is it “a 
plurality connected by no concord of differences or concordant difference between 
persons and adorned by no order of otherness?”195 The answer, because it is the more 
beautiful, is the first. Therefore “. . . it is necessary to believe that the most pleasant 
fraternity of persons cannot be lacking in the supreme happiness nor can the most ordered
variety of properties be lacking in the supreme beauty.”196
But the above argument based on “fitting necessity” is not enough for Richard. He 
writes subsequently, “But, lest this argument, which we have offered, appears to some to 
be probable rather than necessary, let us investigate our assertion further through deeper 
reason” (emphasis mine).197 Richard then moves to an argument based on “logical 
necessity.”198 
Borrowing an important argument from I-II, Richard next shows that what was said 
with respect to divine substance can also be said with respect to divine person. In the 
same way that there can only be one substance that exists from itself and not from any 
other, so there can only be one (divine) person who exists from himself and not from any 
194 Richard, De Trinitate V.2.
195 Ibid.
196 Ibid.
197 “Sed, ne haec quam proposuimus ratio alicui forte probabilis magis quam necessaria videatur, 
hoc ipsum quod dicimus altiori adhuc ratione investigetur.” Richard, De Trintiate V.
198 This movement from fittingness to “necessary reasons” parallels the same in Anselm’s Cur Deus 
Homo when Boso, unsatisfied with Anselm’s argument from fittingness, asks for “necessary reasons”; an 
indication that by the 11th century, there was a growing inclination for necessary conclusions rather than 
merely probable ones, though both were still considered persuasive for belief. See Coulter, 187.
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other; otherwise, there would be an infinity of divine persons in one Divinity. With 
respect to substance, we can speak of a beginning of time such that there cannot be an 
infinite regress of substances. There must, finally, be a first cause; a first substance from 
which all temporal things come to be. But in Divinity (i.e., God in se) there is no 
beginning of time; God is eternal. There is no first being or second being with respect to 
time. However there is a first person and second person with respect to origin, where 
“first” and “second” are understood not temporally but ‘naturally’, or with respect to 
causal-dependence. So a similar argument can be made with respect to origin of being in 
book V as was made with respect to temporal order of being in I-II. To put it another 
way, the same argument that worked for speaking of God ad extra to show that there 
must be a first substance can now be applied to God ad intra to show that there must be a 
first divine person. If there is no “divine person” who exists from himself, then there 
would be an infinite series of divine persons. There would be no first, originating person. 
And hence there must be a first, originating divine person. There must be someone who 
exists from himself, who does not draw source from another, and who does not exist from
anyone other than himself. Richard subsequently provides the evidence that the property 
of this divine person is incommunicable and concludes the section by saying, “Behold we
have now considered with indisputable arguments that mode of existing spoken at the 
beginning of the work with probable reasons” (emphasis mine).199
All of this reveals that Richard is working with two different kinds of necessity. 
One is a “fitting necessity” having to do with the optimal consistency, harmony, and 
199 “Ecce illum existendi modum jam indubitata demonstratione collegimus, de quo in hujus operis 
exordio locuti sumus, ubi probabili magis quam necessaria ratione usi sumus.” Richard, De Trinitate V.5.
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beauty of a set of truths: What is true and what one is more justified in believing is 
whichever of two beliefs is the more fitting and optimal. The other is a “logical 
necessity” having to do with truths delivered by means of a process of logical reasoning, 
and usually the fruit of a reductio ad absurdum argument. What we see above is that 
Richard uses both. But what we also see is that he has a higher regard for “logical 
necessity.” He sees it offering a level of certitude the other lacks. But notice that Richard 
doesn’t dispense with more probabilistic forms of argument once he’s discovered a 
deeper and more logical reason for a particular belief. Rather he offers the “logical 
necessity” for those who are not persuaded by the first kind of necessity. So while 
Richard himself sees both forms of argument offering “necessary reasons” in the sense 
that they cannot be doubted, he is aware of the important difference between the two 
types of necessity he puts forward. They both may be “indubitable” and for that reason 
necessary to believe; but “fitting necessity” argues for what is more probable (i.e., the 
more optimal and fitting is more likely true) whereas “logical necessity” argues for what 
cannot be otherwise. It is not only true, but must be true. The important point is that they 
both provide adequate justifications for belief even if the level of certitude differs 
between the two. 
In addition to these forms of argument, we mention a third Richard uses 
prominently throughout his work: his use of the principle of similitude. As Coulter’s 
thesis makes clear, Richard’s method is one of moving in an ascent from the visible to the
invisible. We noted earlier that this per visibilia ad invisibilia is a thoroughly Augustinian
margin which subsequent Trinitarian authors, including Richard, write within. But there 
are two things to further point out here. First, any time Richard mentions discerning 
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invisible from visible things, he does so by means of the principle of similitude. By this 
he means that he can take something visible and compare it with something invisible in 
such a way as to highlight their similarities and differences. Greater insight can be 
obtained by attending to these similarities and dissimilarities. Second, in De Trinitate this
is almost always connected with the notion of man being created in the image of God.200 
Since man is the visible image of God, one can attend to this image in order to see what is
true about the invisible reality to which that image corresponds. As den Bok notes:
The realm of meaning is as wide as reality can be. God and 
man, the Trinity and his image, have «rationes» which can be 
discovered by a careful study of properties departing from various 
similitudes offered to us by Scripture and creation. Human beings 
are called to read this twofold book and try to understand its text. 
God has expressed himself first; He descends in writing calling us 
to read. A human person images the trinitarian God precisely in his 
transcendent openness of mind to all that can be known and loved. 
Indicating God by so many human characteristics Scripture invites 
us to investigate what He can possibly have in common with 
man.201
This “commonality” between man and God becomes clearer as the apprentice discerns 
the image in which he was made and by means of which he can rise to knowing God as 
He is. As Gregory writes, “‘Experiencing in themselves that the invisible is better than 
the visible,’ they can rise toward God through contemplation of the visible world.”202 As 
200 When Richard speaks of the “ladder of similitude” in De Trinitate V.6 and VI.1, 23—that is, 
when he uses the principle of similitude as a method and is not merely alluding to the principle—he always 
refers to the human nature made in the divine image and from which it can be “lifted” to understand divine 
realities. For the comprehensive list of Richard’s use of the principle of similitude, see III.7, 10, 23; IV.8, 
10, 25; V.6, 25; VI.1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23. Also, notice the disproportionately 
higher frequency of this language in book VI.
201 Den Bok, 486.
202 Straw, 33. Moralia on Job 15.46.52 (CCL 143A, 781).
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a result, as “. . . the universe unfolds, man’s identity becomes more distinct and 
comprehensible.”203 The divine image in man suddenly becomes the ‘mirror’ of 
1 Corinthians 13:12 by which one peers into these invisible realities and their 
similitudes.204 Further, there is the creative play between the ‘speculum’ and the 
‘specula’ in the Latin such that the “mirror” (speculum) is also understood as the 
“watchtower” (speclua) where one enlarges one’s mind and “stands up” in order to peer 
further into these human-divine comparisons. Together, these are the three main methods 
Richard uses to argue for the truth of his claims in De Trinitate. But as we see in the next 
section, it is this last method that shows the limits of reason: where the soul transitions 
from the knowledge of Being to the knowledge of being-in-Being.
Ascending “Above & Beyond” Reason
Like his theological predecessors, and many of his contemporaries, Richard 
conceives the process of learning as a journey from imperfection to perfection, from faith
to full understanding. But when it comes to the contemplation of the Trinity it presents 
the learner with some unique challenges. This is because the Trinity exceeds one’s 
rational capacities; it is “above and beyond” reason, as he says.205 And thus it is 
important for us to understand not only the types of reasons Richard seeks in his quest to 
203 Ibid., 34.
204 Augustine elaborates on “fittingness” in detail and connects it with the mirror of 1 Corinthians 
13:12. See esp. Augustine, De Trinitate IV.2-3 with respect to harmony/consonance, VI.10 with respect to 
form/image, and XIII.5, 14 with respect to ‘will’. Coulter suggests Anselm’s use of fittingness is inspired 
by Augustine’s De Trinitate IV.2, Coulter, 177 n. 11.
205 Richard, De Trinitate I.1. On Richard’s use of this phrase in De Trinitate, see n. 440 of this 
work.
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provide his readers with a full understanding of the Trinity but also to point out where 
reason fits in the ascent to that full and perfect contemplation. As den Bok notes:
Because of the method of «fides quaerens intellectum» the 
(Pseudo-) Athanasian formulations are caught in a very remarkable 
tension. On the one hand, if the enterprise is not to fail, they are the 
threshold, and only that: We should not rest at them, but enter and 
proceed. On the other hand they are, so to speak, written on the 
altar, we cannot leave them behind, they will always be before and 
above us: They will be confirmed by reason, if the enterprise is not 
to fail. So the Quicumque and its setting in tradition and liturgical 
life is the «context of discovery» for God’s trinitarian character, 
whereas De Trinitate offers a «context of justification».
If the enterprise succeeds, we will indeed have gained some 
understanding of what is expressed by the creed—an understanding 
which, when fully unfolded, is eternal life. De Trinitate consciously 
aims at contemplation in its optimal form, which is not only very 
useful, but also pure enjoyment, communicating everlasting delight 
and a taste of endless sweetness.206
Richard’s understanding of the positive, but limited role of reason in theological 
contemplation is virtually identical to that of Anselm, the main contours of which were 
shared by many others in the 12th century. Anselm, too, saw the path to full theological 
contemplation as an ascent; indeed, as we have seen, he was widely influential in further 
contributing to its upward momentum. Moreover, Anselm wrote his Monologion and 
Proslogion with formative aims. Both bring a person to the summit of that being-than-
which-none-greater-can-be-thought through silent reasoning alone. But here we pause to 
notice a critical point in Anselm’s treatises where the God-seeker stands upon the final 
precipice of rationality, still seeking the face of his ineffable Creator.207 For how is one to
206 Den Bok, 156-157.
207 In addition to the metaphysical dimension of Creator-created/creature that fixes the contours of 
the Trinitarian and Christological debates, there is its formative dimension. This formative focus is at the 
center of Anselm’s project as he instructs his reader in how to properly think and speak of himself, his 
Creator, and the similitudes and dissimilitudes that obtain between them.
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see the face of God when the difference between creature and Creator, the common and 
the holy, remains so great? Though one may come to know about God, how is one ever 
to come to know and love Him like a lover her Beloved—inseparable, united, and one? 
Anselm describes this gap as what is “above and beyond” in his Monologion and Richard
uses the same idea but gives it a fuller articulation in his Mystical Ark when he describes 
the factors involved in ecstatic contemplation.208 Anselm writes in Monologion 65:
But what about our earlier conclusion? Namely, that the supreme 
essence is above and beyond all other natures . . . . What then? 
Have I, in some way, brought something to light about something 
incomprehensible, although, in another way, gained no direct 
insight into it? (italics mine)209
For Anselm, as well as Richard, the solution for bridging the divide between the 
little essence and the supreme essence is the process introduced by Augustine of seeking 
the truth of Divinity by means of the ‘mirror’, by means of the creature who has been 
created in the image of God. Anselm continues: 
What we do, when we cannot, or will not, utter something properly, 
is to signify it by means of something else—an [aenigma] for 
example. And often we do not see something properly (i.e., as it is), 
but we see it by means of some likeness or image—when, for 
example, we make out someone’s face in a mirror. Thus we say and 
do not say, see and do not see, one and the same thing. For it is 
through something else that we say it, and we see it. . . . 
208 In Mystical Ark IV Richard charts the course for the fifth and sixth stages of trinitarian 
contemplation; in bk. V he kindles the “white hot longing” (aestuantis animi ardor) that will catapult his 
readers into the presence of the triune God. There he lays out the three modes for ecstatic contemplation: 
enlarging of the mind, raising up of the mind, alienation of the mind.
209 Davies, Anselm: Major Works, 71. The closest Augustine comes to “above and beyond” in his 
De Trinitate is IX.4: “. . . if knowledge is less than that thing which is known, and which can be fully 
known, then knowledge is not perfect . . . . But when the mind knows itself, its own knowledge does not 
rise above itself, because itself knows, and itself is known.” Note the allusion to 1 Corinthians 13:12. See 
also IX.6 “above the eye of the mind.” He also writes in VII.4, “. . . the super-eminence of the Godhead 
surpasses the power of customary speech. For God is more truly thought than He is altered, and exists more
truly than He is thought.”
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This line of reasoning, therefore, allows our conclusions about 
the supreme nature to be true and the supreme nature itself to 
remain ineffable. We understand them to be indicating the supreme 
nature by means of something else, rather than expressing it by 
means of what is proper to its essence.210
This ineffable stopping point requires new methods of inquiry, methods that move 
above and beyond reason alone. As we mentioned earlier, this place in Anselm’s 
Monologion is where he finishes his treatment of the “Word” and “Wisdom.” The 
‘righting’ of words must now extend to the ‘righting’ of power. And that reformation 
requires pursuing, within one’s soul, a conformity of word and deed. From 65 to the end 
of the work, Anselm treats the reformation of the soul in the image of God. For coming to
know God as He is requires not merely “fitting reasons” but a “fitting soul.” 
In Richard’s works, this ineffable stopping point is described as the place at which 
reason “fails” (defecerat)—literally “faints away.” In both Twelve Patriarchs and 
Mystical Ark, he refers to this point as the death of Rachel before giving birth to 
Benjamin (i.e., contemplation): 
And so when Benjamin is born, Rachel dies, because the mind, 
having been carried away to contemplation, experiences how great 
the failure of human reason is. Did not Rachel die and did not the 
sense of all human reason fail in the Apostle when he said: 
“Whether in the body or outside the body, I do not know; God 
knows” (2 Cor. 12:2)? Therefore, let no person suppose that he is 
able to penetrate to the splendor of that divine light by 
argumentation; let no person believe that he is able to comprehend 
it by human reasoning. For if it were possible to approach that 
divine light by some argument or other then it would not be 
inaccessible.211
210 This ineffable stopping point that requires new methods of inquiry; methods that move above 
and beyond reason alone, can also be found in Anselm’s Proslogion, 14-16; Davies and Evans, 95-96.
211 Richard, Twelve Patriarchs lxxiv; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 131. Benjamin itaque 
nascente, Rachel moritur, quia mens ad contemplationem rapta, quantus sit humanae rationis defectus 
experitur. Nonne Rachel mortua tunc erat, et omnis humanae rationis sensus in Apostolo defecerat, cum 
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And later, “Moreover, we can conclude suitably enough from the death of his mother 
what we ought to understand by Benjamin that kind of contemplation which is above 
reason.”212
This failure of reason is not to be thought of in the sense of ineffectualness but 
merely to show that reasoning—as a method of theological inquiry—is only effectual for 
some modes of knowing and not others. I can learn quite a bit about my wife, for 
example. Theoretically I could have full knowledge of her biological makeup, her genetic
constitution. I could study her dispositions, learn her temperament, observe her behavior. 
I could multiply in the acuity of my knowledge of her in all of these ways. But these 
modes of inquiry are not what provide the most appropriate and fullest knowledge of her. 
That requires a different mode of seeking, a mode more conducive to enjoying and loving
her; and likewise, to her enjoying and loving me. In the same way, Richard and Anselm 
know that while knowledge of God may come through reason, the kind of knowledge 
they seek is “above and beyond” it. It is the knowledge of love.213 For Anselm, the ascent
to God must transition from reason to a reformation of the soul in righteousness. It 
requires washing one’s hands and cleansing one’s heart so that one might ascend the holy
hill of the Lord. For Richard, when reason fails it gives birth to a new form of 
dicebat: Sive in corpore, sive extra corpus, nescio, Deus scit (II Cor XII). Nemo ergo se existimet ad illius 
divini luminis claritatem, argumentando posse penetrare; nemo se credat humana illud ratiocinatione 
posse comprehendere. Si enim aliqua argumentatione adiri potuisset lumen illud divinum, utique 
inaccessibile non fuisset. PL 196.53A.
212 Richard, Twelve Patriarchs lxxiv; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 132. Quod autem per 
Benjamin illud contemplationis genus, quod supra rationem est, intelligere debeamus, ex matris ejus morte 
convenienter satis conjicere possumus. PL 196.53CD
213 Indeed, there is much to be made of how love becomes the rich taproot from which one is 
“drawn out of oneself” until one reaches the “rising” and “alienation of mind” involved in the highest levels
of theological contemplation. Love is the source of all language of ‘excess’ in Richard.
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contemplation: an ecstasy and alienation of mind that makes the ardent soul ready for 
divine visitation.
We will describe Richard’s understanding of ecstatic contemplation in chapter 5. 
For now, we only need to show where reason fits in Richard’s broader religious 
epistemology; and specifically how it relates to the contemplation of the Trinity. Richard 
explains this the most clearly in his Mystical Ark with the separation of the “crown” of 
the cherubim on the Ark of the Covenant from the base it rests upon. That physical 
separation of the crown from the base is what Richard regards as the separation between 
what is below reason and what is with, above, and beyond it. He writes:
However, in every part and everywhere, the propitiatory is placed 
over wood, and on that account with sufficient suitability there is 
represented in it the kind of contemplation that, when going beyond 
all imagination (quod omnem imaginationem excedens), is engaged 
in reason according to reason (ratione secundum rationem). And as 
the propitiatory (inasmuch as it is the cover of the ark) nowhere 
descends below wood, nor is permitted to be attached to wood, so 
when this contemplation surpasses all imagination (omnem 
imaginationem supergrediens) and does not agree to let itself be 
mixed with anything, it is mindful of invisible things only and 
directs attention to invisible things only.214
This is the pivotal point in Richard’s religious epistemology that shifts one’s “attention” 
(attentio) or “imagination” (imaginatio) in the first two forms of contemplation to 
reasoning (ratiocinando).215 Richard describes this shift in his Mystical Ark (Fig. 3.1). 
214 Richard, Mystical Ark I.11; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 171-172.
215 Spijker rightly emphasizes both the ‘narrowing’ character as well as the ‘dynamic ebb and flow’ 
involved in Richard’s use of ‘ratio’: “What is important to notice is the necessity of increasing 
concentration. The senses offer images to the reason (ratio) where they become the object of all kind of 
cogitations. These wander around purposelessly. When the mind comes upon one of these free-floating 
thoughts and wants to know more about it, it has to concentrate, and cogitation turns into meditation. Even 
more concentrated is the contemplation. But from this point of concentration things can be seen in all kinds 
of ways: the process can now be reversed, an expanded vision is possible.” Spijker, 202.
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Mode of
Attention
Movement Goal Object Ark Key Verb
Narrowing of
Attention
6
supra
rationem, et
videtur esse
praeter
rationem
ad Trinitate
(exsulto atque
tribudio)
learning
(cognoscere)
those things
seemingly
contrary to
human
reason
quae de
personarum
Trinitate
left
cherub
consultare -
consult,
weigh,
ponder
considering
things
seemingly
contrary to
reason from
irradiation of
divine light
5
supra, sed non
praeter
rationem
ad Divinitate
(ascendo)
perceiving
things that
transcend
limits of
human
reason
quae de
Divinitatis
natura
(simplici
essentia)
right
cherub
cernere -
separate, lift,
distinguish
piercing
insight of the
understanding
from a divine
showing
-------------------------------------------------- upper limit of ratio --------------------------------------------------
full self-knowledge = beginning (initium) and foundation (fundamentum) for divine contemplation
4
in ratione et
secundum
rationem
per invisibilia
nostra ad
coelestium
animorum et
supremum
bonorum
(adsergo)
gathering
intelligible
fruit from
experience
and
reasoning as
foundation
for higher
speculations
solis
intelligibilibus
propiti-
atory
colligere -
gather
together in
mind
reasoning,
comprehension
applied esp. to
invisible things
of ourselves
---------------------------------------------- upper limit of imaginatio ----------------------------------------------
per speculum ad speciem
3
in ratione
secundum
imaginationem
per visibilia ad
invisibilia
(sublevo)
rising to
speculation
of invisible
things via
similitudes
with visible
things
solis
invisibilibus
crown
intendere -
intend, aim
at
by intention
and
investigation
but drawn from
image of
visible things
2
in
imaginatione
secundum
rationem
invisibilia ab
visibilium
(insisto)
discerning
rational
principle of
any one
visible thing
rationem
ordinem
dispositionem
causam
modum
utilitatem
gilding
versare -
ruminate,
meditate
reasoning
accommodated
to visible
things
1
in
imaginatione
solam
imaginationem
ad visibilia
corporalia
(obstobstupesco)
rejoicing in
the manifold
beauty of
God’s
creation
rerum
visibilium
wood
mirari -
look at,
marvel
free movement
of the mind
carried by
wonder
Fig. 3.1 Richard’s Six Modes of Contemplation216
216 Classifying the powers of the soul was common to the 12th century. As McGinn suggests, 
Boethius’s four-fold schema of sensus, imaginatio, ratio, and intelligentia was organized into a five-fold 
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For greater clarity we arrange Richard’s taxonomy from bottom-to-top to give a 
sense for the ascent as well as to better highlight the separation of the fifth and sixth 
modes that culminate in Trinitarian contemplation. The first kind of contemplation 
consists of constructing the ark by garnering materials; that is, by a free attending to 
visible things. It is the effortless gaze of the mind as it enjoys the abundance and variety 
of things God has made. The second adds understanding to this attending of visible things
by seeking their rational principle (rationem). The key verb Richard uses to describe this 
mode is ‘versare’ which literally means “to turn over and over in the mind, to ruminate.” 
It is symbolized by the gilding of the wood with gold. The third consists of the crown of 
the ark and represents the rising with one’s attention from visible to invisible things. It 
“rests” on the four sides of the Ark because it represents the first moment at which 
contemplation takes its root in reason (in ratione). The two prior forms of contemplation 
are “below reason”; reason must “accommodate” itself to what is below itself in its 
interaction with the corporeal sense (sensu corporeo). The third mode consists of 
“drawing out” (trahere) similitudes from visible things in order to rise toward the greater 
contemplation of invisible things alone. The fourth involves using “reason according to 
reason,” where one seeks the similitudes of invisible things only. The key verb Richard 
uses here is ‘colligere’ which means “to gather, recollect in mind.” The goal is to gather 
the intelligible fruit gleaned from experience and reasoning and integrate them into a 
foundation from which one might “stand up” to a full, human understanding of all 
pattern of ascent beginning with Hugh of St. Victor and Thierry of Chartres. Other classifications were 
made by William of St. Thierry, Isaac of Stella, William of Conches, Godefroy of St. Victor, Aelred of 
Rievaulx, and Clarenbald of Arras among others. An overview of the semantic range of these terms in the 
12th century is given in McGinn, The Golden Chain, 153-177. On modifications of the Boethian schema, 
ibid., 208-221. 
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things.217  It is symbolized by the propitiatory. The fifth, symbolized by the cherub on the
right, consists of those things that are above but not beyond reason. These are those 
things that are consistent and agree with reason, such as the simplicity and unity of the 
Divine substance. The sixth, symbolized by the cherub on the left, consists of those 
things that are both above and beyond reason, where things seem contrary to reason, as 
when reason seeks the mystery of the Trinity.218
The first four stages eventually culminate into one contemplation, involving both 
human effort and divine grace in the ascent from visible to invisible things. But the fifth 
and sixth contemplations are “separate” (i.e., “holy”) and depend upon divine grace.219 
The cherubim are in an angelic form. It is only as one tempers one’s soul according to 
their angelic similitude and holiness—a wholly invisible form that exceeds human 
fullness and holiness—that one may enjoy the fruits of trinitarian speculation. As he says:
217 Now it becomes clearer why the educational program at St. Victor was so focused on expanding 
and deepening its knowledge of the liberal arts. Richard’s taxonomy indicates that the wider and deeper 
one’s knowledge, the greater the foundation (fundamentum) from which one can rise up to the 
contemplation of divine things. Furthermore, the fourth mode of contemplation, as he says, involves 
“common understanding” (communem intelligentiam) as well as “full self-knowledge” (ipsa intelligentia 
nostra videtur intelligere seipsam per semetipsum), where ethics is included here as a prerequisite to divine 
contemplation. All individual and communal human understanding and righteousness culminate in the 
fourth mode of contemplation. The “propitiatory,” then, marks the possibility for full understanding—the 
“foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men” (1 Corinthians 
1:25). Faithfulness and grace determine whether it becomes the place of rejection or beatitude; for the 
fullness of theology—that highest of sciences—is “raised up” from there.
218 Richard, Mystical Ark I.6; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 163. Richard would therefore see 
theological inquiry sola ratio as stuck at levels four or five with one or two more levels of contemplation to
go. Moreover, these final levels require a transition from the active mode of knowing to a more 
contemplative one (i.e., in the way that a beloved’s letter “faints away” as a lover encounters the object of 
her love face-to-face.) Reason, fueled by love, reaches the higher levels of contemplation, but only a 
seething love for God can carry one “above and beyond” reason to rest with Him face-to-face; and even 
then, not without the assistance of divine grace and illumination.
219 Richard’s choice of verb is fitting here. He uses ‘cernere’ with its sense of perceiving by means 
of “lifting, separating, and distinguishing.” Ibid.
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Certainly it ought to be noted that those four previously 
mentioned contemplations are, in a certain manner, joined together 
into one (in unum conjuncta). However, these two last ones are 
separate and are set apart (separatim sunt et seorsum posita). And 
indeed in those first four kinds of contemplations we grow daily 
from our own activity (industria), yet with divine assistance (cum 
divino adjutorio). But in these two final ones everything depends 
on grace (ex gratia). They are wholly far removed (omnino 
longinqua) and exceedingly remote (valde remota) from all human 
activity, except to the degree that each person receives the clothing 
of angelic similitude from heaven and by divine providence puts it 
on himself . . . for the reason that without the addition of this 
highest grace (supremae gratiae) no one would be able to attain to 
fullness of knowledge (quis ad plenitudinem scientiae pertingere 
non possit).220
Thus contemplation begins with the wonder and manifold variety of visible things God 
has made, but only takes its root in reason (in ratione) at the third stage. There the form 
of investigation still accommodates itself to the mode of those things that are below 
reason, but rises to the contemplation of invisible things by means of the “principle of 
similitude.” Once fixed in memory, however, the work of “reasoning according to 
reasoning” truly begins. In the fourth mode of contemplation, reason works to unite its 
entire “inventory” of intelligible things—including, and most especially, by bringing 
moral integrity to one’s soul—in order to provide a foundation from which to stand up 
and peer into the Divine mysteries (i.e., the things of faith). Reason then applies itself to 
those things that come down from above and beyond itself in the fifth and sixth modes of 
contemplation. In the former, divine revelation is shown to agree with reason, such as 
Richard demonstrates in books I-II of his De Trinitate. In the latter, reason seems 
contrary to the things of faith. But as Richard shows in book III, necessary reasons for the
220 Mystical Ark I.12; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 172.
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Trinity of persons are not lacking; and where they can be found, there is hope for the 
zealous who wish to make that final ascent. These necessary reasons become the anchor 
points Richard places in the rock leading to trinitarian contemplation, ensuring that his 
readers have both the means and the assurance they need to reach the summit of the Holy 
Trinity. They are footholds that provide hope for successfully making the journey.
Reason therefore plays a very important part in Richard’s understanding of 
theological contemplation. Like a choice tool, it is used in the construction of just about 
every aspect of the “mystical ark,” but it faces its greatest challenges in that face-to-face 
encounter with the Divine. We therefore ask, with an unknown disciple of the 12th 
century, “Who then will conduct us to the city of the great king in order that what we 
now read in these pages and see only as in a glass, darkly, we may then look upon the 
face of God present before us, and so rejoice?”221 In De Trinitate we find the craftsman 
hard at work to provide the fullness of this contemplation for his readers, and challenging
them to forge a unanimity of mind and heart by means of its “trinitarian” structures and 
forms. 
221 Quoted in Leclercq, Love of Learning, 65.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ARTICULATING THE TRINITY “TRINITARIANLY”
…and walk in it.
We have shown that Richard sees a symbiotic relationship between necessary 
reasons offered for truths about God and the fitting necessity—the optimal consistency 
and the beauty—in which those reasons cohere. Both provide greater certainty and proof 
for the things already held firmly by faith. But faith’s chief object is God Himself. 
Richard’s main object of study in De Trinitate is God Himself. And when we look at the 
connection between God and the kinds of reasons Richard seeks to establish firmer 
convictions about God’s Trinitarian nature, we find that the terminus of those reasons is 
God who is their ultimate ground. It is because of who God is and what God is like that 
the very reasons themselves are eternal, necessary, and beautiful. Thus the most eternal 
of all beings—the Eternal One—ought to have proportionally necessary and eternal truths
that can be known about Him. Likewise God is the most beautiful of all beings. Thus, in 
addition to finding necessary reasons, Richard expects the constellation of these reasons 
to reflect the harmony and maximal beauty of true Divinity. Such congruity provides the 
confidence that one’s beliefs reflect a true knowledge of God. Thus the more necessary 
and more congruent the reasons, the greater trust one has in believing them. Faith thus 
increases as the dogmas already believed on the testimony of authority come to be 
believed additionally on the basis of reason and beauty. For Richard, these necessary and 
106
fitting reasons complement rather than replace those things believed by faith.222 As Nico 
den Bok writes:
So, although God is not visible nor created, properties of visible 
and invisible created things can be compared, by reason, with 
properties of the invisible and uncreated God.
This comparison is made possible because God creates material 
and spiritual beings: They are construed by divine wisdom, hence 
rationally consistent. Moreover, since this God is the best possible 
«rational substance» they will have good reasons, optimal 
consistency and beautiful structuring. Yet comparison would still 
be impossible if the realm of reasons were restricted to creation. 
For Richard this cannot be the case, however, since . . . God’s own 
being in fact has the best possible reasons, consistency, and 
beauty.223
As a result of this correspondence between God and the reasons one seeks to obtain 
in the contemplation of Him, discovering these reasons leads to an awareness of already 
existing within their order and structure. And one’s journey, one’s ascent to God, consists
of following that order back to God in whom that ultimate rational beauty and harmony 
consists. Nico den Bok accurately describes this correspondence in Richard and the effect
it has on the construction of his texts:
Richard has a special talent for discovering parallels between the 
structure of the «letter» and that of the «things» that can be read 
from it figuratively. The increased analytical accuracy by which 
knowledge of the realities of man and God is extended and 
intensified by way of differentiation and integration of the aspects 
disclosed matches an increased sense of synthesis. Both spiritual 
sensitivity and empirical sensibility are refined into a capacity of 
vision capable of seeing a «content» in its specific form; both of 
them are enabled and mediated by a more vigorous rational 
penetration into the complexity of things. So Richard intensifies the 
hermeneutic circle between vision and analysis. As such he shows a 
222 The view was common to the era and was given extensive treatment a generation later by 
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 2-2.2.10.
223 Den Bok, 126-127.
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commitment to the objective, for it is the concrete shape of texts, or 
facts or things expressed in it, as given, which leads both sense 
perception and reflection; the spirit «goes out» to them via the 
senses and reason (italics mine).224
It is thus not surprising that those who diligently seek the Divine find their 
contemplations and compositions coming to reflect that rational order and structure. But 
Richard’s talent extends above and beyond the relationship between the “letter” and 
“things”; he also structures his treatises in accordance with the form of their subject 
matter. Thus Richard applies his analytical skill to “arranging” the aspects of revelation 
for his readers so that the organizational dimensions of his texts match—as much as 
possible—the subject being contemplated. In De Trinitate, Richard arranges necessary 
reasons and their optimal consistency in a very special way—a “trinitarian” way. 
Previously Richardian scholars have claimed an originality for Richard’s content in De 
Trinitate. In what follows, we demonstrate that this originality and creativity extends to 
how Richard arranges and forms that content.
We now come to the main thesis of this work: the way Richard argues for the 
Trinity “trinitarianly” for the formation of souls. In this chapter we lay out the triadic 
forms and structures by which Richard constructs his treatise. The next chapter shows 
how Richard uses these structures for the spiritual formation of his readers.
Inventional, Ordering Devices
A written composition can be arranged and organized in many ways, but what is 
especially true of Richard is his tendency to conform the structural pattern of his treatises 
224 Den Bok, 111.
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in accordance with their main object of study.225 One can see organizational patterns in 
Richard’s Twelve Patriarchs consisting of his arrangement around the two wives and the 
twelve sons of Jacob. Similarly, in Richard’s Mystical Ark, the four sides of the Ark of 
the Covenant contribute to regular patterns of four as Richard composes that work.226 It 
is a skill Richard employs throughout his entire corpus. Such organizational patterns are 
what Carruthers—in her studies on memory-work in the Middle Ages—calls “inventional
devices.” These structures aid both the writer and reader in retaining the content for 
contemplation and assist the grueling meditational activity involved in reading texts in 
the Middle Ages. Carruthers provides an example of how this works with the Anglo-
Saxon poem Beowulf. In this poem, King Hrothgar looks upon a sword-hilt depicting the 
scenes of the Flood and then constructs a speech ordered around the flow of scenes he 
perceives. He praises Beowulf for saving the Danes from the dangers of Grendel and his 
mother and then reflects more generally upon life and death. Bringing attention to the 
role the sword plays in the structuring of the poem, Carruthers writes, “It is clear in the 
poem that looking at the sword enables Hrothgar’s meditation, that the decorated artifact 
acts as not only the ‘inspiration’ (as we would probably now say) but as the inventional, 
ordering instrument with which he composes.”227 The sword itself becomes a way of 
225 “In the content and form of almost every work he is in fact doing this: forming the mind of his 
readers by repetition and variation of basic structures. Cf. Van ‘T Spijker, Learning by experience, 
especially 201ff. In this way reading Richard’s works as they enfold themselves is a spiritual exercise 
itself.” Den Bok, 102 n. 31. See also idem., chapter 8.
226 For an example, see n. 430 of this work.
227 On the notion of ‘inventional’: “Inventio has the meanings of both of these English words 
[“creative” and “inventory”] . . . . Having “inventory” is a requirement for ‘invention.’ Not only does this 
statement assume that one cannot create (‘invent’) without a memory-store (‘inventory’) to invent from and
with, but it also assumes that one’s memory-store is effectively ‘inventoried,’ that its matters are in readily 
recovered ‘locations.’” Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 205. Further, the word derives from ‘in’ (i.e., into) 
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collecting and ordering one’s thoughts. It helps gather all of the content to one place, 
aiding remembrance and recollection. And it gathers content within a particular form 
(i.e., the sword). The inventional device of the sword helps the reader recall both the 
content and that content’s structure.
Similarly, Richard chooses “inventional instruments” from the Scriptures that gather 
the content of his compositions together around a familiar biblical object or narrative. 
The device aids further recollection and builds a platform for later contemplation. 
Richard’s goal is to get his reader’s eyes off the book and onto its subject matter so that 
he can enjoy free flights of contemplation upon the more sublime forms to which it 
pertains. It is this “freedom” in contemplation that keeps the soul in a ready state for 
direct encounters with God. As Carruthers writes:
So a reader’s memory, not confined by worries about “the author’s 
intended meaning,” is freed to roam its memorial symphony, 
“gathering up” harmonies and antitheses in the compositional 
activity which Hugh of St. Victor described as “meditation,” the 
highest kind of study, that “takes the soul away from the noise of 
earthly business” (such as grammatical commentary) and “renders 
his life pleasant indeed” who makes a practice of it. Interpretation 
can then become a form of prayer, a journey through memory like 
that Augustine took with his mother Monica, by means of which, at 
moments, the soul seems to recollect beyond its self, to find out 
God’s own sweetness.228
This is precisely what Richard does with his Mystical Ark, where the Ark of the Covenant
serves as the inventional, ordering instrument for the contemplation of God. Everything, 
right down to the gold and the wood with which it is constructed, becomes a way of 
and ‘venire’ (i.e., “to come”) and has the sense of “going into” and “getting to the heart of a matter.” This is
exactly how Richard describes his method in De Trinitate I.4, of “drawing out” truths into the open “from 
the secret sanctuary of wisdom.”
228 Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 147-148.
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calling to mind meditations and contemplative resolutions by which one constructs one’s 
soul into the form of this Ark. All elements of the Ark coalesce in six stages of 
contemplation on Divinity Richard gives in amazing detail. As den Bok writes:
The basic principle of Richard’s theological method can be 
expressed without any technical term: «It gives us pleasure to turn 
our attention eagerly to this description, both to affirm the rule of 
our teaching from the similitude that is set forth, and to forge the 
form and the manner of our work in accord with the formula of 
description.» Scripture provides a specific form or shape, like that 
of Jacob’s family or the ark of the covenant described in Bible-
texts, or even the form of a Bible-text itself. Richard intends to 
study this form as accurately as possible in order to detect its 
complex similitude with things human and divine, factual and 
moral, as believed by the Church. Richard also intends to mold his 
own rendering of this description including his disclosure of the 
similitudes hidden in it by the same form; so his works too 
somehow reflect this form. Finally, the human soul should also be 
molded in accordance with the structures distilled from this form or 
«littera»; Richard is convinced that its form offers a model which 
can bring one’s inner world «into shape.»229
We give attention to this inner shaping in the next chapter. But to fully show how 
Richard’s De Trinitate brings one’s inner world into shape, we have to first make the case
that Richard is deliberately constructing his work with the very triadic forms and 
structures by which he intends to edify his readers. 
In most of his treatises, Richard takes the inventional, ordering device from 
Scripture. In the case of De Trinitate, the content has a scriptural basis, but its form 
transcends the text. There is no equivalent “picture” per se of the Trinity in the Scriptures
by which Richard can devise a similar contemplation as he does in his Mystical Ark. So 
Richard chooses the dogma itself (“one substance, three persons”), derived from the 
229  Den Bok, 101-102. 
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teachings of Scripture, the church Fathers, and the Creeds, to order his contemplation on 
the Trinity. Thus the quality of formation that takes place in Richard’s readers is 
proportional to how well they identify and retain the intricacies of these trinitarian 
structures in his treatise. How well we are formed by them will consist, first, by how well 
we discern them; and second, by how diligently we explore the various aspects Richard 
wants to “draw out” from them. We now make the case for Richard’s intentional, 
trinitarian structuring of his treatise.
Breadth: Beginning with the End in Mind
Richard explicitly states that he structures his De Trinitate in a triadic way at the 
very end of the work. Here he reminds his readers of the most important elements in his 
treatise. They are so important that he asks his readers to memorize them. He writes:
In the end of our work, we want to repeat and commit to memory 
the following: as we have shown with sufficient evidence in the 
previous discussions, it was easily proven from the consideration of 
omnipotence that there is and can only be one God; it was easily 
proven from the fullness of goodness that God is triune in person; 
and it was clearly concluded from the fullness of wisdom how the 
unity of substance fits with the plurality of persons.230
Earlier we showed how Anselm constructed his Monologion in accordance with the 
triad of Power-Wisdom-Goodness and arranged the triad in a particular way as to devise 
the meditation from the point of view of one seeking. Richard knows this triad231 and, 
230 Richard, De Trinitate VI.25.
231 Poirel meticulously traces the complex history of the Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad from the 
patristic era to the 12th century when its trinitarian appropriation became common and controversial. 
Briefly, he suggests its appropriation in the 12th century begins with Hugh and Abelard. The latter’s 
language equates the three properties with the divine persons; this view is condemned in 1140. Poirel 
suggests Richard is the first to use the term ‘appropriatio’ (see De Trinitate VI.10; De spiritu blasphemiae 
PL 196.1192BC) and confidently moves beyond Hugh’s De sacramentis to assign positive reasons for the 
appropriation (see De Trinitate VI.15 where Richard inserts material from his De tribus appropriatis), but  
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like Anselm, he uses it to organize the main tenets of his treatise.232 But whereas Anselm 
organizes his work in the order of Goodness —> Wisdom —> Power, Richard orders his 
as Power —> Goodness —> Wisdom. Later, we explore the significance of this different 
ordering of the triad between Richard and Anselm; but for now it is only important to 
note the familiarity Richard has with this triad and the fact that both he and Anselm use it
as the main organizational structure for their compositions on the Trinity.233
Further evidence for this intentional structuring comes as we connect this final 
summary Richard provides for his treatise with the outline he gives for his entire work in 
book III. This broader outline serves as a useful map to keep in mind as we explore the 
intricacies of Richard’s triadic structures and triads throughout his work. At the opening 
of book III, Richard writes that he previously (referring to I-II) demonstrated the unity 
and property of the divine substance. In book I Richard argued that Divinity is supremely 
simple. In book II he argued that there is only one Divinity.234 The rest of the work, he 
says, consists of three further steps: Step one (book III) answers the question, “Is there 
avoiding the imprudence of Abelard’s language. The appropriation of the triad is furthered by the second 
generation of masters of Peter Lombard’s sentences at the end of the century. See Poirel, 383-399.
232 Further evidence of the importance of this triad for Richard can be seen its use as an underlying 
framework in his Liber exceptionem; a treatise that parallels Hugh’s Didascalicon in delineating the 
methods and subjects of study at St. Victor. This indicates the foundationalness of this triad to the Victorine
educational program and its connections to their teachings on the Trinity. For Richard’s individual use of 
the triad in De Trinitate, see VI.3, VI.15, VI.25. See also Godefroy’s connection of this triad with the 
Trinity on p. 187 of this work. 
233 Briefly, Anselm orders his Monologion as a journey beginning with the participation of God’s 
goodness and conforming one’s words and deeds in accordance with Wisdom en route to behold the primal 
power of God (i.e., God as He is). Richard orders De Trinitate as a beautiful portrait where the first two 
terms of Power and Goodness stand as opposites with Wisdom as the harmonizing, beautifying term. 
Richard’s pattern is treated in fuller detail when we contend with some objections to our thesis in chapter 6.
234 This pattern of treating the substance and then the essential properties that inhere in it is a 
common one, dating back to Aristotle and Plato.
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true plurality in true and simple divinity and if the number of persons comes to three as 
we believe?”; step two (book IV) answers the question, “How is unity of substance 
consistent with the plurality of persons?”; and step three (book V) consists of 
investigating “. . . whether . . . there is among the three [divine persons] one person alone 
who is from himself, and whether each of the other two persons proceeds from the other, 
and if there are other questions to be investigated concerning the same considerations?” 
In book VI, Richard treats the diverse modes of procession of the Son and Spirit, the 
mode proper to each, and what can be learned from the “names” according to the 
property of each [divine] person.235
The relationship between this “table of contents” in book III and the Power-
Wisdom-Goodness triad at the end of Richard’s work is the following. Books I-II 
establish, from a consideration of omnipotence, that there is only one God. Book III 
shows that God is triune in person from a consideration of supreme goodness. And Books
IV-VI fittingly crown the work with a demonstration of the harmony between the unity of
substance and the plurality of persons from a consideration of the fullness of wisdom. 
This is the broad sweep, the overall picture, the bird’s-eye-view, if you will, of Richard’s 
De Trinitate (Fig. 4.1).
Power Goodness Wisdom
I II III IV V VI
Fig. 4.1 Bird’s-Eye-View of Richard’s De Trinitate
235 Nico den Bok, following Ribaillier, argues that this section of bk. III provides the outline of the 
entire work; he also identifies the Power-Goodness-Wisdom triad as the “rough structure” of the treatise, 
with books IV-VI filling out the Wisdom part of that triad. Den Bok, 371-372, see esp. n 177. I agree with 
den Bok but also believe the textual history of De Trinitate is more complicated and that this section of bk. 
III may be one of the latest stages of its development. For more on this, see Appendix A. On the 
relationship of this section of bk. III to the authenticity of bk. VI, see nn. 441 and 456 of this work.
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This breadth, however, also has a corresponding depth to it that reveals the maturing 
intricacy of Richard’s thought as he crafted the work. And upon closer inspection, when 
we consider this breadth and depth together, we find some important clues to the textual 
history of De Trinitate, clues that reveal De Trinitate as a work of art “in relief.” It is that 
depth to which we now direct our attention.
Depth: Richard’s Trinitarian Structures in Book III
Now that we are familiar with the broad triadic structure of Power-Goodness-
Wisdom Richard used to organize the main lines of argument in his treatise, we zoom in 
on book III where he makes his case for the Trinity of persons. Here we discover that not 
only does Richard conceive of a triadic structure for his entire work, but that he 
deliberately incorporates triads and triadic structures within every one of his books. Book
III, however, showcases his most intricate formulations. It is where he uses one triadic 
structure to form three sections of argument for the plurality and Trinity of persons in 
Divinity. Then, within each of these three sections, he uses that same triad in order to 
show how fitting it is to have three considerations supporting one and the same truth. 
The pattern is consistent with Richard’s stated method in book I of “drawing out” 
profound and hidden reasons into the open from the sanctuary of wisdom. In books I-II 
Richard deals with Power; in book III, with Goodness; and in books IV-VI, with 
Wisdom. In book III, Richard “draws out” the Goodness from the Power-Goodness-
Wisdom triad that structures the entire work. Richard focuses in order to magnify. Book 
III focuses on Goodness and then magnifies it with an increasingly lucid set of arguments
for the Trinity of persons. We now look at how Richard does this in book III.
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Richard uses numerous triads in book III, but the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad 
plays the largest structural role. The triad is introduced in III.2-5, and it structures the 
material from III.2-20. The following diagram (Fig. 4.2) provides a perspective of the 
intricacy with which Richard draws these considerations out into the open from the 
fullness of Goodness and it will be helpful to have in mind as we provide a microscopic 
analysis of this material in book III.
Fig. 4.2 Richard’s Use of the Goodness-Happiness-Glory Triad in Book III
The Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad structures three sections of book III. The 
conclusion of each section provides an “anchor point” that marks the end of one pitch and
the starting-point for the next.236 Section one, in III.2-5, establishes the plurality of 
236 The language is taken from rock-climbing terminology. In the same way that a lead climber puts 
in anchor points for those who are making the ascent below him, so Richard provides organizational clues 
that indicate where each new contemplation begins. 
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persons; that is, that there must be more than merely one person in true Divinity. Section 
two, in III.7/11-13, establishes that this plurality must be a Trinity of persons. Section 
three, in III.14-20, establishes the truth of both the plurality and Divinity in a single 
argument from supreme benevolence. The material that comes between these sections 
(e.g., III.6, 8-10 and III.21-25), as will be shown later, consists of earlier stages in 
Richard’s composition of his work. They are the residual pieces of previous work that 
shifted as he expanded on his earlier writing.237 The detailed case for this is given in 
Appendix A, but for now, it is not too difficult to see how Richard’s method of focus and 
magnification from the fullness of goodness in book III might consist of a literary 
development as well as a meditative one. Indeed, the unparalleled intricacy of its content 
and form compared to what we find in the rest of De Trinitate bears this out.
These three sections of material, as well as the further triadic illustrations Richard 
uses within all three, demonstrate how he extends his arguments into a “trinitarian” form. 
This form consists of three elements: three arguments, one truth, and an indication that 
Richard sees the relation of these three arguments and that one truth reflecting trinitarian 
significance (i.e., that this three-and-one is an allusion to the three-in-one of the 
Trinity).238 We start first with an example of how Richard takes what was a clear, biblical
237 Compare, for instance, the content after the conclusion of III.20 with that found at the end of 
chapters 6, 7, 8, all of 9 and 10. They all coalesce around co-eternity, immutability, equality, unity/
plurality, similitudes of divinity/humanity, greater/lesser. Aside from the beginning of III.21, the final 
chapters of the book (III.21-25) never rehearse the content of charity found in the preceding chapters! In 
addition, the language is more simple, connects with the language in the Quicumque (e.g., one omnipotent, 
one immeasurable, one God; see III.8), and reminds of the Power-Wisdom-Nature/Being triad Richard 
develops in detail in I-II (also in VI.20). Richard’s Goodness-Happiness-Glory material was probably 
“expanded” by him as his meditations developed. Futhermore, III.2-20 has the most intricate triadic forms 
and structures of the treatise; and this may indicate that the Goodness-Happiness-Glory material is the 
fullest and most mature development of Richard’s thought on the Trinity. For more, see Appendix A.
238 Like Ribaillier, Richardian scholars have noted the repetition of arguments in bk. III, but instead 
of seeing their trinitarian structure and significance, they focus on the pedagogical value of reinforcing 
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dyad and turns it into three to make it fit this trinitarian structure. Later we see how 
Richard uses the three to undergird one truth and explains their trinitarian significance. 
Richard’s intentionality in crafting this material trinitarianly is seen in his scriptural 
allusion to the need in both the Old and New Testaments for two witnesses to establish 
the truth of something.239 Instead he uses not just two arguments for the plurality of 
persons, but three. The third, he says, stands by to “applaud” (acclamare) the testimonies 
of the other two.240 Richard is not content with only one or two arguments, and so he 
searches for a third. The third witness is the third element in the Goodness-Happiness-
Glory triad. And this threefold witness becomes the structural basis for the three sections 
of this material in book III as well as the content found within each section. We thus have
a ‘macro’-use of the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad in dividing this material into three 
sections, and we have a ‘micro’-use of the same triad in giving three arguments for one 
truth within each of those sections. Richard emphasizes each element of the triad, as 
indicated by the bold words in the following diagram (Fig. 4.3). Let’s look at this more 
closely. 
earlier conclusions with new arguments. Ribaillier, 15; Den Bok, 102 n. 31, Kirchberger, 28. Den Bok 
recognizes Richard’s “tripartite schemes” more generally but does not indicate any specific trinitarian 
significance for De Trinitate. Den Bok, 104 n. 37. Similarly, Salet, nicely summarized in n. 23 of Chris 
Evan’s translation.
239 See e.g., Matthew 18:16; Deuteronomy 17:6; 19:15; John 8:17; 2 Corinthians 13:1; 1 Timothy 
5:19; Hebrews 10:28.
240 Richard, De Trinitate III.5. Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 378. Because Zinn’s translation of 
book III of Richard’s De Trinitate is more widely available we resort to his translations for book III in this 
section.
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Arguments III.2-5 III.7/11-13 III.14-20
#1 Goodness Goodness Goodness
#2 Happiness Happiness Happiness
#3 Glory Glory Glory
One Truth for Plurality of Persons for Trinity of Persons for Plurality & Trinity
Fig. 4.3 Richard’s ‘Macro’ & ‘Micro’-Uses of the Goodness-Happiness-Glory Triad
‘Micro’-Use #1: Greatest Love at the Summit of Perfect Goodness (summa)
In III.2-5 Richard calls forward three witnesses to testify for the truth of the 
plurality of persons in Divinity: (a) the fullness of goodness, (b) the fullness of happiness,
and (c) the fullness of glory. III.2 provides Richard’s statement of what he intends to 
prove. He writes that the “fullness of goodness (plenitudo bonitatis) shows clearly from 
the nature of charity that in true divinity a plurality of persons cannot be lacking.”241 As 
we mentioned earlier, where Anselm turned the “Principle of Perfection” in Augustine 
(i.e., “God is whatever-it-is-better-to-be-than-not-to-be”) to the “Principle of ‘Maximal’ 
Perfection” (i.e., “God is the best of whatever-it-is-better-to-be-than-not-to-be”), Richard 
turns his attention to the “plenitude” of this “maximal perfection” (i.e., God is the fullness
of the best that it is better to be than not to be). Thus we see Richard regularly arguing 
first for what is highest among goods in accordance with Anselm’s principle of maximal 
perfection, and subsequently for the fullness of that highest good at the summit of 
perfection.242 Richard writes, “. . . in order that charity be supreme and supremely perfect
241 Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 375.
242 As Coulter notes, “. . . the terms summus and plenitudo identify the framework within which 
Richard formulates all attributes of a maximally perfect being.” Coulter, 210-211. But there is also a middle
integritas that serves as the middle term between them (also noticed by den Bok, 307 n. 98), as will be 
made clear in what follows.
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(summa et summe perfecta), it is necessary that it be so great that nothing greater can 
exist and that it be of such a kind that nothing better can exist.”243 Richard places charity 
at the summit of God’s perfections. Then he shifts to point out its fullness. He writes, 
“But where there is fullness of all goodness, true and supreme charity cannot be lacking. 
For nothing is better than charity; nothing is more perfect than charity.”244 And so, from 
the fullness of supreme goodness, Richard derives the supreme and perfect love from 
which a plurality of persons cannot be lacking. The “fullness of goodness” who testifies 
about supreme charity becomes the first of three witnesses in support of the conclusion 
that true Divinity must consist of a plurality of persons. Fullness of goodness entails 
fullness of charity; and fullness of charity—by which one person loves another person 
supremely—requires a plurality of persons.245 
The second witness called to testify to the plurality of persons is the “fullness of 
happiness” (plenitudo felicitatis). In III.3, Richard appeals to a distinction between 
ontological and subjective value. In III.2 Richard argues that supreme charity has 
superior, objective ontological worth; that is, on the scale of things great to be or have, 
supreme and perfect charity is highest among them (summe caritatis). In III.3, however, 
the focus changes. Rather than arguing for charity as the highest of objective goods, 
Richard now argues that charity is the best of subjective goods; that is, charity is not only 
243 Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 375.
244 Ibid.
245 The same idea was already in Gregory the Great: “There cannot be love if there are not at least 
two persons: if love («dilectio») is self-love and does not tend to another person, it is not love («caritas»).” 
Quoted in den Bok, 287.
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better (melius) than other things but also the most pleasing and delightful (jocundius).246 
As he says, 
Let each person examine his consciousness; without doubt and 
without contradiction he will discover that just as nothing is better 
(melius) than charity, so nothing is more pleasing (jocundius) than 
charity. Nature and many experiences teach us this.247
Here again we see the language of Anselm, but Richard moves that logic toward the 
experiential quality of the perfection this being-than-which-none-greater-can-exist must 
have and enjoy. He writes further, “Therefore, just as that-than-which-nothing-better 
cannot be lacking in the fullness of true goodness, so also that-than-which-nothing-is-
more-pleasing cannot be lacking in the fullness of supreme happiness.”248 In order for 
there to be such fullness of supreme happiness (i.e., what is most pleasing), love must be 
“mutual.” There must be both “one who can show charity” and “one to whom charity can
be shown.”249 Therefore the second witness of supreme happiness also testifies that true 
Divinity must consist in a plurality of persons. 
The third witness called upon to establish the plurality of persons is the “fullness of 
glory” (plenitudo gloriae). Richard develops this in III.4 where he employs one of the 
246 The terminology of ‘ontological’ and ‘subjective’ is not found in Richard, but the distinction is 
there. The important point is that Richard assesses perfection of charity first with respect to possessing the 
property of supreme love and next with respect to its enjoyment. The distinction is between ‘having’ vs. 
‘experiencing’. The distinction is clearly articulated and used similarly by Achard: “First, they rejoice that 
such they have in part; then they rejoice because such is what they have in this way, for, to rejoice over 
something because they have it is one thing, and to rejoice over the quality of the thing they have is 
another.” Sermon 13.29 in Hugh Feiss, Achard of St. Victor: Works, 244.
247 Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 376.
248 Ibid., 378.
249 Ibid., 376.
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clearest examples of his reductio ad absurdum style of argument.250 He begins with the 
two key propositions needed to make his point:
   (p) There exists a plurality of persons in true Divinity
(~ p) There exists only one person in true Divinity
Richard then assumes the truth of the opposite proposition he wishes to prove and 
combines it with other known facts in order to elicit the absurdity: “If we say that in true 
Divinity there exists only one person, just as there is only one substance, then without 
doubt according to this He will not have anyone with whom He could share that infinite 
abundance of His fulness.”251 This could be true in one of two ways: (a) either by a 
defect of power (i.e., God lacks the ability such that even if He wished to have one to 
share His glory with, He could not have one to share with Him), or (b) by a defect of 
benevolence (i.e., even if God had the ability and could have one to share His glory with, 
He would not wish to share it). Given the known and previously established truth that 
God is undoubtedly omnipotent, the first possibility is ruled out, which leaves the latter. 
But if the latter were true—that God had the power to share but wished not to—this 
would lead to the absurdity that the God, whom we know must be that-which-is-greater-
than-anything-that-exists and lacking in no perfection, would be far less than perfect; for 
He would suffer from this severe defect of miserliness, which is uncharacteristic of true 
majesty and glory. A God who is powerful enough to share the infinite abundance of His 
250 The following is a specific instance of the reductio ad absurdum form of argument Richard uses 
to argue for the plurality of Divinity in bk. III. On the significance of the reductio ad absurdum form of 
argument to Richard’s treatise as a whole as well as its relationship to other forms of argument he employs,
see chapter 3 of this work, esp. nn. 183-185.
251 Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 377. 
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fullness, but unwilling to, would not be the being-than-which-none-greater-can-exist and 
who lacks no perfection. And given this absurdity, which derives from the supposed truth
of (~ p), Richard establishes—beyond the shadow of a doubt—that (p) must be true: 
Necessarily “there exists a plurality of persons in true Divinity.” All of this is spelled out 
by Richard in terms of love: 
. . . nothing is sweeter than charity; nothing more pleasing than 
charity. The life of reason (rationalis vita) experiences nothing 
sweeter than the delights of charity (caritatis deliciis); enjoys no 
pleasure more pleasing than this. He would lack these delights in 
eternity if He remains all alone (solo solitaria) on the throne of 
majesty because He lacks fellowship (consortio carens in 
majestatis).252
In summary, then, the plurality of persons is established by the testimony of three 
witnesses: the fullness of goodness, the fullness of happiness, and the fullness of glory. 
The “Fullness of Goodness” establishes the plurality of persons by arguing from the 
objective, ontological superiority of charity among goods; the “Fullness of Happiness” 
establishes the plurality of persons by arguing from the subjective, experiential 
superiority of charity among pleasing things; and the “Fullness of Glory” establishes the 
plurality of persons by arguing that sharing is required of true majesty. Thus all three 
independently testify and mutually solidify the conclusion that true Divinity must consist 
of a plurality of persons. Richard integrates it all beautifully in III.5: 
Behold, concerning the plurality of persons, we have presented our 
teaching with such transparent reasoning that whoever wishes to 
oppose such a clear confirmation would seem to suffer from the 
disease of folly . . .
252 Ibid.
123
[Witness #1:] For who, except someone suffering from the disease 
of madness, would say that there is lacking in the supreme 
goodness (summe bonitati) that than which nothing is more perfect 
(nihil perfectius), and nothing better (melius)?
[Witness #2:] Who, I ask, except someone weak in mind, would 
deny there is the supreme happiness (summe felicitati) that than 
which nothing is more joyful (nihil jocundius) and nothing sweeter 
(nihil est dulcius)?
[Witness #3:] Who, I say, except someone devoid of reason, would 
think that there could be lacking in the fullness of glory 
(plenitudine glorie) that than which nothing is more glorious (nihil 
gloriosius) and nothing more magnificent (nihil magnificentius)? 
[All Three Witnesses:] Certainly nothing is better (nil melius), 
nothing is more joyful (nil certe jocundius), nothing is more 
magnificent (omnino nil magnificentius) than true (vera), sincere 
(sincera) and supreme charity (summa caritate), which he knows 
does not exist without a plurality of persons (personarum 
pluralitate).253
In his first use of the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad Richard notably takes a 
biblical principle found throughout the Scriptures of the need for two witnesses to 
establish the veracity of a judicial claim and adds a third witness to “applaud” the 
testimonies of the other two. Richard takes a two with a biblical precedent and turns it 
into three. He does not need three arguments to make his claim. He could very well have 
argued for the truth of the plurality of persons with just one or two elements of the triad 
(e.g., either Goodness or Happiness). If he wanted to align his use with the biblical 
precedent, he would only need two arguments. But because he is intentional in 
253 Ibid., 378. The “true, sincere, and supreme” may also be a very small reverse chiastic structure 
(e.g., true-magnificence, sincere-joy, supreme-love). Richard’s summary also reveals that the ‘flow’ or 
ductus of this material in III.2-5 follows his “Nihil . . . nihil” constructions (e.g., Goodness: melius to 
perfectius, Happiness: jucundius to dulcius, Glory: gloriosius to magnificentius). These constructions give 
us the structural and semantic framework of the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad Richard uses to structure 
the material in III.2-20. This “Nihil . . . nihil” is also frequent in strophe VIII.2 of the “Lux iocunda, lux 
insignis” sequence the Victorines recited at Pentecost where there are other verbal parallels with this 
material in book III. For the sequence, see Fassler, 276.
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articulating the Trinity “trinitarianly,” and Scriptures do not preclude the addition of a 
third witness,254 he turns the two into three to fit a trinitarian form.255 
‘Micro’-Use #2: Most Integral Love in The Purest Happiness (integritas)
Interestingly enough, Richard not only uses this Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad in 
the opening section and other sections of book III, but he also adopts it as a governing 
triad that triadically structures III.2-20. Thus Richard uses a ‘macro’ Goodness-
Happiness-Glory triad to divide book III into three sections in addition to a ‘micro’ 
Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad to structure all three! We have already seen the opening 
argument Richard makes for the plurality of persons from supreme charity on the basis of
this triad in III.2-5. In the second section, III.7/11-13, Richard argues for the “Trinity” of 
persons (i.e., that there must be at least three divine persons in Divinity) from the 
“fullness” of charity. In a way that parallels Richard’s use of the fullness of happiness to 
speak of the “pleasing quality” of love, Richard turns in III.7/11-13 to the mutual quality 
and E-quality of this supreme love to argue for the Trinity of persons. In III.7 Richard 
establishes that supreme love can only obtain among supreme equals; III.11-13 then 
builds on III.7 by describing the order and ardor of loving supremely. Thus in III.7 
Richard writes, “Surely it ought to be noted that as true charity demands a plurality of 
254 See n. 239 of this work.
255 By contrast, in Twelve Patriarchs lxxxi, Richard states the same principle but only asks for two 
witnesses: “I do not accept Christ without a witness nor can any probable showing be confirmed without 
the witness of Moses and Elijah, without the authority of Scripture. Therefore let Christ summon two 
witnesses to Himself in His transfiguration if He wishes that the light of His splendor, which is so great and
so unusual, not be suspect to me.” Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 139.
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persons, so supreme charity demands equality of persons” (italics mine).256 This shows 
both a connection with III.2-5 as well as a decisive shift to a new section on the 
“equality” and “integrity” of supreme love. Richard continues, “And so in true Divinity, 
as the particular nature (proprietas) of charity requires a plurality of persons, so the 
integrity of the same charity requires supreme equality of persons in true plurality” 
(italics mine).257 This shift from III.2-5 to III.7/11-13 is further indicated by a transition 
from “supreme love” to a new section on “loving supremely” as this relates to both the 
equality of the divine persons (III.7) and the quality (i.e., order and ardor) of their mutual 
love (III.11-13). Furthermore, Richard recalls the “witnesses” he interrogated in III.2-5. 
He writes in III.11, “And so, concerning the assertion of Trinity, let us question the same 
witnesses we brought forth above to testify for plurality” (emphasis mine).258
So Richard uses the same Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad from III.2-5 for this new 
section in III.7/11-13, but with a twist. That twist consists of baptizing the triad in its 
second element—the fullness of happiness with respect to its pleasing quality. In III.2-5, 
Richard argued, “ . . . in order for charity to be supreme and supremely perfect (summa et
summe perfecta), it is necessary that it be so great that nothing greater can exist, and that 
it be so excellent that no better love can exist.”259 The move there was from “no greater 
love” (majus) to “no better love” (melius). In III.11-13, Richard moves from “no greater 
love” (maximum) to the most excellent love (praecipuum): “For just as in supreme 
256 Richard, De Trinitate III.7; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 379.
257 Ibid.
258 Richard, De Trinitate III.11; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 384.
259 Richard, De Trinitate III.2; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 375.
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charity what is greatest cannot be lacking, so what is clearly excellent cannot be lacking 
either.”260 The goodness of the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad in III.2-5, where the 
emphasis was upon the highest degree of love, has now become the excellence of joy 
experienced by those who love each other supremely. Richard writes, “Certainly in 
mutual and very fervent love nothing is rarer or more magnificent than to wish that 
another be loved equally by the one whom you love supremely and by whom you are 
supremely loved” (emphasis mine).261 Therefore on the basis of this most excellent love, 
there must be a third, a partaker of the love of the other two (condilectum). 
Next, Richard considers the defect of “grief” that would exist if each lacked a 
partaker of their mutual love—either on the basis of lack of power or lack of will—and 
argues that the “ . . . fullness of happiness excludes every defect of charity, whose 
perfection (consummatio) demands a Trinity of persons, . . . ” (italics mine).262 He thus 
combines supreme happiness with supreme goodness of his previous argument to give a 
“mutual attestation” of the truth that there must be a Trinity of persons in divinity. But he 
still has the third part of the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad to use. And he secures this 
by moving from the “grief” that would obtain from a defect of power or will in desiring a 
partaker, to a consideration of the “shame” that would obtain for those who would lack 
such a partaker in their love. As Richard says, “But just as in supreme happiness there 
cannot be a cause for grieving, so in the fullness of supreme glory there cannot be a 
260 Richard, De Trinitate III.11; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 384.
261 Ibid.
262 Richard, De Trinitate III.12; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 386.
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matter of embarrassment.” Such a defect would hide “ . . . the splendor of so much glory”
(italics mine).263
Richard confirms his use of the same Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad in this 
second section when he summarizes it all in III.13:
Behold how the fullness of divine goodness and the fullness of 
happiness and glory come together in one witness to truth. They 
clearly demonstrate what ought to be thought concerning the 
fullness of divine charity in that plurality of persons. Together, they 
condemn suspicion of any defect in that supreme charity; in accord 
they proclaim the fullness of all perfection. In order for charity to 
be true, it demands a plurality of persons; in order for charity to be 
perfected, it requires a Trinity of persons.264 
Whereas the first section was an argument from “supreme charity,” this second is an 
argument about the “fullness of divine charity” from which Richard derives the Trinity of
persons. We also see that in the same way Richard summarized the argument of his first 
section, he also summarizes this one—taking all three considerations into account to hold
forth a single truth. 
We have already shown that Richard uses triads and triadic structures for the 
broader horizon of his work. We have also demonstrated that he uses triads within 
specific sections of his treatise. Now we point out that he employs triads that reflect the 
dogma of Trinitarian orthodoxy: “one substance, three persons” before moving on to 
Richard’s third, and final, ‘micro’-use of the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad in 
III.14-20.
263 Richard, De Trinitate III.13; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 386-87.
264 Richard alludes to the language of the courtroom in bk. III: e.g., interrogate, witnesses, proclaim, 
condemn, attest. Richard further plays with this courtroom language by connecting “condemnation” 
(damnatio) with arguments against any “defects” (defectus) of charity and “proclamation” (acclamatio) 
with arguments for the “integrity” (integritas) of charity.
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At the conclusions of III.2-5 and III.7/11-13 Richard summarizes each section so as 
to make each element of the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad undergird one attestation of
truth. In III.2-5, Richard uses Goodness-Happiness-Glory, with an emphasis on the first 
element (Goodness: i.e., the highest of goods), to argue for the single truth that there is a 
plurality of persons in Divinity. In III.7/11-13, Richard uses the same triad with an 
emphasis on the second element (Happiness: i.e., equal joy), to argue “in one witness to 
truth” what must be understood about the fullness of divine love in the plurality of 
persons.265 The truth is that out of a mutual and ardent love they require a partaker of 
their love; thus a “trinity” is consummated.266 Therefore each ‘micro’-use of the 
Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad in these two sections of book III, consists of three 
arguments for a single truth. The first use establishes that there must be a plurality of 
persons in Divinity; the second that there must be at least a Trinity.267 In the next section,
III.14-20, we see Richard deriving the truth of both the plurality and Trinity of persons 
from a single argument, and with an emphasis on the third element (i.e., Glory). 
Therefore, in the same way that the Trinity consists of “one substance, three persons,” 
Richard uses one truth to argue for it in three ways, and conversely to argue from three 
considerations for that one truth. He thus turns a dyad into a triad to fit a trinitarian form. 
He then relates the three elements of that triad to one truth. And in the process, he “draws
out” a form to this material that reflects the significance of the trinitarian dogma: three in 
265 Richard, De Trinitate III.13; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 387.
266 Ibid.
267 Richard’s argument for limiting the number of divine persons to only three comes later in V.15.
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one. He provides a trinity of arguments for the Trinity of divine persons. He argues for 
the Trinity “trinitarianly.” 
‘Micro’-Use #3: Fullest Love Out of the Most Abundant Glory (plenitudo)
In the third section, III.14-20, Richard takes up the third element in the Goodness-
Happiness-Glory triad to gather everything he has previously considered into one, single 
argument. As he says, “But so that this may be more apparent, let us gather into a unity 
what we have said more diffusely.”268 He considers whether it might be possible to 
obtain from some element of a single divine person alone both the plurality and Trinity of
persons the earlier two sections already secured.269 How will Richard obtain this? He 
considers the “abundance” of Divinity’s glory. He writes, “And for the magnificence of 
His honor, He rejoices over sharing the riches as much as He glories over enjoying the 
abundance of delights and sweetness” (italics mine).270 Richard takes the goodness that 
consists in a divine person “possessing” a bounty of riches and the happiness involved in 
“enjoying” such abundance and subsumes them to the glory that is “the magnificence of 
His honor.” Thus Richard emphasizes the third term of the Goodness-Happiness-Glory 
triad by looking at the “supreme benevolence” that can only be enjoyed and bestowed by 
one who has supreme glory.271
268 Richard, De Trinitate III.14; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 387.
269 The relationship between the new argument in III.14-20 and the one in III.7/11-13 mirrors the 
relationship of Anselm’s Monologion and Proslogion where the latter was a condensation of the former 
into a “single argument” for the existence of God. The pattern is found elsewhere in Richard’s De Trinitate.
270 Richard, De Trinitate III.14; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 387-388.
271 Richard’s constellation of terms (e.g., “glory,” “honor,” “majesty,” “magnificence,” etc.) relate 
to the “aura” or “reputation” of a person’s glory or majesty.
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Richard derives the plurality and Trinity of persons based on a consideration of 
supreme benevolence (benevolentia) in the following way. First, he argues for the 
“fellowship of a fraternity” (consortio societatis) by pointing out that the supreme 
magnitude of one divine person would entail an “abundance of delights (deliciarum) and 
sweetness (dulcedinis)”—an abundance that could neither be “had” nor “enjoyed” 
without the acquisition of “intimate love (intimae dilectionis).”272 There must, therefore 
be, at minimum, a plurality of persons in Divinity. But if there is only one partner (unam 
sociam) then “He alone [would possess]273 the sweetness of such delights who has a 
partner and a loved one (sociam et condilectum) in the love that has been shown to 
Him.”274 Therefore, in order for there to be a “communion of love” (communio amoris) 
there must be at least a Trinity of persons.275 
Next Richard moves to a consideration of the second term of the triad (i.e., 
Happiness) in his argument from benevolence. Richard’s emphasis is on the generous 
nature276 of this supreme benevolence and what it entails for true Divinity. Thus III.14 
focuses on the abundance that true Divinity must possess (e.g., goods, bounty, 
abundance) in order to show such magnificent generosity. While one may have a 
benevolent and generous disposition, one cannot be supremely generous without 
272 Richard, De Trinitate III.14; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 387.
273 Despite the present tense ‘possidet’, the context indicates it should be understood 
counterfactually. I’ve modified Zinn’s translation to make this more clear.
274 Richard, De Trinitate III.14; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 387.
275 Ibid.
276 The basic meaning of ‘benevolentia’ is a generous disposition toward another, good-will, etc.
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possessing a bounty of goods to distribute and share. Thus Richard first emphasizes the 
‘Goodness’ component in the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad by attending to the 
abundant riches true Divinity must possess. But one cannot be supremely benevolent 
without also sharing these goods with others. Supreme benevolence also entails supreme 
generosity; that is, this abundance of goods must also be abundantly shared. And the 
quality and E-quality of this sharing, as emphasized in III.7/11-13, must consist of mutual
order and ardor. As Richard says: 
However, where equal benevolence exists in either person it is 
necessary that each with equal desire and for a similar reason 
should seek out a sharer of his excellent joy. For when two persons 
who mutually embrace each other with supreme longing and take 
supreme delight in each other’s love, then the supreme joy of the 
first is in the intimate love of the second, and conversely the 
excellent joy of the second is in the love of the first (emphasis 
mine).277 
From the goodness found in the bounty and abundance of riches in one divine 
person, Richard was able to derive the conclusion that there must be a “communion of 
love” (communio amoris) that requires a third mutually loved (III.14). Here, in the second
part of his argument (III.15), from the happiness found in the equal sharing of that 
abundance, Richard derives the conclusion that there must be a “communion of excellent 
joy” (praecipui gaudii communione) that requires a third mutually loved 
(condilectum).278 Richard then discusses why the supreme happiness requires both a 
plurality and Trinity of persons by pointing out that pleasures of wisdom and power could
be possessed by one divine person alone; and hence an argument from the pleasures of 
277 Richard, De Trinitate III.15; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 388-89.
278 Richard, De Trinitate III.15; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 389.
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either wisdom or power cannot deliver an argument from reason for the plurality or 
Trinity of persons. But the pleasures of charity, unlike the pleasures of wisdom and 
power that come only from one’s own heart, are drawn from the “heart of another.”279 So
supreme happiness requires at least two mutually loved. And as these two “ . . . draw the 
mellifluous delights of love (melliflua dilectionis oblectamenta)” from the hearts of each 
other, “ . . . a great accumulation of joy and pleasure builds up for anyone who gives and 
receives love in fellowship with another.” Thus “ . . . the supreme level of that generosity 
(benignitatis) would have no place in Divinity if a third person were lacking in that 
plurality of persons.”280 And so “ . . . the consummation of true and supreme goodness 
cannot subsist without completion of the Trinity.”281 
This concludes Richard’s use of the second term of the triad from a consideration of 
benevolence. But, if he is consistent, we should find him searching for a way to “draw 
out” the last element of the triad with respect to Glory. He does this by considering the 
“virtue” of the property of the mutual love for a third person. When one person bestows 
love upon another, this is dilectio not condilectio (i.e., the mutual love for a third). But, 
“Shared love is properly said to exist when a third person is loved by two persons 
harmoniously and in community, and the affection of the two persons is fused into one 
affection by the flame of love for the third.”282 As Richard further notes, this is not 
“shared love” but “supreme shared love. (summa condilectione).” He then asks a few 
279 Richard, De Trinitate III.16; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 389.
280 Richard, De Trinitate III.18; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 391.
281 Ibid.
282 Richard, De Trinitate III.19; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 392.
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questions, showing that he connects the “virtue” of condilectionis with the great “dignity”
obtained in those who perfectly exemplify it.283 He asks: 
If there is so much worth (dignitas) for each person in these two 
virtues [i.e., (a) supreme and totally perfect benevolence and (b) 
intimate and supreme harmony] on account of the virtue itself, what 
virtue, what worth, I ask, will there be where each is fashioned on 
account of the other, where one is greatly praised (magnificatur) on 
account of the other, where one is brought to consummation on 
account of the other? (emphasis mine)284
And he concludes that “Just as a virtue of so much worth (tantae dignitatis) and 
supereminent excellence (supereminentis excellentiae) cannot be lacking in the supreme 
and altogether perfect good, so it is not able to subsist without a Trinity of persons” 
(emphasis mine).285
Does Richard summarize III.14-20 in such a way that it reflects one truth held up by 
these three considerations as he does in III.2-5 and III.7/11-13? In III.20 he writes, 
“Consider now how union with a third person establishes concordant affection 
everywhere and brings about consocial love through all and in all.” Simply take any one 
of the divine persons and we will  “ . . . see the other two love the third concordantly.” 
We recall from III.14 the abundance “had” by Divinity that requires a plurality and a 
283 Here it is is not the experience of condilectionis but the virtue and dignity that comes from 
having it that Richard wishes to emphasize. See n. 271 above on Richard’s associations of glory with 
“aura” or “reputation.”
284 Richard, De Trinitate III.19; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 392. Si tanta itaque dignitas est in 
his duabus virtutibus cuique ex semetipsa, quid, quaeso, virtutis, quid dignitatis inerit ubi quaevis conditur 
ex altera, ubi una magnificatur ex alia, ista consummatur ex illa? Richard’s prepositions seem to make 
further Trinitarian allusions he develops in I-II with respect to being from eternity and V-VI with respect to
the modes of procession: e.g., ex semetipsa (being from eternity and from itself), quaevis ex altera (two 
being from eternity but from another; conditur, literally “built up from”), una ex alia (one procession 
magnified on account of the first), ista ex illa (another procession consummated on account of the second).
285 Ibid.
134
third mutually loved. This is the Goodness of benevolence: the bounty, the “communion 
of love” (communio amoris) that requires both a companion and lover (sociam et 
condilectum). When we take a look at a second divine person we find that the “ . . . 
remaining pair unite with equal desire in love for him.” We remember from III.15 how 
this abundance is “shared” in all of its fullness. This is the Happiness of benevolence: the 
“communion of excellent joy.” And finally, when we look at a third divine person we see 
the “ . . . affection of the others flows in equal harmony to the third.” We call to mind the 
“virtue” and “dignity” of such an abundance where each person is magnified and 
consummated through fellowship with the others in III.19. This is the Glory of 
abundance, of benevolence, of generosity. Richard brings it all to a fitting summary: 
Behold how from shared fellowship (consodalitate) with a third 
person in that Trinity it is argued that concordant charity 
(concordialis) and consocial love (consocialis) are never found 
anywhere in an isolated individual.286
Thus, from a detailed and microscopic analysis of III.2-20, we see Richard being 
very intentional in constructing his treatise with triads and triadic structures. In book III 
he has taken the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad and used it as the basis for structuring 
the material in III.2-20. It draws this material out into three sections corresponding to 
each element in that triad. And within each of those three sections, Richard employs the 
triad to make three considerations illuminate a single truth. III.2-5 takes the Goodness-
Happiness-Glory triad to argue for the plurality of Divinity from a consideration of 
“supreme charity” and with an emphasis on Goodness (i.e., supreme charity is the 
286 Richard, De Trinitate III.20; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 393. Richard considers ‘simplicity’ 
in I-II a perfection, whereas ‘individuality’ is lacking without a trinitarian consummation. It may be perfect 
but it is not supremely perfect without this consummation. 
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greatest of all virtues; there is nothing greater, nothing better). III.7/11-13 takes the same 
triad to argue for the Trinity of persons from a consideration of the “fullness of supreme 
charity” and with an emphasis on Happiness (i.e., the quality and E-quality of the perfect 
charity requires a third mutually loved). And III.14-20 takes the triad from a 
consideration of benevolence and with an emphasis upon Glory (i.e., the virtue and 
dignity of having, sharing, and manifesting the unsurpassable excellence of “supreme 
mutual love” (summa condilectione)). 
Individually and together, Richard’s use of the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad in 
book III makes a strong case for the thesis that Richard argues for the Trinity 
“trinitarianly”—that he constructs his arguments in ways that reflect the trinitarian 
dogma. We see this in how he employs this triad throughout book III as well as in how he
summarizes each section with three considerations attesting to one truth: God is one 
substance and three persons. Richard’s arguments not only provide necessary reasons for 
the greater certainty of this truth; the very form his arguments take seem to manifest it! 
Perspective: Additional Trinitarian Structures and Triads
When we turn our attention to the other books of De Trinitate we also find Richard 
using triads and triadic structures. In the prologue to the work Richard lists no fewer than 
eight of them. None of these triads form a structure within the Prologue, but the fact that 
Richard opens his work with so many right at the outset is good reason to suspect that he 
will give special attention to triads in the rest of his work (Fig. 4.4). 
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VIRTUES Faith Hope Charity
FAITH Beginning Foundation Perfection
HEAVENS 1st 2nd 3rd
LIFE Immortality Incorruptibility Eternal
BEINGS Human Angelic Divine
GOODS Inheritance Merit Divinity Alone
MEANS OF
ASCENT
Actuality Virtue Intellect
KNOWLEDGE by faith by reason by experience
Fig. 4.4 Triads in the Prologue of Richard’s De Trinitate
 In book I Richard adds further triads287 but only one serves to structure the content 
of his work there: namely, the triad of Highest-Best-Fullest. This is the ‘macro’ triad of 
book I. The ‘micro’ triad is Being-Power-Wisdom. Book I is significantly briefer than the
other books and seems to retain earlier material. The opening chapters in I.1-5 detail 
more of Richard’s method in beginning with the articles of faith in the Quicumque and 
searching for necessary reasons. As he says, “I have read but not seen proven . . . ,” “I 
hear daily . . . ,” “I find . . . ,” “Authorities abound but I don’t recall proofs.”288 I.7-10 
establish three modes of being and which of those modes will be the focus of the entire 
treatise. Three modes of being obtain among everything that is or can be: (a) being from 
eternity and from itself, (b) being neither from eternity nor from itself, and (c) being from
eternity and not from itself. He then gives arguments for the existence of each of these 
287 These triads are as follows: Reasoning: Demonstration, Inference, Certainty; Value: Worthy, 
Suitable, Diligent; Source: from-himself-not-another, from-one-person-not-another, from-two-persons-not-
one-person-alone; Divinity: Father, Son, Holy Spirit; Eternity: from-eternity-and-from-itself, not-from-
eternity-nor-itself, from-eternity-not-from-itself; Being: Substance-Power-Wisdom.
288 Richard, De Trinitate I.5.
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modes of being, establishing that all three exist.289 But the unique focus of De Trinitate is
on those two modes of being that are from eternity. Books I-II give special attention to 
the first mode of being from eternity and from itself; III-VI continue to treat the first 
mode of being, but with special attention to that other mode of being from eternity and 
not from itself. In short, I-II treat Divinity in se; III-VI, Divinity ad intra.
Richard organizes book I with the Highest-Best-Fullest triad in three sections. 
I.11-12 take the being from eternity and from itself and argue that it must be the 
“highest” being of all. As such, it must be rational because rational is greater than 
irrational nature, and therefore it must be the highest rational nature of all.290 It is that 
“power of being” (essendi potentia) from which every essence, all power, and all wisdom
come to be. It is the dispenser of everything; and is thus rightly called “primordial 
substance” (substantia primordialis).291
The second part of the Highest-Best-Fullest triad is given in I.13-18. In this section 
Richard describes the internal nature of this primordial being that is from eternity and 
from itself. Its substance, power, and wisdom are all identical.292 And, as seems to be a 
pattern for Richard, he tends to use the second element of his triads to discuss the quality 
and E-quality of the thing. Thus this section focuses on questions of greater or lesser. He 
289 According to den Bok, this approach differs from (a) Aquinas’s cosmological arguments that 
infer a necessary cause from the causes of created things; and (b) Anselm’s ontological argument, 
principles of which Richard employs in De Trinitate III. Richard’s argument in bk. I “from specific 
ontological features of created things” appears to be unique to him and was followed by Dons Scotus who 
referred to it as “ratio Richardi.” For more on this, see den Bok, 172 n. 87.
290 Richard, De Trinitate I.11.
291 Richard, De Trinitate I.12.
292 Richard, De Trinitate I.13.
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has already established that the primordial substance must be the greatest. He then asks 
whether the primordial substance can have either an “equal” partaker of its substance or 
an “inferior” partaker of its substance; and he proves that neither is possible.293 He 
concludes that “true Divinity is in a unity of substance, and a true unity of substance is in 
the Divinity.”294 I.17 opens the possibility that despite the unity of substance in Divinity, 
it is still logically possible for Divinity to have one or multiple persons. What is 
important is that Divinity is nothing other than God and that there is no multiplicity with 
respect to the divine substance. Without this ‘logical space’, Richard would not be able to
make the further arguments he does in books III-VI with respect to the divine persons and
their processions. He then summarizes these arguments in I.18: Regardless of whether 
one looks at substance, power, or wisdom, “ . . . nothing greater and nothing better than 
God can either be determined by him or be reached through intelligence.” God is the 
supreme substance and has no equal.
The third part of the Highest-Best-Fullest triad is taken up in I.19-24 and focuses on 
the “fullness” and “perfection” of the primordial substance with respect to its Being-
Power-Wisdom. I.19-20 show that Richard moves from a consideration of what is 
“better” to what is considered “best” (melius) and “perfect” (perfectius). As he says, 
“Therefore, the more human thinking attains to what is best and perfect, the closer it 
ascends to that which is God, even though it does not reach up to him.”295 In I.11-12, 
293 Richard, De Trinitate I.14-15.
294 Richard, De Trinitate I.16.
295 Richard, De Trinitate I.19. Cf. Augustine and Anselm at nn. 45 and 63 of this work.
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Richard applies the Augustinian “Principle of Perfection” to establish that the primordial 
substance must be the better of what-it-is-better-to-be-or-not-to-be. In I.13-18, Richard 
applies Anselm’s “Principle of ‘Maximal’ Perfection” to argue that the primordial 
substance must be the being-than-which-none-greater-can-be-thought; it must have no 
partaker and no equal. Finally, in I.19-24, Richard introduces his own “Principle of the 
‘Fullness’ of Maximal Perfection” as this applies to the divine substance. And thus he 
shifts from the integrity of Divine substance to a consideration of its fullness and 
perfection. 
Richard also resorts to a chiastic structure in I.21-24 before he summarizes in I.25. 
In the outer part of the chiastic structure, I.21 and I.24, he argues that the divine 
substance is supremely powerful (summe potens). This is so, first of all, because Divinity 
does not lack the fullness of omnipotence; God is not merely the best of all powerful 
beings that exist, but the most powerful of any being that could ever exist. He is “truly” 
omnipotent: the most powerful being (I.21). What’s more, God does not lack the fullness 
of omnipotence, because the omnipotence he possesses, he has from himself and not from
another. He is his own source of omnipotence (I.24), and therefore “truly” omnipotent. 
Likewise, in the inner part of the chiastic structure, I.22 and I.23, Richard makes the 
same arguments with respect to wisdom. God is “truly” all-wise because he is the wisest 
being there could ever be (I.22) and he has his wisdom from himself, not from another 
(I.23). Richard finally brings his arguments for the perfect omnipotence and perfect 
wisdom of God to a fitting conclusion pertaining to the “substance” that makes them one.
Then he repeats the creedal formula he concluded with in the second section: “ . . . true 
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divinity remains in unity of substance, and unity of substance remains in true divinity.”296
In book II, Richard uses triads and triadic structures to organize his material, but 
with a level of detail and intricacy that goes beyond what we find in book I. And 
consequently, Richard’s “expanding” of sections of his work with new material becomes 
more evident in book II.297 The first two sections of book II form a large chiastic 
structure coalescing around the triad he devotes the most attention to in these sections: 
the three divine properties of Uncreated-Eternal-Immeasurable.298 II.1 and II.8 form the 
outer part of the chiastic structure. In II.1, Richard argues that God is uncreated and in 
II.8, that there can be only one uncreated. II.2-4 parallel II.7 to form the next rung of the 
chiasm. In II.2-4 he argues that God is eternal, and in II.7 that there can be only one 
eternal being. The third, final, and inner section of the chiasm consists of II.5 and II.6. In 
II.5 Richard establishes that God is immeasurable; in II.6 he argues that there can be only 
one immeasurable God. The chiasm uses the Uncreated-Eternal-Immeasurable triad in 
the following way (Fig. 4.5): 
296 Richard, De Trinitate I.25.
297 For more on Richard’s method of expanding his previous work, see Appendix A.
298 These three properties correspond to the three divine properties emphasized, and recited, in the 
Quicumque: “Increatus Pater, increatus Filius, increatus Spiritus Sanctus. Immensus Pater, immensus 
Filius, immensus Spiritus Sanctus. Aeternus Pater, aeternus Filius, aeternus Spiritus Sanctus.”
141
II.1 Uncreated
II.2-4 Eternal
II.5 Immeasurable
II.6 Only One Immeasurable
II.7 Only One Eternal
II.8 Only One Uncreated 
Fig. 4.5 Uncreated-Eternal-Immeasurable Chiasm in II.1-8
II.1-5 establish these three divine properties, and II.6-10 that they can only be 
appropriated to one being. There can be no other being with the same properties. II.2-4 
extend Richard’s description of the “eternal” property which entails no end (everlasting), 
no decay to a worse state (incorruptibility), and no change to a better or equal state 
(immutability).299 II.9-10 contain a further argument for these divine and 
incommunicable properties of Divinity on the basis of how well they “cohere” with one 
another. Their optimal consistency and “mutual relationships” with each other are further 
evidence for their truth. II.9 demonstrates the harmony from the mutual relation of the 
Uncreated and Eternal properties; II.10 from the Eternal and Immeasurable properties.300
At the end of II.10, Richard connects with his earlier material in book I where he 
argued for the unity of divinity from omnipotence. Since the divine properties are 
299 Richard takes the three elements of Uncreated-Everlasting-Immutable understood as No 
Beginning-No Ending-No Change to be a triadic proof for the eternity of Divinity. See Richard’s De 
Trinitate II.4. Augustine’s Unchangeable-Invisible-Immortal triad in his De Trinitate II.7-9 counters the 
corresponding Arian views (e.g., Changeable-Visible-Mortal) with an exegesis of 1 Timothy 1:17.
300 For more on this harmonizing method of Richard, see “Richard’s Penchant for ‘Harmonizing 
Opposites’” in chapter 6 of this work.
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identical to each other (because the divine substance has an ultimate, super-simplicity), 
God’s omnipotence is identical to his immeasurability and eternity. In II.11 Richard 
engages in a digression concerning the two properties of Divinity (e.g., Power and 
Wisdom) that seem to be communicable since other rational beings participate in them; 
that is, despite the fact that Richard has argued for the incommunicability of these 
properties, they don’t seem to be limited to Divinity alone. In II.12 Richard introduces 
the triad of General-Special-Individual with respect to substantiality (substantialitas) in 
order to show that God’s power and wisdom—though we apply the same words to other 
rational substances—are sui generis when used of Divinity. They should be understood 
as “supreme Wisdom” or “supreme Power,” and hence incommunicable with respect to 
their supreme status. In short, while “power” and “wisdom” are communicable properties 
(i.e., humans and God have both power and wisdom), omnipotence and omni-wisdom301 
are incommunicable and belong to God alone. Proof that II.11-14 is a digression, and 
therefore added at a later date, consists of the fact that the summary for the chiastic 
Uncreated-Eternal-Immeasurable triad comes directly at the end of the digression in 
II.15.302 Richard writes: 
Except for what we already said above about the singularity of the 
divinity, behold how many ways we can prove that there is only 
one God. One uncreated, one eternal, and one immeasurable—each 
property proves and clearly demonstrates that there is only one 
God.
The reason this summary is included at the beginning of II.15, which initiates a new 
301 See n. 7 of this work.
302 II.11-14 is a digression on the perplexity of the communicability / incommunicability of the 
divine properties of power and wisdom.
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section of book II, is that Richard, having considered the “unity” of Divinity (divinitatis 
unitate) in book I (i.e., there is one divine substance) and the “singularity” of Divinity 
(divinitatis singularitate) in the last half of the chiasm of book II (i.e., there is only one 
God who is uncreated, eternal, immeasurable), now wants to use a single argument to 
argue for the harmony of the unity and singularity of Divinity. He sees it as a fuller 
elaboration of the previous arguments he has made until now; a form that matches the 
Highest-Best-Fullest triad he used in book I. In book I Richard argued that the divine 
substance is supremely one (summe unum). In the last part of the chiastic structure of 
book II Richard argued that the divine substance is singularly supreme (unice summum). 
Now, from a single consideration of unity, and particularly with the consideration of the 
creedal formula “There is one Lord,” Richard argues for the supremely simple identity of 
Divinity; that is, he will take the unity of book I and the singularity of book II to argue for
the “full identity” of unity and singularity.
The section for the full identity of unity and singularity begins in II.15 with the 
argument for establishing the truth recited in the Quicumque, that there is “one Lord.” In 
a way that reminds of the “Divinity can have no inferior, superior, or equal” of book I,303 
Richard demonstrates likewise that there can be only one Lord from a reductio ad 
absurdum argument that leads to the absurdity that he-who-cannot-be-the-slave-of-
another-nor-the-equal-of-another would be the slave of another or the equal of another. 
And since this is contradictory, there must be one Lord. 
303 Further evidence that bks. I and II form a unit in establishing the unity and singularity of Divinity 
comes when Richard explicitly connects his “one Lord” argument with his argument in bk. I for “one 
God”: “For, just as it is only possible for one God to exist who is omnipotent, so there it is only possible for
one Lord to exist.” Richard, De Trinitate II.15. It is likely part of an earlier sequence based on the 
Quicumque. See n. 309 of this work.
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From this consideration of supreme Lordship, Richard uses the desire of he-who-is-
omnipotent to draw out a further argument for the “fullness” and then the “identity” of 
the simplicity and unicity of Divinity. Because omnipotent, God lacks nothing that he 
desires. As Richard says, “No fullness (plenitudo) and no perfection (perfectio) can be 
lacking where there is omnipotence.”304 And further, “Nothing can be better and nothing 
can be greater than that which is full and perfect (plenum et perfectum) in every respect 
(in omnibus).”305 Therefore, “God is the supreme good and his own good to himself.”306 
What’s more, this fullness extends to the happiness and blessedness of Divinity: “For 
what is blessedness other than the fullness and perfection of all good things?”307 The 
direction of the argument in II.16 is toward the “multiplicity” or “fullness” of supreme 
goodness; in II.17 he shifts in the opposite direction to its “simplicity.” The divine is full 
and perfect but also supremely simple. It is simple in the sense that it is non-composite: 
there are no “distinct realities” in the supreme Good. In II.18 Richard argues further, and 
in conclusion, that because Divinity’s properties are identical, “ . . . whatever is in the 
supreme good and true divinity is truly, substantially, and supremely one.” We thus find 
another of Richard’s fitting summaries reflecting a trinitarian form where he takes the full
multiplicity of the supreme Good on the one hand, and the total simplicity of the supreme 
Good on the other, to see the intricate identity of this perfection and simplicity in one 
304 Richard, De Trinitate II.16.
305 Ibid.
306 Ibid.
307 “Quid est enim beatitudo, nisi bonorum omnium plenitudo atque perfectio?” Richard, De 
Trinitate II.16.
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Divinity. This has established, from a consideration of unity alone, a supreme Good both 
wholly perfect and supremely simple. In II.19 Richard makes the further point—as he did
for each of the divine properties in II.6-8—that there can be only one supreme Good. As 
Richard says: 
And so, as it was said, the entirely perfect good will be not only 
supremely one but also singularly supreme. . . . If God is truly the 
supreme good, then as there can only be one supreme good, so it is 
really clear what we believe: there is only one God.
So, there is only one Divinity. This Divinity is uncreated, eternal, and immeasurable; and 
there is only one uncreated, eternal, and immeasurable Divinity. Likewise, Divinity is 
supremely Good in the multiplicity and identity of its properties in a single, perfect 
essence. And there is only one supreme Good. 
This is further evidence that Richard sees books I-II forming a unit to establish the 
unity of Divinity. We pointed out that Richard conceives his entire treatise in accordance 
with the Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad. What is surprising, when we look to book I, is 
that Richard speaks only of Substance-Power-Wisdom and nothing of Goodness. There, 
he was able to show that there is only one supreme Power and only one supreme 
Wisdom, but he does not show in book I that there is only one supreme Goodness, as he 
does this later in II.19. In book III, Richard deliberately draws out a third argument so he 
can have three ways of establishing the same truth. He uses Goodness-Happiness-Glory 
to establish the plurality of persons in Divinity; and in the last one he derives a single 
argument from supreme Benevolence. Here we have something similar, but it spans I-II. 
We can see this by the fact that there are three distinct places at which Richard derives 
the conclusion that there is “only one God.” In I.11-25 he establishes the unity of 
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Divinity from the triad of supreme Substance-Power-Wisdom. In II.1-8 he establishes the
singularity of Divinity from each of the three divine properties of Uncreated-Eternal-
Immeasurable. And finally in II.15-19, he argues for the unity of Divinity with a single 
argument from supreme Goodness. 
What explains this sequence of material in I-II? One has to do with the fact that 
Richard takes his cues from the chronology of the pseudo-Athanasian creed. The 
Quicumque states that there are not three omnipotents, but one omnipotent; not three 
Gods, but one God; not three Lords, but one Lord.308 The material in I-II follows the 
order of the creedal formula in the Quicumque: One Omnipotent—> One God —> One 
Lord.309 But there is also the sequence in I-II of Power-Wisdom-Goodness. Supreme 
Power and supreme Wisdom are taken up in I.11-25 but supreme Goodness is taken up in
II.15-19 with Richard’s chiasm of Uncreated-Eternal-Immeasurable in II.1-8 coming 
between them. This sums up Richard’s argument to II.19. Clearly he uses multiple triads 
in I-II to sequence and structure his material despite the fact that some of these have 
separated as Richard added to his work. 
Finally, in a way that reminds us of the digression of II.11-14 with respect to the 
super-status of God’s incommunicable “power” and “wisdom,” Richard argues for a 
similar super-status of Divinity’s simplicity and unity; for it transcends all unities 
308 See Richard’s rehearsal of this element of the Quicumque in De Trinitate I.5.
309 Richard, De Trinitate, “one omnipotent” (I.25), “one God” (II.14), “one Lord” (II.15). I take it 
that the chiastic structure from II.1-8, the harmonizing of uncreated-eternal in II.9 and eternal-
immeasurable in II.10, as well as the digression on the (in)communicability of wisdom and power in 
II.11-14 expand the “one God” argument initiated in I.25 and concluded in II.14. The expansion is what 
accounts for both (1) the Quicumque sequence (i.e., Omnipotent-God-Lord) and (2) the separation of 
supreme Goodness (II.16ff.) from supreme Power and Wisdom in I.11-25.
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comprehensible to us. Thus in the same way that God’s wisdom and power transcend as 
‘omni-wisdom’ and ‘omni-potence’, so God’s simplicity and identity of properties 
transcend as a kind of ‘omni-simplicity’. All such divine properties elude the human 
mind; they are “above and beyond” it though they can be seen partially as in a mirror.310
In book IV we discover further connections with Richard’s triadic structures in I-III, 
noting that the Highest-Best-Fullest (summa-integritas-plenitudo) triad that organizes 
books I and III lies in the background in this book as well. Here, Richard clarifies the 
definition of ‘person’ in order to bring greater alignment between contemporary 
understandings of the term and its application to the Divine. He does this with a view to 
resolving the unity of Divinity he established in books I-II with the plurality of persons in
Divinity he proved in book III. The main triad Richard uses to organize his 
contemplations regarding this harmony in book IV is Meaning-Difference-Definition.311 
IV.1-10 pertain to the meaning of ‘person’ (i.e., that each divine person is a someone), 
IV.11-20 to the difference of persons (i.e., that each person exists separately), and 
IV.21-25 provide the definition of ‘person’ (i.e., that each person is distinguished by an 
individual distinction and distinct property). Richard explicitly states that he organizes his
material in accordance with this triad when he writes:
310 The incomprehensibility of Divinity connects with the fifth and sixth stages of contemplation 
Richard describes in his Mystical Ark. Reason can lead to an entrance beyond which it cannot follow. For 
both Anselm and Richard ‘ratiocinando’ reaches an ineffable stopping point where one moves from 
language to being, and from being to “being with.” For Richard, reaching what is “above and beyond” this 
entrance requires ecstatic contemplation rooted in a burning longing of the soul for the Divine; for Anselm 
it is the reformation of the image of God in man, where his “deeds” must be righted in addition to his 
“words” (i.e., his reasonings). For more on this, see pp. 95-105 of this work.
311 Abelard is also familiar with this triad, as it structures material in his Theologia “Summi Boni.” 
See esp. CCCM 2.84-5; 2.96-7; 3.4-3.5. Noticed in Nielsen, 111-112.
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As we were able according to our own limited capacity, we 
arranged this discussion concerning the meaning (significatione), 
differences (variatione), and definition (descriptione) of the term 
‘person’.312
In IV.1-10, on the meaning of ‘person’, Richard deals with ambiguities between 
‘substance’ (substantia) and ‘person’ (persona), since the word ‘person’ is commonly 
used to refer to either. He puts it in the plainest of terms: One asks either “Quid sit?” (i.e.,
“What is that?”) or “Quis sit?” (i.e., “Who is it?”).313 The answer to the former is a 
general or specific name or definition: e.g., an animal, a man, a horse. The answer to the 
latter is a proper name or something equivalent, such as Matthew, Bartholomew, a father,
or his son. The former refers to the quality of substance; the latter refers to the quality of 
person. ‘Substance’ refers to something whereas ‘person’ refers to someone. A person is 
both a something and a someone, which is why the word ‘person’ can refer to either one. 
The importance for trinitarian contemplation is that the divine persons refer to the 
‘someones’ of Divinity and not the ‘something’ that is the divine essence (even though, 
as Richard points out, the persons are identical with the divine substance). In IV.11-20 
Richard develops the second element of the Meaning-Difference-Definition triad. As we 
might expect, he focuses on the quality and E-quality of the thing under consideration 
with the second element in his organizing triads. With respect to divine persons, Richard 
then transitions from what it is the same within Divinity to what is different. As he says:
For, a diversity (diversitas) of substances produces ‘something and 
something else’ (aliud et aliud) to exist in a rational nature, and 
otherness (alteritas) of persons causes ‘someone and someone else’ 
312 Richard, De Trinitate IV.24.
313 Richard, De Trinitate IV.7.
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(alium et alium) to exist. But we do find otherness (alietatem) in the 
divine and supremely wise nature, yet we do not the 
aforementioned diversity (diversitatem); consequently, we believe 
that there is a plurality of persons in the divine nature, and we deny 
a plurality of substances.314
Richard’s main concern is to steer the simple-minded away from tritheism in their 
understanding. Thus regardless of how one uses ‘person’ or ‘substance’ the key is to 
avoid understanding, by either term, that there are three somethings in Divinity.315 There 
is only one something but three someones. And to be accurate, one must speak of 
‘substance’ with respect to the former and ‘persons’ with respect to the latter. There is 
one substance, but a plurality of persons in Divinity.
In IV.1-10, Richard establishes that it is logically possible (i.e., not impossible) for 
there to be a plurality of persons in a unity of substance. In IV.11-20, Richard shows how
the “otherness of persons” can obtain without “otherness of substance(s)” as it typically 
does for non-divine, rational beings. To aid him in this, Richard introduces the term 
‘existentiae’ to distinguish three modes of being with respect to quality and origin. 
Existence can be differentiated in three ways: (a) according to quality alone, (b) 
according to origin alone, and (c) according to a concurrence of quality and origin.316 
Humans are distinguished according to quality and origin since they are individuated by 
quality (i.e., what makes this person different than that person) and by origin (e.g., each 
314 Richard, De Trinitate IV.9.
315 Richard is well aware of Augustine’s “Quid tres?” and here we see him with Augustine’s same 
pastoral concern (see esp. IV.5) for steering the “pious and simple mind” away from tritheism; but 
Richard’s introduction of the quid/quis distinction permits him to divide Augustine’s question into “Quis 
tres?” and “Quid una?” respectively, making the answers easier to come by, even though explaining the 
relationship between them remains difficult. See also n. 323 of this work.
316 Richard, De Trinitate IV.13.
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may have different parents). Angels are differentiated by quality alone since angels all 
have the same origin.317 The only mode of being left for the “otherness” in Divinity is 
that according to origin alone. Richard therefore concludes IV.11-20 with how it is that 
each ‘person’ exists separately by showing that the difference consists in the fact that 
“Every person has a rational being from an incommunicable property.”318 It is left to 
book V to explain what those three incommunicable properties are that distinguish the 
divine persons according to each one’s “origin.”319
Finally, in IV.21-25, Richard turns his attention to the definition of ‘person’. He 
begins with Boethius’s definition of person as “an individual substance of a rational 
nature” (rationalis naturae individua substantia), and he refines it to make it more perfect
and complete.320 Thus the continual pattern in Richard we saw in books I and III we also 
see at work here in book IV. In both he starts with what is “highest” (summa), then what 
is the most “integral” or best in terms of quality (integritas); and finally, what is fullest 
and most perfect (plenitudo). Thus here, with the third part of the Meaning-Difference-
Definition triad, Richard turns his attention to “perfecting” Boethius’s definition of 
‘person’. He writes, “However, in order for a definition to be perfect (perfecta), it is 
necessary for it to cover the entire reality (rei esse comprehendat) and only the reality of 
317 Richard, De Trinitate IV.14.
318 Richard, De Trinitate IV.20.
319 Richard, De Trinitate V.1: “As we have already said, it is fitting that every person has a rational 
being from an incommunicable property. But a divine person still requires something further above this, so 
that it can be called divine.”
320 Boethius’s definition of ‘person’ was well known in the twelfth century and many writers 
contended with it in their works on the Trinity. Cf. William of St. Thierry, The Enigma of Faith, trans. John
Anderson, Cistercian Fathers, 9 (Washington, D.C.: Consortium Press, 1974), 65-67. 
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the object to be defined.”321 Thus with respect to Boethius’s definition, Richard writes: 
Now, Boethius defines person as an individual substance of a 
rational nature. In order for this definition to be universal 
(generalis) and perfect (perfecta), it is necessary for every 
individual substance of a rational nature to be a person, and, 
conversely, for every person to be an individual substance of a 
rational nature.322
In IV.1-10 and IV.11-20 Richard establishes that each of the divine persons are 
three someones and that they are distinguished in accordance with their incommunicable 
properties of origin. IV.10 deals with the difference between the ‘something’ and the 
‘someones’ of Divinity; IV.11-20 deals with the differentiating quality among the 
‘someones’ of Divinity. Finally, in IV.21-25, Richard contends with the difficulties of 
distinguishing the divine substance from the divine persons given that Boethius’s 
definition is ambiguous with respect to both: Boethius definition of a person as “an 
individual substance of a rational nature” applies equally to the divine persons as well as 
to the divine substance itself. Consequently, one can say that “Divinity is a person” and 
“the persons of Divinity are persons.” The inaccuracy is a problem. He therefore refines 
Boethius’s definition to apply ‘person’ only to the divine persons of Divinity and not to 
Divinity itself.323 Richard’s refinement of Boethius’s definition concludes, on the basis of
321 Richard, De Trinitate IV.21.
322 Ibid. Here we have a clear example of Richard (a) explicitly noting his interaction with the 
thought of a theological predecessor (i.e., Boethius) and (b) indicating that his primary way of building on 
that thought is by “perfecting” it further. Thus the third element in Richard’s triadic structure here indicates
the “new fullness” he has drawn out from Boethius. This explicit example further corroborates our claim 
for Richard’s “perfecting” Augustine and Anselm where he only alludes to their thought without explicitly 
mentioning them by name.
323 Thus while I agree with den Bok that the ‘image of God’ is restricted to the Divine-to-human 
relation and not (each) divine person-to-human person nor Divinity-to-society, I am more skeptical of his 
conclusion that Richard’s trinitarianism remains that of Person-to-person. Indeed, in the same way that an 
individual human substance can be understood as a ‘what’ and not a ‘who’, it is possible to understand 
individual divine substance as a ‘What’ and not a ‘Who’ (see n. 359 of this work). The difference lies in the
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these clarifications,324 that ‘person’ should be defined as “someone existing through 
oneself alone according to a singular mode of rational existence.”325 Book V is where he 
delineates each singular mode of rational existence for each of the divine persons on the 
basis of each one’s “origin.”326
Do we have any evidence in book IV that Richard designs the form of his 
arguments by showing how three considerations uphold the same truth? In book III we 
saw Richard summarize each of his three sections with conclusions that did exactly this. 
Here in book IV he does not summarize each of his sections in the same way; however he
still plays with this idea. For example, in Richard’s rehearsing of the traditional Latin 
trinitarian formulas in IV.20, he gives three of them:
tres substantias et unam essentiam
tres subsistentias et unam substantiam
tres personas et substantiam vel essentiam unam
He then concludes, “Among the variety of expressions a single truth must be understood, 
fact that for human substance, there is only one ‘what’ and one ‘who’; whereas for divine substance there is
one ‘What’ and three ‘Whos’ as Richard explains in IV.6-10. Furthermore, for Richard, the ‘Whos’ are so 
identical with the ‘What’ that the best possible communication is also the “fullest”: One can therefore 
speak of Divinity-to-humanity, Divine-to-human, Divine-to-society, and (each) divine person-to-human 
person by either term (i.e., What-to-what, Who-to-who, Whos-to-who, and Whos-to-whos). Such Divine 
‘super’-simplicity and multiformity enable the communication to be a conditio summa et summe perfecta.
324 Bk. IV consists almost entirely of refinements of definition, but Richard’s formative concern is 
the understanding in the minds of his readers: Knowing the refined definition matters less than that 
“Among the variety of expressions a single truth must be understood, although the meaning of words is 
different with different people.”
325 “persona sit exsistens per se solum, juxta singularem quemdam rationalis exsistentiae modum.” 
Richard, De Trinitate IV.24.
326 Richard, De Trinitate V.1: “But seeing that we are certain about the unity of the divine 
substance, the plurality of persons, and the harmony and mutual relation of plurality and unity, the occasion
now requires that we inquire about the properties of each person and specify the particular characteristic of 
each person” (italics mine).
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although the meaning of words is different with different people.” There were no doubt 
other Latin formulations, but Richard chooses three and then highlights how all three 
express the same truth. One truth found in three formulas; and three formulas describing 
the same truth. Likewise, Richard summarizes this section in the following way: 
I think that no term can be found more suitable for the divine 
plurality than the word “person.” And indeed there ought to be 
nothing more authentic (authenticum) for a faithful mind (fideli 
animo) than what sounds (sonat) in every ear (in ore omnium) and 
what the Catholic authority confirms (confirmat).327 
Since Richard deals with definitions and the concepts by which things are said, heard, 
and understood, he lifts this “agreement of minds,” with respect to definition, into the 
realm of agreement of soul in chanting the liturgy. Thus he connects the communi animi 
with the in ore omnium in a creative way that binds these three creedal formulations on 
the Trinity together in a harmony that beckons faithful minds toward ecclesiastical unity!
He also concludes in IV.25, “Behold how, by its inclusion, the angelic property 
arranges the contrariety of opposites as in a kind of symmetrical proportion and 
composes the dissonance (dissonantiam) of alternating sounds (alternantium) into one 
consonance (in unam harmoniam).”328 Subsequently he asks: 
Which, in your opinion, seems to be a more appropriate order, 
which, I ask, seems to be more befitting for the supreme 
arrangement of Wisdom (summe sapientis dispositioni): if among 
this trinity of natures—namely, the divine, angelic, and human 
natures—the properties of the outer two are related to the third as 
opposites through contrary natures without the intervention of an 
intermediate, or if it is said that the third nature intervenes between 
the outer two natures and, having been connected alternately 
327 Richard, De Trinitate IV.20.
328 Richard, De Trinitate IV.25.
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(alternatim conjuncta) through the similitude of both natures, 
reconciles their opposition in a harmony (in unam harmoniam)?329
The language of book III was the courtroom; there were three witnesses who testify to 
one truth. In book IV the language is the liturgy. The sound must be “authentic” in the 
sense that what is stated is true and firmly believed. It must also compose the “dissonance
of alternating sounds into one consonance.”330 It must be chanted in-tune. Furthermore, it
must reconcile contrasting consonances into “one harmony.”331 And these liturgical 
allusions come together in the final conclusion of book IV, when Richard writes, “How 
nothing is dissonant with the reason that we are ordered to venerate one God in the 
Trinity and the Trinity in a unity.”332 
Richard realizes at the end of book IV that his clarifications of ‘person’ and his 
argument for the harmony of unity and plurality in Divinity are only “fitting” (convenit), 
and therefore may be regarded as only probable and not necessary. Thus, while his goal is
to reach a perfect harmony at the end of book IV, we do well to pay attention to the 
emphasis in the last line of IV.25 that “nothing is dissonant in venerating the one God in 
the Trinity and the Trinity in a unity.” Book IV consists of refinements of definition and 
clarifications of terms. It therefore argues for the “non-impossibility” of the harmony 
329 Richard, De Trinitate IV.25.
330 Ibid.
331 Here Richard connects his “fitting necessity” with the experience of Victorine liturgical life. The 
Victorine liturgies were performed in groups standing opposite one another, with their harmon(ies) coming 
between them. Thus Richard “calls to mind” this liturgical image as a contextual backdrop to his arguments
of “fitting necessity” in bk. IV whereby two opposing terms are harmonized by a middle term to achieve 
optimal consistency. In doing so, Richard not only gives his readers a “common understanding” (communi 
animi) he also calls on them to sing it with “one voice” (una voce)! 
332 Richard, De Trinitate IV.25.
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between unity and plurality in Divinity (i.e., non-dissonance) on the basis of these 
clarifications.333 Richard still has to go beyond this to argue for the actual harmony of 
unity and plurality in Divinity; and he does this on the basis of “necessary reasons” in 
book V.334
Book V is divided into three sections based on the triad Origin-Relation-Number. 
Richard fulfills two goals in this book: first, to limit the number of divine persons to three
as the Catholic faith teaches; and second, to specify an incommunicable property for each
divine person along the way. V.1-5 argue, on the basis of the distinctions Richard first 
delineates in book I, that there are only two modes of eternal existence in Divinity: (a) 
one who is from eternity and from himself, and (b) another two who are also from 
eternity but not from themselves.335 V.6-9 deal with the relation the latter two divine 
persons have to the first divine person with respect to the (im)mediacy of their 
processions. Thus one procession in Divinity is only immediate, the other is both mediate
and immediate. The first procession is required in order for the second procession to 
obtain since a duality of persons logically precedes a trinity of persons. V.10-15 deal with
limiting the number of divine persons to three by ruling out a fourth. V.16-21 consist of a
single argument for these same truths on the basis of love. Here Richard introduces 
333 As Richard states, the method of clarification bk. IV consists of rendering “ . . . more certain . . . 
what was formed from a concept of common minds (communi animi).” Richard, De Trinitate IV.5. It 
therefore argues for the possibility of harmony between unity and plurality in Divinity on the basis of these 
clarifications. In bk. V Richard argues for the actual harmony of unity and plurality on the basis of 
“necessary reasons” rather than just probable ones. In short, the refinements of definition in bk. IV make 
such harmony “not impossible”; the arguments of bk. V make it necessary. See V.2.
334 Richard, De Trinitate V.1: “But we have not yet apprehended through reasoning those properties 
that are applicable to them individually. Therefore, let us now pursue these issues . . . ”
335 Cf. Richard’s De Trinitate I.10 and V.5.
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another triad—Gratuitous-Love, Owed-Love, Gratuitous-and-Owed Love—to show how 
three distinctions of properties in supreme love can obtain with one and the same love in 
every person. V.22-25 handle a concern as to whether the different kinds of love entail a 
“diversity of dignity” in Divinity that would make one divine person more worthy than 
another. These latter two arguments consider the same truth from two different 
perspectives. In V.16-21 Richard looks at “one and the same love” from the perspective 
of the distinctive love of each person (e.g., gratuitous, owed, gratuitous and owed); 
whereas in V.22-25, he looks at the three persons through the prism of one and the same 
love. Thus Richard focuses on the “fullness” of this supreme love distinguished by three 
properties in V.16-21 and he also speaks of the “integrity” of that same love in V.22-25. 
The former has to do with the source and reception of love, the latter with the equal 
dignity of benevolence involved in that bestowal and reception. As Richard concludes in 
V.24 before he draws it all together in V. 25: “It is certain and not at all ambiguous that, 
with regard to the integrity of perfection, there is no difference in the Trinity between 
love and dignity.”
Book VI and Discovering De Trinitate “In Relief”
When we get to book VI, Richard has two further goals. One is to distinguish two 
modes of procession in Divinity, and the other is to find arguments for the 
appropriateness of the divine names ascribed to each of the divine persons. But unlike 
previous books, though there are plenty of triads in book VI (Fig. 4.6), the book is not 
organized in accordance with any triadic structure. 
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Immediate Principal Order Operation of Nature
Son Grandson Great-Grandson
Conception Articulation Audition
Unbegotten Begotten Neither-Begotten-Nor-Unbegotten
Father Son Spirit
Power Wisdom Goodness
Discovered Learned Read
From None From One From Both
Fig. 4.6 Triads in Book VI of Richard’s De Trinitate
What are the reasons for this? First, book VI has the most polemical material of the 
treatise. Most of these dialogical exchanges with “opponents” are found in book VI and 
this material centers on the debate over how there can be both Unbegotten and Begotten 
substance in Divinity without this entailing a contradiction.336 If De Trinitate began as a 
dialogical exchange with real or imagined opponents on the basis of the Quicumque,337 
then the bulk of this material ends up in book VI. Second, Richard “returns” to the 
language of the Quicumque in a way that connects with books I-II.338 Further, there is a 
higher concentration of the use of the Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad in book VI that 
336 The highest concentration of this polemical material is in VI.15-25; there is a noticeable shift to 
the third person plural (e.g., they say, they deny, etc.). Parts of it are found in V.8-9, 13. The only other 
places ‘begotten’-language is found is I.5, when Richard rehearses the things he finds in the Quicumque but
has not seen proven; and II.25, where he refrains from their discussion. Ribaillier also notes the difference 
in style this material has when compared with the rest of the treatise: “Certains passages, par example dans 
le débat sur la formule substantia genuit substantiam, tranchent par la vivacité du style sur la sérénité du 
reste de l’ouvrage.” Ribaillier, 10.
337 For more on this, see n. 460 of this work.
338 This similarity of style and language in bks. VI and I is also noted by Ribaillier: “Enfin la 
méthode n’est plus tout à fait la même: au chapitre IV du livre I, Richard prétend non pas tant s’appuyer sur
les autorités que donner une démonstration rationnelle de la Trinité, non tam auctoritates inducere quam 
ratiocinationi insistere; or dans le livre VI les références à l’Ecriture, à la liturgie, aux Pères sont plus 
abondantes.” Ribaillier, 10.
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also connects with earlier material in books I-II.339 
Second, book VI offers explicit evidence that Richard returned to insert and edit this 
material. And though we provide more details of this in Appendix A, here we must treat 
it because it relates to the intentionality we ascribe to Richard’s incorporating triads. At 
the opening of book VI, after stating in VI.2 that the relationship of the first and second 
divine persons is “ . . . entirely immediate, and it is according to the principal order of 
proceeding and according to the operation of nature,” he concludes, “Because this is clear
enough from the previous discussions, there is no need for further explanation.” But he 
then provides further explanation when he introduces the Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad 
in VI.3 stating, “ . . . if we desire to know what the singular mode of proceeding is in the 
supereminent and superexcellent nature of deity, then let us think about the goodness, 
wisdom, and power of the Unbegotten, and perhaps we will discover what we seek more 
quickly.” But Richard gives minimal treatment of this triad in VI.3 and only returns to it 
again in VI.15. The subsequent chapters VI.4-5 suddenly break into an extended 
treatment on the difference between human and divine procession according to the 
“operation of nature” (operationem naturae). VI.4 contends that the more worthy of the 
sexes (i.e., man) shows the appropriateness of the conventional language for the parent-
child relation to be that of Father-to-Son. This is where divine and human propagation are
similar. But there is also dissimilitude, since what holds true concerning the operation of 
nature in humanity (i.e., male and female parents) does not hold true for the operation of 
nature in Divinity (i.e., only Father-to-Son). VI.5 then engages in a speculation about 
339 Further linguistic evidence for connecting this material is Richard’s use of “primordialis” found 
only in De Trinitate I.12-15, II.8, V.7, VI.12, VI.18.
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what similitude would exist if it were possible for Adam to will a son who was 
consubstantial with himself and equal with himself in every way, showing that the 
principal relation of parent-to-child would still obtain. 
Further evidence of editing is seen subsequently when Richard gives an explanation 
for the distinct causes, reasons, and order of each of the processions in VI.6-7: one, 
because the first divine person wants a person of equal dignity (condignum); and the 
other, because he wants a partaker of their mutual love (condilectum). The first desire 
precedes the second and is therefore considered to be the more principal relation. But 
following this—despite the fact that he has already given an argument for the distinctness
of the modes of procession in VI.6-7—he argues for the distinctness of the modes of 
procession on a different basis: that one procession is immediate and principal and the 
other is immediate and not-principal. What makes each procession different is that one is 
from the first divine person alone and the second is from both the first and second divine 
persons. But why would Richard need a further argument that distinguishes the two 
modes of procession if he already provided one “previously ascertained with reasoning” 
in VI.6-7? And further, why would the condignum-condilectum language developed in 
those chapters not find its way into the following argument? The only other place we find
this language is in VI.17 where Richard gives a paragraph providing an “abbreviated 
account of this topic,” presumably a briefer argument for things he argued previously. 
We also have Richard explicitly stating that he is inserting material in the subsequent 
chapter, VI.18: “But, in order that we may return to that question on account of which we
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inserted these remarks . . . ” (emphasis mine).340 In all likelihood, then, this condignum-
condilectum material in VI.6-7 and VI.17 was inserted at a later date. And if this is true, 
the same applies for the material found in the latter part of V.16-25, since Richard 
structures the last two sections of that book around “love” and “dignity” respectively.341 
One of two things is taking place in book VI. One possibility is that Richard’s focus 
in the latter part of book V, and the first part of book VI, deals with the two processions. 
Thus Richard could be constructing book VI around this duality, which would account 
for the corresponding duality we find in the condignum-condilectum material and the 
corresponding lack of triadic structure. Another possibility is that, given more time, 
Richard would have found a way to arrange the material of book VI in a triadic way. 
Given what we have already seen in book III and elsewhere, the latter is more likely. 
What is the evidence? We have seen Richard work with the triad of Highest-Best-
Fullest as one of the major triads that organizes other sections of his work. What is most 
notable in those sections is what he does with the “plenitude” in the third part of that 
triad. But the way Richard speaks of plenitude and fullness in book VI is less developed. 
With respect to “plenitude” he always and only speaks of the fullness of Divinity received
or given to one or another divine person. Here is an example: 
 . . . possessing all plenitude is common to every person; and both 
possessing and giving the fullness is a property common to the 
Father and Son; yet, possessing and not giving it to another is the 
particular property of the Holy Spirit. . . . the Son alone  . . . 
340 “Sed ut ad id redeamus propter quod et ista interposuimus . . . ”
341 V.16-21 focus on fullness of “one and the same love” through three different properties (e.g., 
gratuitous, owed, and gratuitous-and-owed); V.22-25 focus on integrity of persons who have equal dignity. 
See esp. the concluding line of V.24 where Richard clearly sees them as two different arguments for the 
harmony of unity and plurality from a consideration of love.
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possesses the image, since just as the plenitude of divinity flows 
from the Father, so the bestowing of the same plenitude flows from 
the Son. . . . Yet absolutely no person receives the plenitude of the 
divinity from the Holy Spirit, and, consequently, the Holy Spirit 
does not express the image of the Father in himself.342
With respect to “fullness,” he only speaks of the fullness of wisdom and “perfect 
learning” in the final chapters of book VI. Here the intricate details of the fullness of 
divinity are lacking. Richard speaks only of the “plenitude” of divinity “given and 
received.” When he begins thinking of his meditations in books V and VI, with his newer
contemplations on love and dignity, these more intricate details begin to flourish. But the 
these are the early buds, not the full flowering of Richard’s contemplations in book III. 
The love-dignity material in book VI343—especially in comparison to his treatment 
elsewhere344—is less developed. As a result, we can glimpse this earlier stage in 
Richard’s thought with a view to how he may have refined this theme for book VI in 
accordance with his further reflections on love and dignity in other sections of his work. 
And given the polish of his other writings, he may have rewritten the work in its entirety 
in light of them.
Book VI therefore contains many triads but no discernible triadic structures. 
Furthermore, Richard returned to this material with new insights. We are thus left at the 
end of Richard’s work with a dissipating intricacy of design and a disappointing sense 
that someone who could so carefully craft book III of his treatise would leave us with a 
final book that “fails” by comparison. Is there anything further to this? Is there anything 
342 Richard, De Trinitate V.11.
343 See Richard, De Trinitate VI.17d-18b.
344 See Richard, De Trinitate V.16-25. For comparison of these sections, see Appendix B.
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more constructive book VI might reveal in Richard’s articulation of the Trinity? Earlier, 
we juxtaposed the “breadth” and “depth” of Richard’s De Trinitate. The breadth refers to 
the bird’s-eye-view of the work; that is, how Richard structures the work according to the
Power-Goodness-Wisdom triad (Fig. 4.1). The depth of De Trinitate refers to the 
intricacies of Richard’s use of triads and triadic structures in specific sections, the most 
intricate of which we find in book III (Fig. 4.2). But when we consider the breadth and 
depth of De Trinitate together, we discover that Richard’s method of focusing and then 
magnifying on some element to draw out further arguments is a literary process by which
he returned to his own work. This becomes evident when perceive two things: first, 
despite the fact that books IV-VI deal with the harmony of unity and plurality in Divinity,
the arguments “from the consideration of the fullness of wisdom” (i.e., the last part of the
Power-Goodness-Wisdom triad) don’t come until the last few chapters of book VI; 
second, the language of these final chapters is simpler and less sophisticated in 
comparison to the material that immediately precedes it—a pattern reflected throughout 
De Trinitate.345
This simply confirms that Richard is “expanding” and “filling out” his treatise with 
new insights and material. Nevertheless, these expansions do not disrupt the overall flow 
since the expansions simply fill out, make more clear, or establish the same point from a 
different consideration. Richard looks over his previous compositions, finds seeds to 
cultivate and water, and gives them fuller treatment, fuller insight and articulation. It 
345 As demonstrated in Appendix A, this pattern repeats throughout the treatise: Sophisticated 
reflections and distinctions precede much simpler arguments on the same topic. Further, none of the 
sophisticated language in previous sections finds its way into the concluding material. See also n. 237 of 
this work.
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would be the equivalent of adding pages to a section of a book without rewriting what 
came before and after it. The pages simply elaborate some element in more detail but do 
not disrupt the flow of the previous work.
If this is true, then we should expect to see some of his earliest material at the very 
end of his work—material that connects with the language and content at the beginning 
of his treatise. And this is indeed what we find. Richard started with the Power-
Goodness-Wisdom triad and composed his work arguing for the unity, the plurality, and 
the harmony of unity and plurality on the basis of this triad. But as he contemplated 
things further, he expanded his previous work. His final argument for the harmony of 
unity and plurality from a consideration of the “fullness of wisdom” at the end of book VI
was therefore an earlier stage of his writing. It was only as Richard continued to expand 
and provide further details on the definition of ‘person’ in book IV, and the intricacies of 
procession and generation in book V, that we find the final component of the Power-
Goodness-Wisdom triad drifting further and further away from material it was originally 
connected with.
The reason why this is important for us to point out is that it helps us broaden our 
understanding of Richard’s “intentionality” in composing this work. It is tempting, given 
what we have discovered about Richard’s intricate triads and triadic structuring to treat 
De Trinitate as a finished work of art, a sculpture in its most perfect and final form. But 
as we step closer, we discover it is more like a work of art “in relief”: a sculpture attached
to the block of marble from which it was carved. The picture is almost full and complete; 
about as full and complete as could ever be imagined—the form is in “high relief.” And 
we can be incredibly thankful for this. For unlike a sculpture detached from the mold and 
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marble that gave it life, where all we see is the work of art and the feeling it evokes as we
behold its form, a relief shifts our attention to the artist and his craft. We imagine how the
beauty and craft with which the artist chipped away at those things he was able to “draw 
out” from the marble might advance through those elements left untouched. It brings us 
to the lines that mark the margins of the artist’s thought. We connect with the “process” 
of his craft and we join him in his work with our own theological imagination.
In conclusion, Richard deliberately constructs De Trinitate with triads and triadic 
structures. We see that Richard resorts to the same Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad that 
Anselm uses in organizing his Monologion. But unlike Anselm, we see that Richard went
to painstaking lengths to incorporate the use of triads and triadic structures within each of
his books and even within sections of each of his books. Nowhere is this more apparent 
than in book III where Richard uses the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad, emphasizes 
each element of that triad in each of the three sections, and brings all three considerations
together in a final argument from supreme benevolence. What remains to explore is the 
way Richard uses these triads to sustain the hearts and shape the minds of his readers in 
their contemplation of the Trinity. We know the “form” by which Richard molds De 
Trinitate; what we want to know next is how he “forges” that form in his readers; how in 
“constructing” his trinitarian theology he gave an inner shape to their souls and an outer 
shape to their communal life in accordance with these “trinitarian dimensions.” 
165
CHAPTER FIVE
FORGING THESE “TRINITARIAN DIMENSIONS” IN THE FAITHFUL
And you will find rest for your souls.
We have seen the incredible artistry by which Richard constructs his De Trinitate 
with triadic structures and forms. He also returns to his work, filling it out with further 
insights and intricacies. Richard gave a lot of attention and care to De Trinitate and he 
surely expected a mutual devotion from his readers as they joined with him in 
contemplating the Trinity. As Richard writes in Twelve Patriarchs: 
O how many persons we see today, studious in reading, slothful in 
work, tepid in prayer, who nevertheless take it for granted that they 
are able to take possession of the peak of this mountain. But I ask, 
when will those who do not have Christ as leader take possession of 
it? For Christ who does not wish to ascend except with three 
disciples does not lead them. Therefore let one who seeks to have 
Christ as guide of the journey and leader of the ascent join the 
effort of work and prayer to the effort of reading. No doubt the 
mind is not lifted up to the complete height of knowledge without 
much exercise, without constant effort, without burning longing. 
This is because one who does not follow the footsteps of Christ 
perfectly does not enter the way of truth rightly.346
346 Richard, Twelve Patriarchs lxxix; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 137; Interestingly, Richard 
speaks more of the humanity of Christ in Twelve Patriarchs in contrast to Mystical Ark where it is absent. 
Augustine speaks in his De Trinitate IV.3 of having thoughts of Christ “after a fleshly manner.” If we are 
right about the Augustinian loci the Victorines follow—outside-Temple-House of God—the contemplation 
of Christ in Mystical Ark may mirror the shift in Augustine from fleshly to spiritual contemplations of 
Christ (e.g., human Jesus to divine Wisdom). As Colin Morris notes, “William of St. Thierry and others 
seized on the phrase [‘to know Christ after the flesh’ (2 Corinthians 5:16)] to describe the condition of the 
beginner in the monastic life. The monk was intended to go further, progressing on the path of meditation 
and purification to union with the Eternal Word.” Morris, 377.
166
Richard’s De Trinitate is a mature contemplation, that inner court of God’s temple that 
very few were able to enter; and of those who did, not without an effort of consecration 
worthy of approaching the throne of God. It is only after purging the soul of vices, 
inculcating virtues, and of developing a “holy curiosity” and undistracted resolve for the 
face of God that one would then embark upon this final ascent. In this chapter we focus 
on the formative implications of Richard’s triadic structures. How, then, did these 
“trinitarian dimensions” of De Trinitate shape the trinitarian consciousness of the 
Victorine apprentice and consummate this trinitarian love throughout his community?
Shaping the Trinitarian Consciousness of the Individual
The stages of learning at the abbey of St. Victor parallel monastic training in 
general at the time. Apprentices first focused on learning the literal sense of words. Later 
they built on the quality of that foundation by exploring the allegorical and tropological 
insights they could build up from it. They were called “first things” and “second things” 
respectively.347 Monastic reading, we must remind ourselves, was a moral act.348 It was 
not reading for its own sake, but reading for the purpose of moral and spiritual formation.
As Carruthers notes:
The essential generative process in composition was 
recollection of “things,” Memoria verborum was a task best 
347 Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 29-32; Den Bok, 115.
348 Speaking of those who read with non-formative aims, Richard says, “Surely they thirst for the 
sort of thing about which they can boast but not for that by which that can be built up. Indeed, they strive 
after knowledge, not sanctity.” Mystical Ark, IV.14; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 283. By contrast, 
Richard indicates that a successful read of his Mystical Ark does not consist in turning the last page, but in 
learning to put such contemplations to good use “ . . . by much effort and labor, and, finally, to consummate
the work at some time and in the end to be perfect in all things” (emphasis mine). Mystical Ark IV.22; ibid.,
304. See also Hugh’s Didascalicon III.12, V.7, 10, VI.3; Taylor 94, 128, 134, 138.
167
accomplished without thinking, a first task for children or for 
slaves. But memoria rerum was the task that produced wisdom and 
built character, and could help to perfect one’s soul (“perfect” in 
the sense of “fill in,” inscribe things in all those empty tablets of 
memory). It built upon matters stored verbaliter by habit, but built 
up from the various cues they supplied as links in associational 
chains. The goal of an education was not to become a “living book” 
(by rote reiteration, the power of an idiot) but to become a “living 
concordance,” the power of prudence and wisdom.349
To seek Divinity in all of its plenitude required also seeking a plenitude of soul in 
accordance with that divine image. As den Bok points out:
If man is «made to» God, he is «made to» the best possible being, 
which as such must be a trinitarian being. De Trinitate intends to 
give a hand to anyone who desires to approach the Most High daily, 
step by step, growing in understanding and love. The fulfillment of 
this desire will be a perfect love for and vision of God as He is. In 
its best possible form this loving and knowing is realized, according 
to Richard, in the mutual and perfect contemplation of divine 
persons.350
Thus, like Anselm and Augustine, as Richard “takes” his reader to God, he “re-makes” 
him in the process, shaping and forming him in accordance with the imago Dei. Doing so 
enables the reader to untarnish the mirror of his soul so that he can see God “as He is”: in 
all of his Trinitarian splendor and glory. This should remind us that much of the 
formative work being done on the apprentice in De Trinitate follows upon previous soul-
work: the kind of work we read in Richard’s Twelve Patriarchs and Mystical Ark. 
Without the affective and intellective control Richard seeks to deeply inscribe in his 
apprentices by those works, they lack both the purity of desire and perspicuity of intellect
to come to a “full and complete knowledge of the Trinity.”
349 Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 30-31.
350 Den Bok, 153.
168
Richard wishes to shape the trinitarian consciousness of his reader. And to discover 
how he does so, we must seek those places where he uses his triads and triadic structures 
to do this. For as Carruthers cautions:
 . . . the picturae and formae which we encounter in twelfth century 
literature, such as those in the meditations of Hugh and Richard of 
St. Victor, should not be presumed to be descriptions of pictures or 
plans that necessarily existed physically, but to be prescriptions, 
examplars and patterns to be “copied” by the means of rhetoric: 
augmentation, abbreviation, and translation. Such ekphrastic 
pictures have the role in monastic rhetoric of the plan measured out 
by the angel for Ezekiel to hold in his memory, providing ways and 
places for the mental task of composing prayer.351
In what follows we divide our treatment on the formative implications of Richard’s 
treatise and structures between Wisdom and Love, despite the fact that they have obvious
overlaps. For shaping the trinitarian consciousness of the individual we focus on 
Wisdom; for the communal significance of Richard’s triadic structures we focus on Love.
Richard himself makes this division and it will be helpful to review it for this section: 
There is usually a significant difference between the pleasures of 
charity and wisdom. The pleasures of wisdom are able to and 
accustomed to being drawn from one’s own heart; but the intimate 
delights of charity are drawn from the heart of another. For he, who 
loves intimately, is not delighted but anxious if he does not draw 
from the heart of his beloved the sweetness of love for which he 
thirsts. But the pleasures of wisdom delight more when they are 
drawn from one’s own heart. Therefore, nothing is defined in a 
manner contrary to nature, if it is asserted that the fullness of 
wisdom can subsist in a single person (italics mine).352
Wisdom is the crowning piece of Richard’s treatise. As we saw before, Anselm 
orders his Monologion according to the order of Goodness —> Wisdom —> Power. 
351 Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 227-228.
352 Richard, De Trinitate III.16; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 389.
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Richard orders his as Power —> Goodness —> Wisdom. How do we know that Wisdom 
is Richard’s point of emphasis? We know this because of the recurring pattern throughout
his treatise of introducing the first two terms of a triad only to add a third as the 
intermediate and harmonizing piece—the piece that brings out the fullness of its 
beauty.353 Whether we are speaking of the condilectio of book III, the divine person who 
harmonizes the gratuitous and owed love of the other two persons in book V, and 
numerous other examples, the third term is almost always the harmonizing piece. Thus 
even though the linear order of Richard’s treatise is Power —> Goodness —> Wisdom, 
the final picture he creates shows the relationship of Power <—> Wisdom <—> 
Goodness, where Wisdom fittingly perfects the picture by being placed between Power 
on the one hand, and Goodness on the other. Where unity is established from a 
consideration of omnipotence (I-II) and plurality is established from a consideration of 
supreme goodness (III), Wisdom is what brings that unity and plurality together in a 
complete harmony (IV-VI). It is fitting, then, that Richard crowns his De Trinitate with 
the fullness of Wisdom.354
In chapter 3 we referred to Richard’s method of fides quaerens intellectum a 
plenitudine ad plenitudinem to highlight the extent to which he “fills out” the fullness of 
353 This “harmonizing of opposites” was a common meditative practice in the 12th century. Focused 
treatment of it is given in chapter 6 of this work. For an introduction to this idea in Bonaventure and its 
relation to Richard, see Ewert H. Cousins, Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites: The Theology of
Bonaventure (Chicago: Franciscan Press, 1978).
354 By placing Wisdom last in De Trinitate, Richard makes it simultaneously (a) the consummation 
of contemplation as well as the treatise and (b) makes it, conceptually, the ‘middle term’ that harmoniously 
joins Power and Goodness. This also proves consistent with Richard’s final stage in his Mystical Ark where
the full contemplation of God achieves its final form in the cherubim who represent the “fullness of 
knowledge.” The crown of that Wisdom “rests” on the four sides of the Ark and the Unity and Trinity of 
the Divinity are “harmonized” in the propitiatory. For more on this, see Chase, Angelic Wisdom, 104-111.
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Divinity. We showed how Richard combines “plenitude” with principles found in 
Augustine and Anselm in order to draw out further contemplations on the Trinity. We see
this, for example, in books I-II where Richard uses the triad of Highest-Best-Fullest to 
speak of God’s supreme power, wisdom, and goodness. Using that triad, Richard brings 
out the full, trinitarian splendor of Divinity. With each new development, one comes to 
comprehend more and more of the depth and width and length of the Trinity, so to speak. 
But in addition to the height of this trinitarian vision of the Divine, there is a 
corresponding depth Richard seeks for his readers. As one’s understanding of God 
broadens, the mind itself has to enlarge and widen. In short, if one is to see the fullness of
Wisdom, one has to make further room in one’s soul to receive—and be received by—it. 
Richard is very clear about this in his Mystical Ark where he describes the enlarging of 
the mind that precedes moving into the final ecstasy of Trinitarian contemplation:
And so the human mind is reminded of the first stage of its 
enlarging, when it is said to it by the Prophet: “Set up a watchtower 
for yourself; lay out bitternesses for yourself; direct your heart in 
the straight way in which you have walked” (Jer. 31:21). You hear 
concerning the second, when you read: “I will stand upon my 
lookout; I will fix my position upon the fortification, and I will 
contemplate what is said to me” (Hab. 2:1). This concerns the third: 
“Go across to the islands of Gethim and see; and send into Cedar, 
and consider vigorously” (Jer. 2:10). What does it mean to stand 
upon a watchtower, except to acquire knowledge of contemplating? 
For we raise up a watchtower for this: in order that we may be able 
to see for a long distance from it and to enlarge our vision in all 
directions. And so in these words is rightly indicated that enlarging 
of the mind in which a watchtower of contemplation is raised up 
and knowledge of such an effort is acquired. However, what does it 
mean to stand upon a lookout and to fix a position, except to 
strengthen by use the knowledge of speculating? For what one 
person calls a watchtower, another calls a lookout. Whether they 
are public or private lookouts, we are accustomed to raise up 
watchtowers so that when looking out from them we can see 
imminent dangers long beforehand. So we raise up as it were a 
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spiritual watchtower, the grace of contemplation, so that we may be 
able to anticipate the ambush of tempters. However, it is one thing 
to ascend and set up a watchtower; it is another thing to stand on it 
and even to fix one’s position. The former is by the acquisition of a 
skill; the latter is by the exercise of a skill. . . . Indeed it is rightly 
said and taught that the capacity of the mind increases and is 
enlarged by the vigor of consideration and attention. And so, if you 
pursue carefully you will be enlarged more and more to a greater 
perfection of keensightedness by means of these three stages of 
advancement (italics mine).355
Seeing the fullness of the Divinity in full, trinitarian splendor consists of seeing that 
Divinity in three primary dimensions.356 First, it means seeing Divinity at its height—
God is the highest of all: He is the Most High. Second, it consists of seeing God as the 
most integral of all—the quality and E-quality of His perfections are pure and genuine: 
He is simple and true. Third, and finally, it consists of seeing God as the fullest and most 
complete. He is the fullness of His perfections. He is the source and fullness of His 
power, wisdom, and goodness. He is the fullest, most perfect, and most complete of all 
beings. He lacks nothing. The bounty of his perfection overflows with an infinity of 
riches. Nothing can be added to Him that would make Him more perfect or more 
complete: He is King of kings. 
But to reach this contemplation in all of its fullness requires daily exercise, of 
mounting the rungs of the ladder, of ascending and enlarging the mind, and of burning 
with an ardor of soul that turns that human ascent into an angelic flight. It requires 
ascending each element of that triad. It requires ascending to its summit, diving into its 
purity, and becoming awestruck by its plenitude. Thus as Richard describes the fullness 
355 Richard, Mystical Ark V.3; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 313-14.
356 For Richard’s use of the Highest-Best-Fullest triad, see esp. pp. 137-161 of this work.
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of divinity in terms of what is most High, most Pure, and most Perfect, he inscribes the 
elements of this triad within his readers as well. As he enlarges their minds with the 
contemplation of the triune God he is simultaneously enlarging and shaping their souls in 
accordance with these same divine perfections.
We begin our ascent at the base of the mountain, fully aware of the difficulty 
involved in reaching the summit of the Most High God, “ . . . for the created and 
corporeal things show us how distant we are from the greatness and highness (sublimitas)
of the Creator. Everything we see warns us to be humble.”357 At every point of ascent in 
De Trinitate, at every place where Richard moves from visible to invisible things, from 
humanity to Divinity, one reaches that elevation where language grasps at something 
“above and beyond” itself. Reason and language have been trustworthy guides to the 
summit. They have pointed the way. They have shown both that true Divinity is one and 
triune and how that unity and triunity obtain without contradiction. But though they have 
led to a fuller contemplation of the Trinity, they cannot provide full comprehension,358 
because an all-critical ‘super’ guards the transcendence of Divinity.
Richard speaks of this ‘super’ at numerous places in his writings; it is the 
metaphysical ground for the “above and beyond” involved in the fifth and sixth stages of 
contemplation of his Mystical Ark. But in De Trinitate, he gives it some important detail:
And so, the possession of a substantial being belongs to the divine 
existence—or rather the possession of a supersubstantial being 
without creation and without beginning—because it is the property 
357 Straw, 34; Moralia on Job 26.12.18 (CCL 143B, 1279).
358 “But, I ask, seeing that this designated unity of Trinity and Trinity of unity cannot be 
comprehended (comprehendi), surely this does not mean that it cannot be true?” Richard, De Trinitate IV.2.
173
of every substance which receives a name from reality, to be a 
composite being and to be subject to accidents. However, the divine 
substance alone, which transcends the nature of substance, has a 
simple being both without composition and subject to no inherent 
accidents. And, for that reason, the divine substance is rightly said 
to have a supersubstantial being (supersubstantiale esse) rather 
than a substantial (substantiale) being (emphasis mine).359
In virtue of the fact that Divinity is a substance (substantia), it exists in the way that 
everyday things exist. But it is a unique substance (supersubstantiale esse) in that its 
existence never was non-existent and has existed forever without any composition or 
subjection to change. God is truly the being that is, was, and forever will be (Revelation 
1:4, 8, 4:8). It is this ‘super’ to Divinity that forms the upper limit at which man’s 
intellectual and formative quest for the face of God ends. Without divine grace, without 
breaking out beyond language to essence, from being to “being with,” man remains 
“below and under” that inaccessible light.360 To rise above and beyond it requires an 
alienation of mind and ecstatic contemplation, a dependence upon God whereby God 
benevolently grants a “divine showing.” This is why, in IV.5, Richard points out that the 
‘super’ that forms the ontological and epistemological “above and beyond” between God 
and man is matched by a proportional condescension—a “here and now”—by the Spirit:
 . . . the word ‘person’ was by no means ascribed to the very 
sublime and supereminent mystery of the Trinity (sublimi et 
supereminenti Trinitatis mysterio) without the divine impulse and 
superintendence (sine instinctu divino et magisterio) of the Holy 
Spirit. Consider how the same Spirit prophesied through the lips of 
the prophets, formulated through the lips of the Evangelists, and 
expounded through the lips of the doctors so many mysteries of our 
faith, redemption, sanctification, and glorification. He who 
359 Richard, De Trinitate IV.16.
360 It is worth noting here that although this may suggest Dionysian influence, Ribaillier also 
suggests Boethius’s ‘ultra substantiam’ as the inspiration for Richard’s ‘supersubstantialis’. Ribaillier, 24.
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considers this will in no way be able to believe that the Holy Spirit 
has subjected to human estimation, rather than ordained through his 
inspiration, the supreme article of our faith, the very sacred and 
secret mystery of the Trinity, and the very word that he wanted 
every heart to believe and every tongue to confess.361
Seeking the summit thus requires knowing where it is as well as how to get there. One 
must recognize the truth of God’s super-substantialness along with a dependence upon 
divine grace in order to rise and stand with Moses in the cleft of that rock—in that 
‘watchtower’ (specula) where one moves “above and beyond” oneself and awaits the face
of God.362 Consequently, God is the Most High God. He does not share this summit with 
any other. It is a summit reserved for Father, Son, and Holy Spirit alone. As Richard says:
Certainly you are able to grow daily in awareness of God, and each 
day you are able to be lifted up higher and higher in this lofty flight. 
But above this watchtower of contemplation you are now 
completely unable to find another that is higher. For it is one thing 
to run about here and there in this kind of manifestation and to 
enlarge one’s knowledge in knowing God; it is another thing to 
want to seek above these things for other and higher things that you 
cannot find in any way. There is nothing above God—nothing that 
exists, that might be able to exist, or that can be thought to exist. 
There is nothing higher to which knowledge might ascend, nor is it 
capable of ascending higher. And so, the fullness of knowledge is 
to know God.363
And reaching that summit through contemplation requires following that journey 
with some of Richard’s theological predecessors. With Augustine, one discerns what it is 
361 Richard, De Trinitate IV.5.
362 The full list of ‘super’ in De Trinitate: I.9: superexcellenti natura, superessentiali 
incommutabilitate; II.22: supersubstantialis essentia, IV.5: sublimi et supereminenti, IV.16 
supersubstantiale esse, IV.18: supersubstantiale esse, IV.19: supersubstantiale esse, V.1: 
supersubstantialis essentia, V.6: singulari et superexcellenti natura, VI.3: supereminentia et 
superexcellenti natura, VI.12: supereminenti natura, VI.17: supereminentis naturae. 
363 Mystical Ark, IV.5; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 265.
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better to be than not to be. With Anselm, one makes further progress by ascending in the 
mind from one perfection to another until one reaches that summit and discovers the 
greatest-one-of-all. Richard continues in the tradition of Augustine and Anselm by 
directing his readers’ minds upward to that being-than-which-none-greater-can-exist. 
Formatively, this has tremendous effect. This is because, in the process of growing 
in one’s own wisdom and knowledge, one is also contemplating better and better things. 
One may move from one perfection to discover that there is still some further perfection 
greater and better than the first: e.g., that the mutual love that obtains between a bestower
and requiter (or a lover and beloved) is greater than a private love for oneself. This road 
that proceeds from the base of the mountain and up and around various “grades”364 of 
perfection eventually reaches that summit of the being-than-which-none-greater-can-be-
thought. But along the way it also perfects the mind of the one who seeks to live in 
accordance with those newly discovered perfections. For how can one ascend to the face 
of God if, after one has discovered a greater love, one does not seek to live in accord with
it? If mutual love for another is greater than private love for one’s self, how can one 
continue to ascend that hill of perfection if one only has love for oneself and not for 
another? Or, alternatively, if it is a greater and better thing to have a “freer 
contemplation” of the Trinity unhindered by the need to return to books and empowered 
by arduous memory-work, how can one continue in this ascent through meditation and 
prayer if the mind is constantly drawn down to the words on a page?365
364 Indeed, in his Mystical Ark, Richard uses the verb ‘supergredior’ —a compound of ‘super’ and 
‘gredior’, hence it means “to walk or step beyond, to exceed or surpass,” and its etymological connection 
with ‘gradus’—“by degree, step, rank.”
365 Richard writes, for example, in De Trinitate VI.23: “we gladly utilize the ladder of similitude, so 
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Whether we are speaking with respect to ability, knowledge, or will, the road to the 
summit of the Most High God—He who is all-powerful, all-wise, and all-good in a 
‘super’-unity of substance—rises through these perfections. And as the apprentice 
ascends in mind, he discovers higher and higher elevations of perfection he must live in 
accordance with if he is ever to reach that summit of the being-than-which-nothing-is-
greater and nothing better. As Richard says, “Therefore, the more human thinking attains 
to what is best and perfect, the closer it ascends to that which is God, even though it does 
not reach up to him.”366 In this way, “with unveiled face, beholding as in a mirror the 
glory of the Lord” he is “being transformed into the same image from glory to glory” (2 
Corinthians 3:18, emphasis mine). 
Once one reaches the summit of true Divinity, however, the contemplation does not 
end. As we have observed, Richard looks to the quality and E-quality of perfection with 
the second element of his triads. He considers the integrity and purity of some property of
perfection. In book III Richard attends to the proper order and intensity of love along 
with its pleasing quality. This connects with the formative aims of Richard’s work as 
follows. Purer joy results from the proper conformity of one’s knowledge and love to the 
object of contemplation. One experiences truer joy in proportion to one’s congruence of 
attention and the integrity of one’s longing. In the case of contemplating true Divinity, 
both knowledge and love are fixed on what is the greatest and best of all. Therefore the 
that those who have not yet received the wings of contemplation may have the means by which they can 
ascend.” Also Hugh: “ . . . let the student prepare himself once and for all by fixing these matters in the 
forefront of his mind, in certain little formulae, so to say, so that thereafter he will be able to run the course 
before him with free step and will not have to search out new elementary facts as he comes to individual 
books.” Didascalicon V.1; Taylor, 120.
366 Richard, De Trinitate I.19.
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apprentice must regard God as the greatest in the order of his knowledge and love.367 
Loving what is less worthy with greater affection than what is more worthy is disordered 
and degenerate.368 This is why the divine persons love themselves above all: The 
supreme-ist of all beings requires being loved supremely. Because the divine persons are 
the most supreme of all, they must love each other supremely and most of all. Because 
God is the greatest being to know and love, the one who seeks His face must not only 
place him in the highest place, he must also regard nothing else as more worthy of his 
attention. As Richard writes in Twelve Patriarchs:
Whatever sort of soul you now may be, take action, hasten now to 
bring Him into the innermost and most secret sanctuary of your 
heart. For who would deny that the innermost sanctuary of the 
human heart has or even can acquire recesses of such a sort that the 
force of supreme and singular love cannot be torn away by any 
alien delight whatsoever, when it has been fixed by affection to 
something? Certainly if you seek or love your God supremely, 
nevertheless you do not love Him singularly. Therefore, He is not 
yet led into the innermost place; He is not yet situated in the best 
place.369
Likewise, not only must one regard God as the most worthy of attention, the proportion, 
the ardor, the intensity, and the longing of one’s soul must also be in accordance with 
such majesty. Because God is the most majestic of things to behold, He requires the most 
intense longing and ardor of the soul. The soul should want nothing more. One should 
367 The notion that only the Trinity can be enjoyed is a common theme in the Christian mystical 
tradition inspired by Augustine: “The true objects of enjoyment, then, are the Father and the Son and the 
Holy Spirit, who are at the same time the Trinity, one Being, supreme above all, and common to all who 
enjoy Him . . . ” De doctrina, I.5. And “you are to concentrate all your thoughts, your whole life and your 
whole intelligence upon Him from whom you derive all that you bring.” Ibid., I.22.
368 On ‘(dis)ordered love’, see n. 400 of this work.
369 Richard, Mystical Ark IV.16; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 288.
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love Him alone “with all one’s heart, with all one’s soul, with all one’s mind, and with 
all one’s strength” (Deuteronomy 6:5; emphasis mine).
A good place to better understand this conformity of knowledge and will Richard 
wants to forge in his reader is to look at the proximity and conformity of the Son to the 
Father in book VI. In VI.21-22, Richard considers how it is that the Divine Son is called 
“the figure of His substance” (Hebrews 1:3). The term ‘figura’ can be understood as 
either ‘a forming figure’ or ‘a representing figure’. The former he describes as “the figure
of a human, which forms his substance”; the latter he describes as “the figure of an 
image, which represents him.”370 If the divine Son’s figure forms the divine substance of 
a thing, then the paternal substance would receive its form from the Son, whereas 
tradition teaches that the Son’s form is received from the paternal substance. But if the 
Son’s figure represents the paternal substance, this entails there being two divine 
substances, which is also contrary to the faith. How does Richard solve the dilemma? He 
points to the beautiful conformity of will that can exist among friends. He writes:
Now your soul is a spiritual nature. Indeed your soul is either 
beautiful or deformed by its will. A good will makes your soul 
beautiful; but it becomes deformed by a bad will. Its benignity 
makes it beautiful; its malignity makes it deformed. From these 
assertions we may consider what the figure of a spiritual substance 
is. If the Lord grants it, the same form of perfection (perfectionis 
forma) can undoubtedly form (informare) your soul and my soul.371
Thus, on the basis of sharing this one perfect will, Richard finds what he needs to 
explain how the Son is the “figure of God’s substance.” But as he makes special mention 
370 Richard, De Trinitate VI.21.
371 Ibid.
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earlier in VI.17, “ . . . when we speak of a conformed person, seek carefully, diligent 
reader, whether perhaps this term is able or ought to refer to a conformity in which only 
the Son bears the image of the Father on account of a conformity of properties.”372 There 
is something unique to the Son’s being called ‘image’ and ‘figure’ of the Father, for he is 
the archetype of that total wisdom and love. Nothing more immediately represents the 
paternal glory than the one eternally-begotten in super-conformity to that image. He is the
fullness of wisdom. There is no earlier or later, no accretion or decretion of knowledge, 
no greater or less than. He is the unique progeny of the Father, neither made nor created, 
but begotten and consubstantial with the Father. And this Word—full of grace and 
truth—has become flesh, offering a visible model of obedience to the Father by which 
humanity can be instructed and drawn into that “same form of perfection” (eadem 
perfectionis forma). As Anselm writes:
And this, then is quite clear enough: what is in the Word through 
which all things were made is not the likeness to all things, but true 
and simple essence. What is in the things made, on the other hand, 
is not simple and absolute essence, but a pale imitation of it. 
Necessarily, as a result, the Word is not more or less true, 
depending on its likeness to created things. Rather it would seem 
that every created nature stands at a higher stage of essence and 
worth the more it approximates to the Word.373
This super-proximity of Son to Father, and likewise, of Spirit to both, means that 
despite the fact that the Father is Wisdom and the Son is Wisdom and the Spirit is 
372 “Quod autem conformem diximus, diligens lector quaerat attentius, ne forte ad id referri valeat 
vel debeat in quo juxta quamdam proprietatum conformitatem solus Filius Patris imaginem portat.”
373 Monologion 31; Davies and Evans, 47. Cf. Hugh of St. Victor: “The Word and the Father were 
one in unity, since they were one in nature, and the Word himself wished to become one with us to make us
one in Himself and through Himself and with Him [the Father] with whom He himself was one.” Quoted in
Rorem, 92. De sacramentis II.1.12; PL 176.412C.
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Wisdom; there is, nevertheless, only one Wisdom. As a result of this unity of mind in the 
fullness of this wisdom—as a result of their clear knowledge of all worthy things in one 
eternal glimpse—they have an “intimate affection of the mind” (intimus animi affectus) 
and “impulse of a burning love” (aestuantis amoris impulsus).374 It is why they have 
“one spirit (unam spiritum) and proceed in one spirit: there is one intention (unum 
consilium) and same purpose (idem propositum), and they love the same (idem amant), 
desire the same (idem affectant), long for the same with equal desire.”375
Consequently this supreme wisdom is beautiful in its fullness and the most pleasing 
in its quality. As Richard says in book V, “the more fraternal the plurality of persons, the 
more intimate; the more intimate, the more pleasant.”376 What can be more pleasant and 
intimate than being of one and the same mind? What greater affinity can there be among 
divine persons when their consubstantiality of substance and proximity of mind are as 
close as the conformity of the Son to the Father, and as pure as the holiness of their 
super-spiritual Breath, the Holy Spirit? Who are united in their knowledge and love of 
one another by Him who illuminates and sanctifies, who refines the impurities of 
ignorance and impiety in order to lead all men to the Truth?377
Two implications, therefore, exist for the formation of the apprentice in accordance 
with the Wisdom of God. First, mankind has been invited—through the processions of 
Son and Spirit—to return to God. Why? In order that he might taste and grow in that 
374 Richard, De Trinitate VI.10.
375 Ibid.
376 Richard, De Trinitate V.2.
377 Richard, De Trinitate VI.10.
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intimate affinity and fraternity of persons. Thus as one comes to what is most worthy of 
his attention and purifies the intentions and desires of his soul—as he seeks the most 
qualified object for his contemplation, in its most integrated purity—he must re-prove the
quality of his own knowledge and love. He must fix his eyes upon the author and 
perfecter of his faith (Hebrews 12:2).378 He must move from the foundation of faith to the
fullness of knowledge. And in doing so, he “proximates” himself toward that principal 
relation—where the unity of mind comes closer than the resemblance of a son begotten in
the image of his father—where, besides reaching the summit of the Most High God, one 
also becomes the “friend of God” (Exodus 33:11).
The second implication for the formation of the apprentice is in his relation to his 
brothers. For just as the fullness of wisdom accounts for the fraternity of divine persons, 
so as brothers come to refine the integrity of their own knowledge and order it toward the
most worthy of things they come closer to one another in both mind and will. As 
Augustine says: 
Why then do we love another whom we believe to be righteous, and 
do not love that form itself wherein we see what is a righteous 
mind, that we also may be able to be righteous? Is it that unless we 
loved that also, we should not love him at all, whom through it we 
love: but whilst we are not righteous, we love that form too little to 
allow of our being able to be righteous? The man therefore who is 
believed to be righteous, is loved through that form and truth which 
he who loves discerns and understands within himself . . . .379
378 “ . . . aspicientes in auctorem fidei et consummatorem Iesum” (emphasis mine).
379 Augustine, De Trinitate VIII.6. Note also that as Augustine proceeds to move from visible to 
invisible things by means of the reformation of the soul created in the image of God, he moves in this 
section from Body —> Mind —> Righteous Mind. It is thus not the “rational perspicuity” of the mind but 
rather its spiritual and moral sanctity that makes the soul see all things more clearly: “For righteousness is 
the beauty of the mind” (emphasis mine). Ibid.
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Like other monastic orders in the 12th century, the harmony the Victorines sought 
was a purer form of the apostolica vita, and their means to it was living in communion 
with God and each other. They desired, by living according to the Rule of St. Augustine, 
by adopting the same habits, the same dress, the same look, by sharing the same 
dwellings, the same food, the same work, that they would likewise—and most of all—be 
conformed of mind. They wanted complete unity in their desire and will: to delight in 
their shared knowledge of divine things. In the end, they desired that their external 
disciplines would reflect their common faith, and that the integrity of their habit would be
matched by an inner integrity of soul. They desired that the “organ of their heart” and the 
“drum of their flesh” might be “united to each other with suitable consonance” (sibi 
confederet pari consonantia). Thus the inner harmony of one apprentice’s soul can be 
united to another’s to bring about an even greater harmony. As Richard writes in his 
Mystical Ark:
. . . the Spirit of the Lord daily combines them little by little in His 
elect and skillfully forms them into one harmony and by the 
plucking instrument of His graces fits them together in a certain 
harmonious consonance like a learned harp player who stretches 
these and loosens those, until a certain melody, mellifluous and 
sweet beyond measure, resounds from them . . .380
Thus as the ascent toward the summit guides the soul in accordance with newly 
discovered perfections, so the purity of divinity, in its knowledge and love, refines the 
soul with purer and purer forms of congruity by which the contemplative can come to 
enjoy an ever-increasing “confraternity” with God and others. 
380 Richard, Mystical Ark III.24; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 257. The concept of the Divine 
Harpist was common in the 12th century. For further examples, see McGinn, The Golden Chain, 162 n. 
261.
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The third dimension by which Richard shapes the mind of his reader is by leading 
him into the fullness of divinity. This is probably Richard’s crowning achievement and 
contribution to the theology of the Trinity. Applying ‘plenitude’ to Power, Richard 
proves the true omnipotence and wisdom of God in book I. God has these from fullness 
and not by participation in a source greater than himself. He is thus “truly” omnipotent as
well as supremely wise. Applying ‘plenitude’ to Goodness, Richard concludes that a 
trinity of persons cannot be lacking in true Divinity in book III. And finally, in applying 
‘plenitude’ to Wisdom in VI.25 he shows that “full learning” can be shared by three in 
such a way that they have one and the same knowledge. Thus God is the highest, the best,
and the most perfect and complete of all things.
This plenitude accounts for Richard’s “filling out” these dimensions of Divinity; but 
it also, concurrently “fills in” the soul of his apprentice with a wellspring of pleasures and
delights. In this way Richard makes the soul of his apprentice supreme, congruous, and 
“full” in accordance with these corresponding dimensions of the Trinity. Ultimately 
Richard wants to “draw out” a further fullness from the soul of his reader so that he 
becomes increasingly open to the benevolence of God. For it is in this encounter with the 
“supremely blessed one” that one becomes awestruck by the majesty of His riches, 
graced by the outpouring and benevolence of His generosity, and drawn out of oneself to 
seek the fullness of consummate love and joy with others.
Richard also uses the Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad in a specific way in book VI, 
showing that he not only used it to structure his treatise, but that he also intended for it to 
be understood in accordance with formative aims. He repeats an argument he remembers 
writing elsewhere, “ . . . why, through a special kind of attribution, power is attributed to 
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the Unbegotten, wisdom to the Begotten, and goodness to the Holy Spirit.”381 He says 
that through our daily experience we all know what power, wisdom, love or goodness 
is.382 Our experience further reveals how they exceed our human capacity. Whatever 
power, wisdom, love or goodness each of us may have, we are constantly growing in 
them; we thus come to know that there is a limit to ourselves: an “above and beyond” 
ourselves we participate in. As such, this limitation serves as a “mirror” for 
understanding the ultimate Trinity that can be discerned in these three attributes. As we 
untarnish that mirror, we can better see the Divine and conform our lives in accordance 
with Divine Power, Wisdom, and Goodness. Richard first considers each element of the 
triad as potentially lacking to illustrate the defect it brings to both Divinity as well as the 
individual’s moral life. Powers can exist where wisdom does not, as with animate objects 
that can hear, see, walk, eat, etc.—they can do all of these things without wisdom. But 
wisdom cannot be without power. This is because wisdom itself is a power (potentia). 
Wisdom receives this power from Power, and thus wisdom does not give Power the 
power to exist but Power does give wisdom the power to exist. Here Richard describes 
the relationship between power and wisdom in order to allude to its further, trinitarian 
significance; for similarly, the Father gives the Son the power to be but not vice versa. 
381 Richard, De Trinitate VI.15. As Ribaillier notes, here Richard incorporates, verbatim, material 
from his De tribus personis appropriatis in Trinitate. Ribaillier, 11-12, 247-248.
382 Richard, De Trinitate VI.15. Here we have an explicit identification Richard makes between 
bonitas and caritas showing that he sees them as intimately related and alludes to both when he uses one or
the other term. What’s more, as Poirel shows, the ‘Goodness’ element in the Power-Wisdom-Goodness 
triad had a wide semantic-range for Richard’s predecessor, Hugh: e.g., benignitas, voluntas, amor, bonitas, 
dilectio, gratia, caritas; whereas Power (potentia) and Wisdom (sapientia) are rarely ever changed. See 
esp. Poirel, 315-316. This semantic freedom with respect to ‘Goodness’ permits Richard to prioritize 
caritas in Anselm’s supreme Good and derive his argument for the Trinity in bk. III.
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There is only one divine person from himself; the Son, though eternal, is from another. 
Similarly, it is possible for power and wisdom to be present, but without goodness. As 
Richard notes, consider Lucifer who had great power and wisdom but a bad will. He 
serves as a witness to the possibility of having preeminent power and wisdom but “no 
remaining vestige of goodness.” But goodness requires “willing the good.” It therefore 
contains two components: (a) willing the good and (b) willing the good. The latter 
requires wisdom; the former requires power. For one must be able to discern what is good
in order to will the good; otherwise one does not know the good he ought to choose. But 
even if one knows the good, one must also be able to will it; and this requires power. 
Goodness—that is, willing the good—therefore draws its being from both know-how (i.e.,
Wisdom) and ability (i.e., Power). The Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad, experienced by 
every rational creature, therefore, illustrates what ought to be believed about the Trinity, 
that there is only one who is from himself and not from another, a second who is from 
another but not from himself; and still a third who draws his origin from the first two. 
Thus Power is tied to the Father, Wisdom to the Son, and Goodness to the Holy Spirit. 
Moreover, one cannot think of these three properties in the fullness of their perfection 
without the others. In the same way, therefore, one can see how Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit exist in a harmony of unity and plurality, unique with respect to their causal 
dependence, but united in the simplicity of their substance. They are unique and 
inseparable, a Trinity in unity and a unity in Trinity.
Richard uses this trinity of properties to draw the minds of his readers toward what 
they ought to believe about the properties of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.383 But unless 
383 The specific, Trinitarian appropriation of the Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad permeates much of 
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the mirror reflects these properties “rightly” they cannot see God properly. Only as the 
apprentice rightly orders that trinity of properties in his own soul does he come to know 
God as He is. Gradually his habitual experience of growing in Power-Wisdom-Love 
creates a way for him to know God more and more. Without the fullness of this trinity of 
properties there cannot be a true Trinity with respect to Divinity; without a corresponding
fullness of this trinity of properties in his soul, neither is he a “whole” or “holy” person. 
Godefroy confirms these formative implications of Richard’s teaching, as den Bok notes:
At the end of the twelfth century [Godefroy] of St. Victor, for one, 
writes that the creating Trinity being supreme power, wisdom and 
goodness creates man into a created trinity having some power, 
wisdom and goodness by nature, and recreates him into a recreated 
trinity having supreme wisdom and goodness and power by grace. 
Such a sentence can serve as an excellent summary of Richard’s 
thoughts on God’s trinitarian missions and man responding to them 
(emphasis mine).384
 Thus the apprentice who wants to worship God in his fullness must also seek a 
corresponding fullness of his soul—a fullness recreated in him as he responds to the 
exitus and reditus of the trinitarian missions.385 He cannot have power alone. Nor can he 
have merely power and wisdom, “for even the demons believe and shudder” (James 
the Victorine literature besides Richard’s. For example, “Andrew [of St. Victor] claims that the Trinity is 
suggested (insinuare curant) in all God’s works: ‘power in creating things from nothing, wisdom in 
deposing them and guiding them, goodness in sustaining and cherishing.’” Signer, 91. See also Achard’s 
“Sermon 13,” in Hugh Feiss, Achard of Saint Victor: Works, 207-253. In Hugh, see Poirel, 315-344.
384 Den Bok, 467.
385 As Gilles Emery writes, “ . . . we are saved by the persons who have created us, and we are 
conducted to the Father (reditus) by the persons who are also the reason of creation (exitus). The trinitarian 
order of salvation thus presupposes the trinitarian order of creation that provides its foundation.” Gilles 
Emery, “Trinity and Creation,” a chapter in Trinity in Aquinas, eds. Rik van Nieuwenhove and Joseph 
Wawrykow (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 71. This relationship between 
the ‘work of creation’ (opus conditionis) and the ‘work of restoration’ (opus restaurationis) was important 
to the Victorines (see Feiss, 49; Coulter, 40ff.); and, as evidenced by Godefroy, it was intricately united 
with their understanding of the Trinity and the Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad. For more on this, see esp. 
den Bok, 358-365.
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2:19). No. To be complete, he has to have a good will, a loving will. He must have a will 
that both discerns the good and does the good, that discerns love and wills love. For love 
draws its being from the fullness of power and wisdom and binds them together into one. 
As den Bok writes, “when man’s motives are «in order» his entire willing is well-formed,
beautiful, just like that of the divine persons.”386
Without the harmony of Power-Wisdom-Goodness there can be no true Trinity; and 
without the same in the soul there can be no true individual, no true “son.” The individual
must reform his counter-triad of impotence, ignorance, and malice in accordance with 
Divine power, wisdom, and goodness.387 Then he shall “know fully even as he is fully 
known” (1 Corinthians 13:12). For only as one comes to reflect properly upon oneself 
and God, and rightly orders that mental trinity, does the gaze of the beatific vision 
become more clear.
Consummating Trinitarian Love in the Community
We have seen how Richard uses a number of his triads and triadic structures to 
shape the trinitarian consciousness of the individual. He seeks a proportional depth of 
soul as it ascends to the summit of the Most High God. He seeks a congruity in the 
individual’s knowledge and love as it conforms “from glory to glory” to the fullness of 
Wisdom shared by Father, Son, and Spirit—a conformity revealed most intimately in the 
conformity of the Son to the Father. He likewise seeks a corresponding fullness of joy 
386 Den Bok, 355.
387 For more on the counter-triad of Impotence-Ignorance-Malice and its relationship to Power-
Wisdom-Goodness, see Richard’s De statu interioris hominis.
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and wonder in the individual’s contemplations of divine plenitude. These are the 
pleasures of Wisdom drawn from one’s own heart. But Richard desires “more” from his 
readers than a private Wisdom for themselves alone. Now that they have been filled to the
brim with the plenitude of these “inner” delights, he seeks to make their cups overflow 
with love for others. We turn now to the significance of Richard’s trinitarian forms and 
structures for the Victorine community.
We now shift from wisdom to love, since, as Richard says, its pleasures can only be 
drawn from the heart of another. Love is central to Richard’s De Trinitate. In the 
Prologue, Richard opens with the love chapter of 1 Corinthians 13 along with the familiar
triad found there: faith, hope, and love. Following Augustine and Anselm, Richard sees 
love as the ultimate goal, faith as its foundation, and hope as the movement from faith to 
love.388 But love is the ultimate prize, and without it one cannot truly know God; for 
“God is Love” (1 John 4:8). Richard writes:
Now if I do not have love, then whatever I will have profits me 
nothing. You hear from the mouth of Truth what the profit of 
charity is: If someone loves me, then he will be loved by my Father, 
and I will love him and manifest myself to him. This manifestation 
then derives from love, contemplation from manifestation, and 
knowledge from contemplation. Moreover, when Christ, our life, 
appears, then we will also appear with him in glory, and we will be 
like him at that time, since we will see him just as he is. You see 
where we begin, the destination that we reach, or the extent to 
388 This movement from faith to love is the basis of Richard’s fides quaerens intellectum, as is made 
clear in the following analysis of his Prologue. Love is the basis of Richard’s quest for “rationes 
necessariae” in De Trinitate. The faith-to-love motif is a common one in the 12th century and is found in 
Augustine. See, e.g., p. 70 of this work where it serves as the structure for his De doctrina christiana. 
William of St. Thierry, as is well known, gives extensive attention to this triad and its Augustinian themes 
in his Speculum fidei. See William of St. Thierry, The Mirror of Faith, trans. Thomas X. Davis, ed. E. 
Rozanne Elder, Cistercian Fathers, 15 (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Cistercian Publications, 1979). 
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which we ascend by means of hope and love from faith up to divine 
knowledge, and through divine knowledge up to eternal life.389
If one wishes to behold the face of God, if one wishes to see the “true God,” then 
one must love Jesus Christ. For as he promised, those who love him will be loved by his 
Father and he will manifest himself to them (John 14:21). And the hope, the joy, the love 
for that appearing is to appear with him in glory and see him as he is. Faith guides, hope 
draws, but love compels.390 Thus as Richard uses this love to make his case for the 
Trinity of persons in book III, he kindles the fire of this love in his readers with the hope 
that they might consummate this Trinitarian love within their community.
In the same way that Richard elevates the mind of his readers through various 
grades of perfection with respect to God’s Wisdom, he does the same for God’s Love. 
But where wisdom fills the soul to its capacity, love drives the soul out of itself, 
overwhelms it with such delight and longing that it can only find its fulfillment in 
overflowing toward others.391 In the same way that wisdom must become supreme, 
integral, and perfect, so love must do the same. And if we are to take seriously Richard’s 
claim that supreme and perfect love requires a plurality of persons for Divinity, how 
much more must the human possibility for such Trinitarian love require a plurality of 
persons? If the “fulfillment” of Divinity requires a plurality of persons where such 
fulfillment obtains, everlastingly, ab eterno, without beginning or end; how much more 
must this be the case for those who have been crafted in that image, who receive their 
389 Richard, De Trinitate Prologue.
390 Ibid.
391 Indeed, Richard’s argument for the Trinity of persons from supreme benevolence in III.14-20 is 
an argument based on the “overflow” of charity. Cf. the “pouring in and out” (infusio / effluo) of V.23.
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beginning ex tempore, and who must find their plenitude in a “full and perfect 
contemplation of the Trinity”? As Richard aptly says therefore, “it is necessary that love 
be directed toward another, so that it can be charity. Therefore, charity absolutely cannot 
exist where a plurality of persons is lacking.”392
Richard guides his readers from the base to the summit of supreme love. The first 
movement in the ascent is a recognition that there is a greater love than private love for 
oneself without which one cannot have or enjoy fellowship with another. As Richard 
writes, “As long as someone loves no one else as much as himself, that private love, 
which he has toward himself, demonstrates that he has not yet apprehended the highest 
degree of love (summum caritatis gradum).”393 Private love is inferior to love for 
another. And if one is to ascend to that greater love, one must seek to love another.394 
Supreme and complete love has some essential aspects. In III.2-20, Richard explains 
those aspects in the most exquisite detail with the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad. In 
order for love to be good it must be for another and not merely for oneself. Second, the 
love must be mutual in order for it to be pleasing. The second element refers to both the 
quality and E-quality of this love. With respect to equality, Richard points out that such 
love must be among equals. As he says, it is not just love of another, but love of “another 
392 Richard, De Trinitate III.2. Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 374.
393 Richard, De Trinitate III.2. Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 375.
394 There is an interesting play, too, in Richard’s use of ‘a semetipso’. With respect to the simplicity 
of the divine essence in relation to all created things, there is only one ‘esse a semetipso’ (I.6). With respect
to God ad intra, there is only one divine person who is ‘a seipso’ (IV.15). As an individual seeks his (false)
beatitude in a private love for himself, he stands by himself (stare in semetipso). It is, therefore, only as the 
individual discovers and grounds his soul in the sufficiency that is God’s alone that his disillusionment is 
revealed for what it is and he seeks (true) beatitude by loving God and others. Taking root ab Alio, one 
overflows ad alterum.
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of equal dignity (condignum).” But for Divinity, this is not just an equality among equals 
of any degree, but supreme equality. In the case of Divinity, they must be supremely 
equal and equally Divine. Such supreme equality, therefore, cannot obtain for non-
Divine, rational creatures.395 But what can obtain is a mutual effort, in accordance with 
divine grace, to reciprocate Divine love “that has been graciously poured into our hearts 
through the Holy Spirit” (Romans 5:5). As Richard says: 
Without this [spiritus], none of the spirits are holy, neither human 
nor angelic spirits. For, the human spirit undoubtedly begins to be 
holy at that time when it loves what pertains to piety and hates and 
detests what pertains to impiety. This indeed is the affection of 
piety; this breath, when it blows from the hearts of many, causes 
many to be one heart and one mind.396
Thus as one ‘breathes’ with the order and ardor of the Holy Spirit’s own Love—by 
conforming one’s love to Love—one ascends with Him to that summit of supreme 
dignity by which two, who are supremely equal, can love each other supremely. The 
mutuality of love among the Victorines will be proportional to the degree that each and 
every one of them perfects their power, wisdom, and goodness/love. To the extent that 
some have a greater dignity and integrity of soul than others, those who are more mature 
in their faith, more ardent in their love, will grieve for those who lack that same form of 
perfection.397 In Twelve Patriarchs, Richard reveals the tenderness of this brotherly love:
395 “In Gregory, inferiors show reverence [reverentia] to superiors but superiors show love [dilectio] 
to inferiors.” Straw, 87; Ep. 5.59 (CCL 140, 357-58). Adopting a similar distinction for Richard, we can see
that as brothers reach a consummate equality of soul they approach a form of condilectio that approximates 
the perfection of Divine love. 
396 Richard, De Trinitate VI.10.
397 For Richard’s teaching on stronger members of the body supporting weaker ones, see De 
questionibus, in M. L. Colker, “Richard of St. Victor and the Anonymous of Bridlington,” Traditio 18 
(1962): 223.
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Certainly, while [the mind] considers more diligently the successes 
of some and the failures of others, the infirmity of the latter and the 
perfection of the former, the pious mind is surely touched by 
various affections in turn—now this one, now that. Thus it begins 
to fear for some, to grieve for others, and to hope for good things 
for the one and better things for the other. It sees in others those 
things it ought to love and for which it should rejoice. It sees in 
certain persons those things it ought justly to abhor, and for which 
it ought justly to grieve. And so in this way when good affections 
sport with simple thoughts that run forth here and there out of the 
examined and self-pleased discipline of neighbors—what is this, 
other than that the brothers of Dina, the sons of Leah, feed their 
cattle? Do you see how at one and the same time true love of 
neighbor produces one thing and vain love of self produces the 
other? True love of neighbor is responsible for the pastures of the 
brothers for feeding their cattle.398
Only as the Victorines maximize their love in accordance with the true Spirit of the 
apostolica vita will they begin living righteously in word and deed and experience that 
mutual and pleasing love that can only be known by the friends of God. The Rule of St. 
Augustine also serves this purpose. Like a Good Shepherd, it herds them into one fold, 
teaches them the one voice of their ‘magister’ so that they might live as equals and enjoy 
the pleasant delights that come from being of “one heart and mind.”
Such equality speaks to the order of one’s love and to the quality of the object or 
person to whom it is directed. To have mutual love is both to be a good person yourself 
and to love a brother who equally exemplifies such goodness. The greater the perfection 
and dignity of something, the greater the priority it should have in your affection for it.399
398 Twelve Patriarchs lii; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 109. For Richard, even the virtues 
themselves are spoken of as “brothers” and their unity as “brotherly love.” Ibid., 126, lxix: “whole fraternal
union of virtues.” 
399 On the role of discretio in the order and ardor of one’s love, and the difference between true and 
supreme caritas, see den Bok, 310-312.
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When one loves something more of lesser value, one’s love is perverse and disordered.400
This is why God—who is the most supreme and perfect—should be loved most of all. It 
is also why all of the divine persons love themselves as much as they love each other.401 
But there is also the ardor of one’s love—that is, not only what one loves more, but how 
much more one loves it: the level of one’s intensity and longing for it. For Richard, one’s 
love must not only be properly ordered but also properly “ardored.” One’s longing and 
intensity for something must be in proportion to its dignity and worth. One must therefore
love the supreme God with the most supreme longing. Similarly, one must love one’s 
brother or another with a proportional desire and longing. The ardor of one’s love must 
be moderated in accordance with discretion. 
Thus as brothers grow in their love for one another, as they come to see in each 
other a proximity of wisdom and love for God, the intensity of their love for each other 
increases. For they witness the same love and delight they have for God and others 
coming from another. As Richard says, “For when two mutually loving persons embrace 
one another with supreme longing, and are supremely delighted in each other’s love, then
supreme joy of the one is in the intimate love of the second, and, conversely, the 
excellent joy of the second is in the love of the first.”402 
400 The notion of “(dis)ordered love” has a long history in the Christian mystical tradition, making 
the source and inspiration for Richard’s “inordinata caritas” more difficult to isolate. It is found in all three
of the authors the Victorines most frequently read: Augustine, Origen, Gregory the Great. For a good list of
sources and a useful survey of suggestions by Richardian scholars, see Chris Evan’s note on Richard’s use 
of inordinata caritas in III.2 in his forthcoming English translation of De Trinitate. 
401 Richard, De Trinitate V.24. On divine self-love, see den Bok, 312-313.
402 Richard, De Trinitate III.15. Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 388-389.
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Finally, as this love ascends in goodness and pleasantness, it must also become full 
and complete.403 For Richard this means it must have everything of perfection and lack 
nothing that would make it more complete.404 Mutual love is greater and better, as well 
as more pleasing, than private love for oneself405; but the fullest and most complete 
love—consummate love—is the best and most pleasing.406 It is more perfect and 
complete than mutual love. In a way that matches the “drawing out” of oneself by making
that love overflow toward another in mutual love, Richard further draws out the 
abundance of love of a bestower and requiter to overflow for a third mutually loved.407 As
long as two remain fixed in their mutual love for each other they lack a third to share in 
their love. But because each knows how great and how pleasing it is to experience the 
mutual and intimate love of another; and because they are committed to what is more 
perfect, they want a third to share in this love. If they did not, they would exemplify the 
imperfection of selfishness and miserliness by which they hoard the riches of their love, 
along with its delights and pleasures.408 In the same way that private love shows itself 
selfish in the presence of mutual love, so mutual love shows itself selfish in its encounter 
403 Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 375.
404 On the relationship of ‘lacking’ and ‘fullness’ see esp. Richard, De Trinitate I.21-24; II.7, 16-17, 
III.2-5, 11-13, 14-20; V.2, 11, 14, 17.
405 Richard, De Trinitate III.2.
406 Richard, De Trinitate III.11.
407 Richard, De Trinitate III.20.
408 Richard, De Trinitate III.4, 11-13, 14-20.
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with consummate love—where mutual love is shared with a third equally loved.409 
The ultimate exemplification of such consummate love is the Trinity of Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit since each divine person is supremely perfect, supremely loved, and has 
and enjoys (being) a third equally loved.410 Out of the abundance of this love humankind 
was created—by choice and not by nature, of course411—to come to discover this love 
and enjoy it. The divine ‘generation’ of this love extends to the human procession of Eve 
from Adam,412 and subsequently to the whole human race. For a human person alone to 
know and experience such love does not require another human person, since this love 
already obtains from eternity as a Trinity of divine persons who can share such love with 
a single human individual alone. But it is “fitting” that God would inscribe creation with 
a human form from which he could guide, draw, and compel his little ones to approach 
the throne of his majesty and invite them to enjoy its choicest of riches. Richard writes:
For, who else, except one considered completely insane, can doubt 
that there is truly the same affection of piety and one and the same 
love in the Father and Son? Thus, this love, which is common to 
both persons, is called the Holy Spirit; this is the one who is 
inspired into the hearts of the saints by the Father and Son; this is 
the one through whom the saints are sanctified, so that they may 
merit being saints. Just as the human spirit is the life of the body, so 
that divine Spirit is the life of spirits.413
409 Richard, De Trinitate III.15.
410 Richard, De Trinitate III.7/11-13, 14-20, 21; V.2, 9, 19, 23-24; VI.11.
411 Richard, De Trinitate III.8.
412 Richard, De Trinitate VI.2, 16.
413 Richard, De Trinitate VI.10.
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Thus God gives consummate, divine love a human possibility. This is the place in 
one’s religious ascent where one becomes “transfixed” with the cosmological, 
soteriological, and eschatological significance of the two greatest commandments: Love 
of God and Neighbor. As Gregory marks this with the sign of the cross: “One is lifted 
high in love of God, and joined together in love of neighbor.”414 Trinitarianly conceived, 
love comes to be seen as a consummate, Trinitarian abundance that freely overflows with
love for God and others. It “proceeds” out of this abundance and unites another—a 
third—into its bond of love.
By forging this form in the minds and hearts of his readers, Richard not only adds to 
their theological delight, he turns that delight into a wellspring of longing for that 
consummate Trinitarian love supremely exemplified in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. He 
makes their soul yearn and burn for it.415 Such yearning becomes the basis for the 
“counter-procession” that must return “above and beyond,” where reason itself faints 
with the longing of Rachel and gives birth to the ecstatic contemplation of Benjamin. 
Here knowledge and love catapult the soul into the fifth and sixth levels of 
contemplation. One moves from language to being, and from being to “being with.” Here
one hovers in the midst of the propitiatory between the two cherubim. One’s soul passes 
over to wholly invisible things and flies with holy wings, traversing “how wide and long 
414 “ . . . in Dei suspendere, sed etiam proximo in caritate sociare.” Gregory the Great, Hom. Ez. 
2.7.5 (CCL 142, 319).
415 Richard, De Trinitate VI.14: “For, when this Holy Spirit enters the rational mind, he ignites its 
affection with the divine flame, and transforms it to the similitude of his property . . . . For the whole mind 
becomes white-hot from the igniting of the divine fire, it flares up and, at the same time, liquefies in the 
love of God, according to the Apostle: The love of God was poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit, 
who was given to us.”
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and high and deep is the love of Christ.” Here “being rooted and established in love,” one
comes to “ . . . know this love that surpasses knowledge—that you (plural!) may be filled 
(plhrwqhvte) to the measure of all the fullness of God” (Ephesians 3:17-19; emphasis 
mine).
That those filled with this divine love for a third would carry it out beyond 
themselves to their community will scarcely surprise us. For out of this “root of charity” 
they become enriched by its abundance and overflow with the sweetness of God’s love 
for others. Through teaching and study they draw the minds of others to the invisible 
things of God, to those eternal things that last and endure, where moth and rust do not 
destroy (Matthew 6:19). Through washing the feet of those beyond their walls they seek 
many “thirds” who might become the beneficiaries of this divine benevolence and be 
won over to the common life. As Fassler notes:
The ministers of the altar renewed the power of consecration and 
dedication in the altar-washing ritual, a power believed by them to 
have first been created by Christ’s redemptive act on the cross. In 
the actions that followed, it was transferred to the people, as the 
Victorine community went solemnly forth to adore the lowest 
members of society and to offer them gifts, not only of washing, 
food, and money, but also of instruction, both through the hearing 
of Mass and through the example of the canons’ humility. This 
particular commemoration of the Last Supper did not attempt a 
realistic portrayal; rather, it searched for the spirit of the original 
event and challenged the participants to experience charity and 
humility in their every day lives. Thus through their particular 
interpretation of this standard ceremony, the Victorines emphasized 
their ideals of instruction through deeds and words, attempting to 
teach through symbolic, ritualized action.416
416 Fassler, 265.
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All of these practices of the Victorines, all of their words and deeds, ascend and 
increase in their purity and generosity as this consummate, Trinitarian love comes to be 
incarnated among them. It is by means of the triad of Goodness-Happiness-Glory that 
Richard forges it in them. He enlarges their minds in order to fill them with the fullness 
of divine Wisdom; he draws out their hearts in order to make them overflow with love for
others. He focuses in order to magnify, that his readers might discover and enjoy that 
consummate love supremely exemplified in the Trinity. Richard thus not only argues for 
the Trinity “trinitarianly” with trinitarian forms and structures, he also “trinitarianly” 
forms his readers with them. Thus by filling out all of the dimensions of true Divinity, 
Richard ful-fills his apprentices with “a full and perfect contemplation of the Trinity” in 
whose image they have been made and in whom they find their true perfection.
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CHAPTER SIX
OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSE
But they said, ‘We will not walk in it’
We now have a very strong case for the thesis of our work that Richard articulates 
the Trinity “trinitarianly” for the formation of souls. In chapter 4 we established the 
structural dimension of our thesis, showing in both micro- and macro-scopic detail the 
triads and triadic structures Richard uses in constructing his De Trinitate. And in chapter 
5 we looked at how Richard used these triadic forms and structures for formative aims; 
that is, how he used them to shape the trinitarian consciousness of his readers and 
consummate trinitarian love within the Victorine community. In this chapter we consider 
the most salient objections to our thesis and then defeat them. 
Since our thesis comprises three main elements, it may be undermined in three 
corresponding ways. The three components are (a) the “intentionality” (or 
“deliberateness”) of Richard’s use of triads and triadic structures, (b) the triads and triadic
structures themselves, and (c) the claim that Richard uses these structures for formative 
purposes. The first can be undermined by arguing that however intentional Richard’s use 
of these triads and triadic structures may seem, it is either coincidental or less intentional 
than we have claimed. The second can be undermined by arguing that what appear to be 
triads or triadic structures are not so; or that if so, they do not have the trinitarian 
significance we attribute to them. And lastly, the third can be undermined by arguing that
the structures do not have the formative purposes or implications we ascribe to them. 
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Given that Richard explicitly states that he writes De Trinitate with formative 
purposes in mind, whatever structures or structuring his treatise can be shown to have—
regardless of whether it is as we suggest or otherwise—such structures and structuring 
can be shown to fit within Richard’s stated goals. Therefore any threat to the third 
element of our thesis will be proportional to the success of objections raised against its 
first two elements and upon which our formative claims were based. In other words, 
Richard’s treatise has formative aims; these aims are met by whatever structures he 
incorporates in arranging his material. But if his structures or his intentionality in using 
them are not as we have suggested, then whatever formative implications we derived 
from our analysis will be shown to be either disconnected from the way Richard arranges 
his material or different than what we have suggested. The force, therefore, of any 
successful objection to our thesis must come against its first two elements—either 
denying the intentionality involved in Richard’s structures or denying that they have the 
trinitarian structuring we have claimed they do.
Objection #1: Triads as Common to 12th Century
We look first at those objections that deny the intentionality involved in Richard’s 
structuring. This can be argued a few different ways. We will list them first and provide 
our rejoinders later. One objection of this sort suggests that these triadic structures were 
common to the 12th century, can be pointed to in numerous other literary works, and that 
we find them in Richard’s De Trinitate ought not surprise us.417 Furthermore, Richard 
417 The use of triads in the Middle Ages is extensive: in Peter Lombard, see Colish, 26; Abelard 
organizes his work with the triad of faith-sacraments-charity which is followed by Roland of Bologna, 
ibid., 66; Constable, Three Studies in Medieval Religious and Social Thought, 264-65, 290, 335; For 
Hugh’s three-storyed picture of Noah’s Ark, see Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 271, (see Plate 30); Isidore 
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employs triads in his other works.418 He is simply a man rooted in the 12th century where
triads and triadic structures were common. His use of them, at most, demonstrates he 
writes within the inherited traditions of the time and within the same historical milieu as 
his theological contemporaries. These structures that we find in Richard’s De Trinitate 
are an adopted pattern Richard uses to construct his treatise and therefore the level of 
intentionality we ascribe to his incorporation of them is suspect.419 
In addition, one can point to some of the meditative practices common to the era, 
and incorporated at the abbey of St. Victor, to strengthen the case. A further objection 
points out that in addition to the commonality of triads to the 12th century that these 
triads and triadic structures merely express the form by which the Victorines and others 
pursued their contemplations. Many methods were at work in the 12th century, but two 
come to mind as the most expressive of triadic appearances and forms. These are the 
practice of ‘collatio’420 and the “harmonizing of opposites.”421 Let us describe each of 
these in turn and then see how they might further undermine our thesis.
of Seville’s three stages of building (dispositio-constructio-venustas), ibid., 230; Adam of Dryburgh’s De 
tripartito tabernaculo, ibid., 246-250.
418 In Twelve Patriarchs lxxix: work-meditation-prayer, experience-discover-obtain; lxxxii: 
threefold failure of reason: death of Rachel-fall of disciples-failure of sense-memory-reason; lxxiv: faith-
reason-contemplation, below reason-with reason-above reason; lv: outside-inside-above, corporeal-
spiritual-divine. What is noteworthy about De Trinitate is the noticeable scarcity of non-triadic structures 
indicating he intends greater significance for them in De Trinitate. Despite many triads in Twelve 
Patriarchs, for example, the treatise is governed by the dualism of Rachel-Leah. On Richard’s non-triadic 
patterns in Mystical Ark, see n. 430 of this work. 
419 This objection could be further strengthened by the suggestion in Carruthers’s studies that 
memory-work favored twos and threes. Mary J. Carruthers, The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in 
Medieval Culture, Cambridge Studies in Medieval Literature, 10 (Cambridge University Press, 1992).
420 For more detailed treatment of collatio as a meditative practice at St. Victor and its use by 
Richard and Hugh, see Coulter, 149-161.
421 Coulter, 213-220.
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Objection #2: The Meditative Practice of collatio
The word ‘collatio’ had a wide semantic range that can refer to either physical or 
mental acts that involved gathering things together for the purpose of further study.422 At 
St. Victor, it seems to have been used in three domains: with respect to communal 
dialogue, scriptural exegesis, and personal meditation. With respect to dialogue, Sicard 
suggests it could refer to: (a) a colloquy or conference among several persons, (b) the 
spiritual reading listened to silently by the entire Victorine community (hora collationis), 
and (c) the particular discussion between a master and his disciples for the purpose of 
edification.423 Likewise, collatio could refer to the ‘collating’ of the comments of church 
fathers or catenas of biblical texts related to the same passage or idea. So it could refer to 
the gathering of people as well as the gathering of texts. But the use that interests us most
is the activity of gathering ideas together in the mind for some further purpose.424
One of the greatest benefits of this practice of gathering ideas together was how it 
aided the mind in finding one’s way through the maze of a complicated set of ideas. 
422 “‘Gathering’ is a favored word in later monasticism for recollective, meditative reading, 
undoubtedly because of the etymologia (philologically correct in this case, for colligere was actually 
fashioned from con + legere) that links it to legere, the verb meaning both ‘gather up’ and ‘read.’” 
Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 192-193. That listening to spiritual reading was called “collatio” comes from 
the monastic use of ‘conferentia’ as a talk or speech. See also n. 423 below. “Recollection” (colligere), 
“collection” (collatio), “gather up” (collocare), “drawing in” (tractare), all refer to aspects in gathering 
from an inventory, particularly in memory. Ibid., 16. Collatio was also connected with the Victorine use of 
symbols. See Chase, Angelic Wisdom, 59, 191 n. 8.
423 Coulter, 149-150. The first two types are found in the Liber ordinis sancti Victoris Parisiensis; 
the third, in Hugh’s De archa Noe morali. The first is also found in Hugh’s Didascalicon IV.16, where 
‘collatio’ has the meaning of “conversation”: “A ‘dialogue’ is a conversation (collatio) between two or 
among several persons: the Latins call it sermo, or talk, moreover, it is so called because it is interwoven 
(seritur) among each of the speakers.” Taylor, 119.
424 Sicard further suggests this scholarly activity took two forms: (a) bringing together (collating) 
the texts of commentators and (b) comparing and contrasting intellectual ideas or images. Coulter 149-150. 
“The Victorines also saw ‘collatio’ as a scholarly activity involving an act of ‘rapprocher’ and of ‘mettre 
en rapport’—that is, a mental act of comparing objects or concepts.”
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Since collatio functioned to bring a diverse set of ideas into one place, that one place 
could serve as a summary of previous contemplations, thus aiding the mind in memory 
and recollection. But in doing so, that same place could also serve as a new foundation 
(fundamentum) for subsequent considerations. As we have seen previously, like anchor-
points for the rock-climber, these places of condensed-thought became the footholds that 
aid both the lead-climber and his apprentices in their meditative ascents. Concerning this,
Carruthers writes:
The power of this elementary technique is that it provides 
immediate access to whatever piece of stored material one may 
want, and it also provides the means to construct any number of 
cross-referencing, associational links among the elements in such 
schemes. In short, it provides a random-access memory, and also 
sets of patterns or foundations upon which to construct any number 
of additional collations and concordances of material. This latter 
goal, the making of mental “locations” for “gathering up” 
(collocare) and “drawing in” (tractare), is where memoria and 
invention come together in a single cognitive process.425
Since this was a meditative practice at St. Victor that one would pursue either in solitude 
or in the company of others, it is no surprise to find the same practice in their literary 
compositions: their literature merely reflects this meditative practice in a written form. 
The Victorines used collatio for two further purposes in their meditations and 
contemplations. One is called ‘comparatio’, the other ‘translatio’.426 The first compares 
ideas or concepts for the purpose of drawing out further insights and considerations. The 
second consists of gathering these contrasts and “translating” them to another domain. 
425 Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 16.
426 For further examples of comparatio-translatio, see Coulter, 153; Den Bok, 131-132; Zinn, RSV’s 
Three Main Works, 15.
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Richard alludes to both practices in De Trinitate VI.2, showing that they were often used 
together:427 
And so, we ought to examine carefully the natural order of 
proceeding in humanity and, with all acuteness, search for what the 
divine reality has in likeness to it (in se simile habeat). After 
finding and understanding it according to the practice of theological 
discipline (juxta theologicae disciplinae morem), we ought to 
transfer (transumere) the terms of the proprieties from the human to 
the divine according to the principle of similitude (pro similitudinis 
ratione).428
The comparatio that follows consists of collating all of the modes of human 
procession (e.g., immediate, mediate, or mediate and immediate at the same time). The 
translatio consists of transferring what is important from this collection of truths 
concerning human production to what is true for Divine procession. The key relation is 
the principal relation of parent-child, for it is the immediate mode of human procession. 
Like humanity, the relation of divine Father to divine Son is both immediate and a 
principal relation. But unlike humanity, the production of the Son is according to the 
operation of nature. The collatio of human modes of production makes it possible to 
compare them and derive the necessary distinctions needed to see what is similar and 
dissimilar about the divine procession that obtains between Father and Son.
427 “In the actual practice of making a spiritual interpretation the interpreter would most likely 
employ both where one’s translatio becomes grounded in one’s comparatio such that they may be seen as 
one fluid mental act.” Coulter, 153. Richard also alludes to comparatio in De Trinitate II.7: “Among those 
truths that we concluded with reasoning, we draw out some truths by analyzing the property of one 
attribute, which we are discussing; and we demonstrate other truths by considering the property of another 
attribute and the mutual relationship between them.”
428 Richard, De Trinitate VI.2. The theologicae disciplinae should be understood as the transumere 
from humanity to Divinity, as Richard makes clear subsequently: “And so, since, according to the example 
of divine Scripture (juxta divinarum Scripturarum morem), we are accustomed to transfer (transumere) the 
terms of human relationship to the divine reality on the basis of the principle of similitude, . . . .”
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So collatio was a way of gathering together a couple of concepts or ideas in order to 
better remember them and draw out further insights from their joint consideration.429 
This might undermine our thesis when applied to either of its first two elements. With 
respect to intentionality, it can be argued that this was a common meditative technique or 
a common method of composing written work. Consequently, whatever triads or triadic 
structuring Richard incorporated into his treatise is the result of this technique and 
therefore not something he intentionally added to his work. Whatever triadic structures 
appear in De Trinitate are simply places where Richard engages in collatio and such 
structuring is a by-product of this method and not an intentional part of Richard’s thought
when he incorporates them into his work. 
In addition, this objection can undermine the second element of our thesis by 
arguing in one of two ways. First, it can be argued that such triads are not triads at all but 
merely places where Richard draws together two concepts. Thus despite the appearance 
of triadic structuring, they are actually dyads Richard pulls together in his collatio for 
further insights and reflection. The collatio itself is what accounts for the appearance of a 
third. Second, even if Richard’s collatios retain a triadic structure, it could be argued that 
this technique gives them whatever triadic structure they possess. They are simply 
summaries of Richard’s thoughts; they have no further trinitarian form or significance. 
429 Another use of collatio is Richard’s De Trinitate III.14, but since he deals with the Trinity, the 
further insights come with greater difficulty: “And indeed nothing seems more credible and nothing seems 
more correct than when each of these considerations and assertions is considered separately and 
independently. But if we ever discuss the unity together with the plurality and consider how they can stand 
together harmoniously, then whatever the various arguments has made convincing runs straight into 
ambiguity, unless the steadfastness of faith stands in the way.”
206
Objection #3: Richard’s Penchant for “Harmonizing Opposites”
A still further challenge to our thesis comes from the suggestion that the apparent 
triads and triadic structuring of Richard’s treatise embody a pervasive method of 
“harmonizing opposites.” Richard incorporates this throughout his writings and it 
accompanies his use of “fitting necessity” in De Trinitate. This is what accounts for how 
Richard ends his treatise with Wisdom despite the fact that the Power-Wisdom-Goodness
triad ends with goodness. Richard typically treats two things and then harmonizes them 
with a third. Thus where omnipotence speaks to the unity of substance and goodness to 
the trinity of persons, wisdom speaks to their harmonization. It can thus be argued that 
the harmonizing element is the third term of Richard’s triads and triadic structures, and 
that these structures merely reflect this harmonizing technique. Either these places are by-
products of this meditative practice and therefore not intentional; or their triadic form is 
reflective of this harmonizing pattern and therefore has no trinitarian significance.
Response to Objection #1: Triads Common to 12th Century
We take each of these objections in turn. First, with respect to the commonality of 
triads and triadic structures in the 12th century, Richard’s use of triads is not surprising. 
Many of his contemporaries and predecessors incorporated triads and triadic structures 
into their works. Thus Richard’s employment of them in De Trinitate provides one 
example of how he wrote within the accepted norms of his time. But Richard’s search for
triads in De Trinitate shows him going well beyond these common norms. We have seen,
for example, that Richard opens his treatise with a litany of triads. This gives us prima 
facie justification for believing he will be using more of them in his work and that he will
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be doing so in more intentional ways. We have also noted Richard’s pattern of molding 
his meditations in accordance with the scriptural symbols each of his works have as their 
special focus. Thus while it is common to use triads in the 12th century, and Richard does
use many of them in his Mystical Ark, the major contours of his thought break into six 
stages of contemplation based on the six elements of the Ark: wood, gold, crown, 
propitiatory, right cherub, left cherub. And the forms Richard’s taxonomies take in 
Mystical Ark establish themselves in accordance with the elements as the contemplation 
progresses (e.g., four sides, four rings, two poles, etc). Likewise, we find numerous 
dualities in his Twelve Patriarchs since that work follows the sons of Rachel and Leah 
and the two favorite sons of Rachel: Joseph and Benjamin. Since Richard conforms his 
reader’s attention in accordance with the main objects of contemplation across his works, 
his intentional use of triads and triadic structures in De Trinitate is all the more evident. 
Consequently, the central object for contemplation in De Trinitate requires infusing the 
minds of his apprentices with the beauty of three divine persons united in one substance. 
Indeed, when we compare Richard’s De Trinitate with his other works, despite the fact 
that he has no problem using non-triadic taxonomies, De Trinitate’s higher proliferation 
of triads combined with an inversely proportional scarcity of non-triadic categories 
makes Richard’s intentional use of them in this treatise even more conspicuous.430 
In addition, we have also seen that when Richard uses triads and triadic structures 
he often does a lot more than simply incorporate them. In book III, for example, we 
430 Indeed, in the case of Richard’s Mystical Ark, which he constructs as a meditation around the 
four sides of the Ark of the Covenant, he adds “happiness” to the Power-Goodness-Wisdom triad to bring it
into alignment with his generally quadratic formulations in that work: “If every good is there, He is the 
supreme good and everything is there; therefore He is the supreme power, the supreme wisdom, the 
supreme goodness, the supreme happiness” (italics mine). Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 291.
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demonstrated that not only does Richard divide the content of book III into three sections 
based on the triad of Goodness-Happiness-Glory, but that Richard uses that very same 
triad within each of those sections and chronologically emphasizes each element of that 
triad. This level of intricacy by which Richard employs the Goodness-Happiness-Glory 
triad exceeds what we find in other treatises on the Trinity and cannot be attributed 
simply to the commonality of triads and triadic structures being used in the 12th century. 
Further, Richard claims in book III that he has neither read nor heard the plurality of 
divine persons proved by means of necessary reasons. He indicates where he perceives 
the existing theological tradition on the Trinity and then explicitly refers to book III as his
“bold undertaking” for the plurality of persons. Richard therefore viewed his use of the 
Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad as something unique and new to the 12th century. 
Moreover, Richard’s development of principles found in Augustine and Anselm provided
evidence of this new undertaking.
Response to Objection #2: Meditative Practice of collatio
What about the use of meditative practices at St. Victor like collatio and the 
“harmonizing of opposites”? Is Richard’s incorporation of triads and triadic structures in 
De Trinitate simply a by-product of such practices and techniques? With respect to 
collatio and summaries in De Trinitate, these are clearly triads he gathers together and 
not merely two concepts. In book III we saw Richard “drawing out” a third argument on 
the basis of the fullness of glory to complement his previous two arguments for the 
plurality of persons in Divinity. Despite the fact that the scriptural precedent only calls 
for two witnesses to establish the veracity of a judicial claim we find Richard fighting for 
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a third witness in order to “applaud” the testimonies of the other two. Richard elsewhere 
speaks of “mutual attestations” of the truth on the basis of two claims, but in each of 
these places a quest for a “third” follows immediately upon the mutual attestation.431 
Richard constantly works to bind the truth in that “triple chord” not easily broken.432
Response to Objection #3: Harmonizing of Opposites
The strongest argument against our thesis is the “harmonizing of opposites,” for 
Richard employs it throughout his other writings in addition to De Trinitate. As we said 
before, this accounts for the fact that Richard, in contrast to Anselm, arranges the Power-
Wisdom-Goodness triad in the way he does (i.e., where Wisdom becomes the third, 
harmonizing term of the triad). Richard treats Wisdom after Power and Goodness as a 
way of perfecting the picture; it is how he crowns the work. But Richard does not limit 
his use of this harmonizing of opposites to this main triad alone; he employs this method 
with triads throughout his work. The strength, therefore, of this objection, lies in its 
ability to account for the same triadic structural evidence but with an alternative 
explanation than the one we offered. We claim that Richard is intentionally arranging his 
work with triads and triadic structures because they give a trinitarian form to his content 
and further reinforce allusions of trinitarian significance. This objection can account for 
the same arrangement of material and it can admit that there are indeed triadic structures. 
But it denies they have a deliberate trinitarian form. The triadic structures are simply part 
431 Richard, De Trinitate III.3,12. Bk III.4 and III.13 subsequently argue from the “mutual 
attestation” in each case for the third from the fullness of glory; also III.19 “mutual concurrence” followed 
by III.20 to provide the “bond of a third person.”
432 Richard, De Trinitate III.5, 20. Cf. Ecclesiastes 4:12.
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of a meditative practice Richard is familiar with and incorporates into his composition of 
De Trinitate. So this objection explains the same data in an alternative way, and in a way 
that has widespread explanatory power for describing not just Richard’s use of triads 
within De Trinitate, but across his works as a whole.
How do we avoid the force of this objection? First, not all of Richard’s triads fit this 
harmonizing of opposites practice. Book III’s Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad, for 
example, does not fit this pattern as we see below. Second, this meditative practice is not 
inconsistent with our thesis. It offers an alternative explanation to our thesis only if these 
places of harmonizing opposites in De Trinitate show evidence that they are being done 
for the sake of this meditative practice and not with a view to how such harmonizations 
might “fit” structures and meaning of greater trinitarian significance. In other words, the 
use of this meditative practice whereby two things are harmonized with attention to a 
third that perfects the picture, as it were, can be used in accordance with the purposes of 
the one employing it. And one of Richard’s purposes is to provide a “full and perfect 
contemplation of the Trinity.” Thus we have two elements and a question with respect to 
which one governs Richard’s method and thought as he composes De Trinitate. One is 
this meditative practice of harmonizing two things with a third. The second is the 
Trinitarian content of Richard’s contemplations. The question is whether Richard makes 
his contemplations on the Trinity fit into this meditative practice where he can harmonize
two elements by a third or whether he makes this meditative practice fit into his 
reflections on the Trinity such that they have both a trinitarian form and significance. In 
short, is Richard harmonizing his trinitarian content by means of this technique or is he 
“trinitizing” this practice in accordance with his pedagogical and formative aims?
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The answer is the latter. It would be one thing if Richard always and everywhere 
used this practice of harmonizing opposites with a third for whatever triad he may 
employ. But he does not. We see, for example, in book II where Richard uses the three 
properties of Uncreated-Everlasting-Immutable to establish the eternity of Divinity. He 
writes:
But if we combine those three aforementioned properties into one, 
then we demonstrate that God is not only everlasting but also 
eternal. . . . From these three attributes, therefore, it is proven that 
God is eternal; for, without ambiguity, these three attributes grant 
that God has eternity and is eternal (italics mine).433
The same is shown with the three witnesses of book III: Goodness-Happiness-
Glory. The harmony already exists between the fullness of goodness and happiness to 
testify to the trinity of persons that must exist in true Divinity. The fullness of glory does 
not, therefore, harmonize the fullness of goodness and happiness but confirms their 
witness. Furthermore, in the concluding section Richard emphasizes not the harmonizing 
of the first two testimonies by a third, but how three individual points establish one truth. 
As he says: 
Behold how the fullness of divine goodness, happiness and glory 
coincide with one another in one attestation of truth, and how they 
clearly show what ought to be understood about the fullness of 
divine love in the plurality of persons. Together they condemn the 
suspicion of any defect in the supreme love, and they proclaim in 
one accord the fullness of total perfection (italics mine).434
Even in a place where Richard does employ the harmonizing of opposites for the 
giving and receiving of love within Divinity (e.g., gratuitous love, owed love, and both 
433 Richard, De Trinitate II.4.
434 Richard, De Trinitate III.13. Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 187.
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gratuitous and owed love), he emphasizes not how the trinitarian content fits this 
harmonizing pattern but how this harmonizing pattern provides the three distinct 
properties that relate to one and the same love. As he concludes, “Behold the three 
distinctions of properties in supreme love, although it is still one and the same love in 
every person, namely, a supreme and truly eternal love.”435
Finally, in book VI, where Richard gives his argument for the harmony of unity and 
plurality in Divinity from a consideration of the fullness of wisdom/knowledge, the 
harmonizing consists in the source from which the knowledge of three persons is gained. 
The first person discovers knowledge from himself. The second person learns from the 
first. The third knows from both the first and the second. The first has the wisdom 
through discovery. The second has the same wisdom through reading what the first had 
written down. But Richard does not go on to emphasize the harmony of the third person 
receiving the same knowledge from the first two persons. Instead he emphasizes the 
sameness of the understanding shared by all three: 
And so, if the same truth of understanding is whole and complete in 
all three persons, then surely, with respect to the essential truth, the 
knowledge of one person is not different from the knowledge of the 
other persons? . . . If therefore one and the same knowledge can 
exist in the three persons, then why is it not believed all the more 
that one and the same wisdom exists in the three persons of the 
divine Trinity (italics mine).436
Therefore, the harmonizing of opposites does not govern the triads and triadic 
structures Richard incorporates throughout his work. On the contrary, these harmonies 
435 Richard, De Trinitate V.19.
436 Richard, De Trinitate VI.25.
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are always being used in the service of the greater trinitarian significance Richard wants 
to “draw out” from them.437
We have considered the three most significant objections to our thesis and provided 
sufficient rejoinders to them. Doubtlessly, Richard writes during a time when triads and 
triadic structures were widely used, and their prevalence in his work indicates he is a man
of his time. But the absence of non-triadic patterns, along with the proliferation of triads 
in De Trinitate, make it more probable that Richard intentionally incorporated them. 
Likewise, Richard’s “bold undertaking” in book III demonstrates that he moves beyond 
his theological predecessors in deliberately drawing out and searching for a third by 
which three arguments come together to support one and the same truth. Richard also 
uses the meditative practices of his time such as collatio and the harmonizing of 
opposites. But while these techniques are incorporated throughout De Trinitate, they do 
not account for all of the triads and triadic structures Richard employs. And where they 
are used, Richard always shows how their form has a further trinitarian structure and 
significance—a structure and significance that show both the “craft” and “care” of his 
theology. 
437 When Richard explicitly describes his method of harmonizing opposites, it is in sections that 
have to do with comparing human and divine substance (i.e., his use of the “principle of similitude”) rather 
than with specifically trinitarian-like triads. See, e.g., De Trinitate III.9, IV.25. In V.5 and V.14 Richard 
uses the “harmonizing of opposites” to obtain the essential middle elements he needs for his trinitarian 
purposes: e.g., mode of being from eternity and not from itself, person who both gives and receives fullness
of Divinity.
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CONCLUSION
RICHARD: THEOLOGIAN AND CRAFTSMAN
And so I appointed ‘watchmen’ over you . . .
“Everything is permissible for me, but not everything is constructive”; or so the 
apostle Paul wrote the church at Corinth. What does it mean to be “constructive”? More 
importantly, what does it mean to a theologian like Richard? Above all, it means to 
choose wisely. Like the craftsman who surveys a vast range of materials and designs 
from which he must choose what is best and most fitting, so too must the theologian 
bridge the divide between ‘what is available to the mind’ and what is the most ‘fitting for 
its attention’. His mind ranges over the vast array of visible and invisible things, 
discovering—with Augustine—that some of them are better than others. Some are better 
to have than not to have. Some to be than not to be. Some to use, others, to enjoy. In the 
end, the craftsman must choose something worthy of his devotion: something worthy of 
his attention and care. And whatever that ‘something’ is, it surely is good most-of-all: 
one-of-a-kind. For only something “magnificent” sustains the mind, draws it away from 
worldly delights, and fixes its gaze on something beautiful. And a good craftsman spends 
plenty of time with it. For the longer he beholds its invisible form, the more taken he is 
by its elusive perfection. There, before his mind, is the object of his desire and love. “If 
only I could see it more clearly? If only I could get closer?” 
And so the process begins—little by little, day by day. The craftsman and the 
theologian ascend in their knowledge and love. Each day brings some new insight, some 
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new “fullness” they didn’t see before. They chip away. They write—bit by bit, stroke by 
stroke. More and more is revealed. More and more is “drawn out.” Both are in pursuit of 
a full and perfect contemplation. With each new strike and stroke, their vision enlarges 
and grows. The distance between visible and invisible things nears; and the mind—aided 
as it is now by the icon—moves more and more “freely” between them. The craftsman’s 
love, the theologian’s joy, their delight, increases with each new flight. The visible puts 
on invisibility and the invisible puts on visibility—until there is no more variation of 
shadows. Today, something “good and perfect” has come down from the heavenly lights:
a holy “gift.” And there is joy, great joy. Come and see! Come and see! Dilectio becomes
condilectio; and the private preoccupation becomes a “mutual sharing.” 
But with that change, the rules of “invention” and “construction” shift: The social as 
well as the individual dimension to their craft now comes to light. Neither works for 
himself now, but for the good of others. For the craftsman, whatever his handiwork may 
be—a chair, a fireplace, a footstool, a sword—the value is weighed, not in pounds, but in 
the quality of the construction and the service it renders others. Similarly, the art of the 
theologian is not measured, ultimately, by how well he articulates his subject-matter, but 
by how well he informs another soul with its knowability. Thus for the theologian, as for 
the craftsman, the “work of creation”—the opus conditionis—demands a sacrificial act: 
an offering for others. And the more conscientious the craftsman, the more compassionate
the theologian, the heavier that burden is borne. For the service now renders their tools 
“instruments of righteousness,” their canvas: the souls of men. Who will be their potter? 
their counselor? their ‘watchman’?  “Here am I, Lord. Send me!”
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These are the “inventors,” and their “inventories” are filled with their artistic quests 
for perfection. No time for pride, only devotion. These are the humble ones, who 
unbeknown to themselves, serve all of humanity and not merely their students, their 
schools, or their cities. Their work—to the extent that it is known and its genius 
discovered—defines the artifact or subject-matter in a way that becomes a standard for 
generations to come.
Richard exhibited such invention and genius in the artistry of his works and the 
formation of his readers. What’s more, he never stopped perfecting them. For Richard, as 
for the craftsman, a work is never “done.” For unlike the connoisseur, who stands before 
a “masterpiece” and perceives only exquisite detail and perfection, the theologian and the
craftsman see much, much more. The true object of their devotion lies “above and 
beyond” the grasp: where obedience condescends to “death.” Here the craftsman’s chisel 
strikes the rock; the theologian’s pen descends to paper.
Admiring a work hanging on the wall of a gallery differs from seeing the same work 
lying in the studio. In the gallery one seeks a “finished” form—something to be evaluated
on its own terms—in isolation from the artist and his other works. In the studio, however,
we find the artist and his materials. Here we gain a greater sense for his “craft,” his 
“tools,” and his “methods.” Alongside other pieces, we may see the development of a 
theme or pattern that culminates in the artist’s latest work. In the gallery, we behold the 
work’s divine inspiration; in the studio, we witness its incarnation.
In order to be fully appreciated, therefore, Richard’s De Trinitate requires 
placement in the studio as well as the gallery. In this work, we spent most of our time 
examining De Trinitate in the gallery. There we saw Richard creatively construct his 
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work with triadic structures and forms in order to sustain the hearts and fix the minds of 
his readers with a full and perfect contemplation of the Trinity.
Stepping back, we saw the breadth of Richard’s work: how he organized the entire 
contemplation in accordance with the triad of Power-Wisdom-Goodness. Together all 
three showcase the whole truth of the singularity, plurality, and harmony of the one true 
God. Stepping closer, we saw the depth of Richard’s work: his dedication to triadic forms
and structures by which he focused on specific elements, then magnified their 
contemplation, and drew out their trinitarian significance. With suitable time and 
attention paid to each of these dimensions, we came to appreciate the intricacy of the 
design and the diligent care with which Richard crafted De Trinitate.
However, when we combined the breadth of the Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad 
with the depth of Richard’s intricate trinitarian structuring, we also discerned a “theme” 
and a method by which he constructed the treatise. Richard alerts his readers that he is 
“ . . . drawing out profound and hidden reasons into the open from the sanctuary of 
wisdom” (emphasis mine).438 Consequently, we discovered that his way of focusing and 
enlarging upon certain elements for trinitarian reflection was an editorial method by 
which he returned and expanded on his previous work. In the same way that an artist later
decides to add some new detail to the foreground of his painting, or to touch up the 
background to heighten some contrast, so Richard returned to perfect his De Trinitate.
And these additions, and their chronology, are not easy to discern. Nor have we 
attempted a comprehensive analysis of them—a task for which the present work can only 
438 Richard, De Trinitate I.4.
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point the way. It took a very keen mind to construct De Trinitate; it takes a mind equal to 
it to discover and appreciate all of its subtleties. As Richard himself says, “ . . . it does not
belong to any soul (cujusvis animae),” but to the “diligent one (studiosi).”439 And under 
the care of a magister like Richard, that soul becomes a “sacred space” where the 
theologian and his apprentice seek the Form and Face—the quid and quae—of their Love
forevermore!
Thus having discovered Richard’s De Trinitate “unfinished,” we reluctantly end our 
work by taking it down from the gallery and placing it in the studio. But lest we rue its 
newfound resting place, perhaps there is something more to behold there, dwelling as it 
does among Richard’s lowly crafts and tools. Perhaps if we remain awhile, we may 
discover something about God, what it means to be a “Trinity,” and the “artistry” 
involved in trying to bring that Word to words. Should we persevere with a diligence 
approaching Richard’s own devotion and care, perhaps we will discover the true art of 
this theologian’s craft: allowing his words to punctuate and bleed beyond the page—from
the gallery of glory to the little studios of our souls; that place where “ . . . everything is 
permissible, but not everything is constructive.” Perhaps there we can discover what it 
means to do “constructive theology,” where the Craftsman returns to His work and 
resurrects it, daily, in accordance with His image.
X faciebat
439 Richard, De Trinitate I.4.
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APPENDIX A:
DISCERNING THE TEXTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF RICHARD’S DE TRINITATE
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Richard does not explicitly say that he uses the Power-Goodness-Wisdom triad to 
organize his treatise, so providing evidence for this must move beyond the obvious 
emphasis he gives it at the end of his work to discovering other places in the treatise that 
demonstrate him doing so.
Fortunately Richard regularly summarizes his work and prepares his readers for 
what comes next. One of the most important is the opening of book III. He writes that 
previously, referring to books I-II, he proved the unity and property of the divine 
substance. In book I Richard argued that Divinity is supremely simple. In book II he 
argued that there is only one Divinity. Now, in book III, he turns his attention to 
establishing the plurality of persons.440 And he then lays out the order of questions he 
will answer as he constructs the rest of his work in three steps. Step one, beginning with 
book III, consists of answering the question, “Is there true plurality in true and simple 
divinity and if the number of persons comes to three as we believe?” Step two, the 
subject of book IV, answers the question, “How is unity of substance consistent with the 
plurality of persons?” And step three, the subject of book V, investigates “ . . . whether 
. . . there is among the three [divine persons] one person alone who is from himself, and 
whether each of the other two persons proceeds from the other, and if there are other 
questions to be investigated concerning the same considerations?” 
440 As Ribaillier aptly notes, this structure also reveals the “above and beyond” distinction that plays 
such a prominent role in Richard’s Mystical Ark. Here in De Trinitate, bks. I-II contend with what is above 
reason (supra rationem) and bk. III and following with what is beyond reason (preter rationem). Ribaillier, 
16. Richard also introduces the distinction explicitly in the Prologue to De Trinitate: “For some of those 
truths which we are ordered to believe seem to be not only above reason (supra rationem) but also contrary 
to human reason (contra humanam rationem). Richard also frequently alludes to 2 Corinthians 2:16: “Who 
is capable of these questions?” (Ed ad hoc quis idoneus?). Cf. II.22, III.8, 10 “supra intelligentiam,” VI.22.
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Richard aims to demonstrate these considerations by reason. He then adds that he 
will provide further considerations related to the diverse modes of procession of the Son 
and Spirit, the mode proper to each, and what can be learned from the “names” according
to the property of each person. These further considerations are the focus of book VI.441 
Like Anselm’s use of the Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad, this is the ‘loose 
structure’ for Richard’s entire treatise. This becomes evident when one searches in vain 
for an elaboration of the argument for the consistency of the plurality of persons with the 
unity of substance from a consideration of the “fullness of wisdom” in book IV. It is not 
that Richard does not argue for this harmony in book IV. We can see from the concluding
section of that book, as well as the summary of conclusions Richard rehearses in book V, 
that Richard already established it. As he says in V.1:
But seeing that we are certain about the unity of the divine 
substance, the plurality of persons, and the harmony and mutual 
relation of plurality and unity, the occasion now requires that we 
inquire about the properties of each person and specify the 
particular characteristic of each person (italics mine).
The point is not that Richard lacks an argument for this consistency of unity and 
plurality in book IV, but that he does so without any recourse to a consideration of 
Wisdom. The concept of the fullness of knowledge shows up sporadically throughout 
Richard’s treatise, but it isn’t until the very end of book VI that we encounter the highest 
concentration on the subject—especially in the final three chapters from 23-25.
441 Nico den Bok likewise argues that this section of bk. III provides the outline of the entire work; 
he further takes this as evidence for the authenticity of bk. VI rather than a later redaction by a different 
author. Den Bok 371-372. This view is shared by Ribaillier, 9.
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What we have, then, is Richard’s argument for the unity of Divinity in books I-II 
from omnipotence; an argument for the Trinity of persons in book III from the fullness of
goodness; and we have the argument for the harmony of unity and plurality in VI.23-25. 
There is, therefore, a large gap between books I-III on the one hand, and book VI on the 
other. What is to account for the fact that Richard clearly establishes the harmony of 
unity and plurality in book IV but waits until the final chapters of book VI to do so from 
a consideration of the fullness of Wisdom? Richard gives us a few clues. 
The first clue comes at the conclusion of book IV. Richard says “Behold, we have 
now discussed this issue by means of a digression, and we have strayed far beyond our 
subject.”442 And he concludes that the “pious and simple mind” should be satisfied with 
what was said about how nothing is “dissonant” in venerating “one God in the Trinity 
and the Trinity in a unity.” The only other place the word “dissonant” is used in 
Richard’s treatise is in the opening paragraph of IV.25. So the digression refers only to 
the question Richard considers with respect to the alleged corporeality of demonic spirits 
in the preceding paragraph. Thus Richard’s argument for the harmony of divine unity and
plurality in book IV consists of his explanation of the similitudes between human, 
angelic, and divine substances. How this connects with book VI will be made apparent 
shortly.
The second clue comes at the end of book V. Richard writes: 
I had intended to reveal publicly what I thought about these 
issues, but because there is intense profundity in them, it will be 
better to leave them to be discussed more thoroughly by those who 
442 “Sed ecce hoc dum per excessum diximus, a nostro proposito longius evagati sumus.” Richard, 
De Trinitate IV.25.
223
have greater abilities. It will also be better to prove from the 
judgment of others what sort of gratitude or ingratitude I deserve 
from those things that I have said up until now.
As previous Richardian scholars have pointed out, there is suspicion based on this 
comment by Richard, that perhaps this marks the end of his treatise at book V and leaves 
questions with respect to the status of book VI.443 
This second clue, like the first, presents a perplexity in need of a good explanation. 
To what does this parenthetical remark at the conclusion of book V refer? Furthermore, 
does it give us any further insight on how Richard constructed this work? The immediate 
context suggests that Richard either refers to the issue of procession and the differences 
between the Son and the Spirit with respect to that property; or, he refers to that plus the 
appropriation of divine names. We add a third possibility: That this parenthetical 
statement at the end of book VI is connected with an important distinction Richard makes
a few chapters earlier, but admittedly never develops.
Toward the end of V.22, Richard brings up the distinction of the “work of grace” 
and the “operation of nature.” And while he has brought up the distinction in previous 
books, it is never as problematic as it is here. The distinction in those other sections 
always refers to created things444; but here, he is concerned with whether what is 
perfectly appropriate with respect to human action and propagation might be thought the 
same for Divinity.445 He assures his reader this is not the case. But uncharacteristically, 
443 Ribaillier, 15.
444 Richard, De Trinitate I.9, II.8.
445 Richard may have been familiar with a contemporary debate about what kind of ‘necessity’ 
pertains to the divine processions. As den Bok notes, “Abelard combined the principle [of divine plenitude]
with the idea of Christian love («caritas») in such a way that it not only showed its importance to the 
trinitarian relations, but also, again, its impact on the relation between God and the world.” Den Bok, 287 
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Richard does not go on to explain this in any more detail. Instead, he speaks of the 
profundity of the mystery and the difficulty involved in trying to find suitable words for 
asserting the truth. The dilemma consists of the tension between two dimensions of God’s
being: what God must be (operation of nature) and what God chooses to be (operation of 
grace).446 If the divine processions are an operation of nature, then the processions are 
‘by-products’ of the divine nature which seems incompatible with the Scriptures. But if 
the divine processions are an operation of grace then they are not necessary to true 
Divinity, which results in Arianism.
In all likelihood, the parenthetical statement Richard gives at the end of book V is 
related to this section of V.22. Further evidence in support of this can be found by the 
fact that this section of V.22 and the statement at the end of book V have further 
similarities. They both speak of the profundity of mystery. They both speak of gratitude 
or ingratitude. They both involve an articulated awareness of those who would judge the 
quality of one’s work. And they both pertain to finding the right “words” to explain the 
profundities. But we do not find the statement placed immediately next to that of V.22; 
instead, it is found at the end of book V.
What explains all of this? V.22, and its concern with the “work of grace” and the 
“operation of nature” as it relates to procession, is connected with the final section of 
n. 7-8. But as Gregory of Nazianzus writes in Theological Orations 29, 2: “We do not have the audacity to 
speak of overflowing goodness as one of the Greek philosophers who dares to say «as a basin that 
overflows» in a passage on the first and second cause; for we are careful not to assume an origination by 
natural power, a kind of natural and unforced movement that does not fit to our thoughts on the godhead.” 
Den Bok, 292 n. 31. Given the tension between Gregory and Abelard on ‘what must be true’ and ‘what 
could have been otherwise’, Richard’s hesitancy in V.22 is not surprising, though he obviously addressed it
when he added the first chapters of bk. VI. See also n. 455 of this work.
446 Den Bok, 433. For more on the dilemma, see den Bok, 301 on “ethical necessity.”
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book V. Combined, they reveal that Richard’s thoughts at the end of book V concern 
perplexities he has not yet explored. The distinction of the work of grace and the 
operation of nature, and the difference of procession between Son and Spirit, still have 
questions yet to be answered. As Richard says in both statements, he hopes that those 
with greater minds will show “ . . . gratitude for the things he has shown up until now!” 
as he would be grateful to those who might shed light on issues he still finds obscure.
When we look to book VI, we discover that Richard eventually takes up the topic of 
the work of grace vs. the operation of nature as this relates to procession within Divinity. 
As we mentioned, and as scholars of Richard’s De Trinitate have noted, this statement at 
the end of book V leaves questions as to the relationship of book VI to the rest of the 
treatise. Some surmise that book V may have have been the final book at an earlier stage 
in Richard’s writing, book VI being undertaken at a later date. Most scholars agree that 
book VI was written by Richard.
But consider how all of these pieces come together to help us make better sense of 
how Richard constructed his work. It would be one thing if all we had was this one 
parenthetical statement at the end of book V to help us decide, but we have more. First, 
we know Richard conceived the overall structure of the work on the basis of the same 
Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad that Anselm did. But whereas Anselm constructed his 
treatise in the order of Goodness—>Wisdom—>Power, Richard constructs his in the 
order of Power—>Goodness—>Wisdom. And the final consideration of wisdom comes 
at the very end of book VI. When we compare the language found at this section of book 
VI with the language we find at the end of book IV we find striking similarities. And 
when we look at the content of books IV, V, and VI, we discover that they all coalesce 
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around considerations related to explaining the harmony of unity and plurality in 
Divinity. Given the “spatial distance” of the arguments from the fullness of wisdom 
found at the end of book VI from the conclusion and language at the end of book IV—
along with parenthetical statements at the end of books IV and V that show evidence for 
earlier and later material—we have the beginnings of an insight on how Richard went 
about his work.
It seems he was in the habit of taking the final pieces of previous work and 
“opening them up” to explore further nuances and details. And this “opening up” left the 
earlier material on both sides of his newer insights. This explains, in part, why the 
language at the end of his books is more simple when compared with newer material that 
precedes it. On both sides of the newer material we can see the language that was 
connected together at an earlier stage. One of the clearest examples of this is found at the 
end of book II where this “earlier” material has migrated to the end of the book. At the 
end of book II, Richard provides a “taxonomy of properties” in II.25: 
Substance Consubstantial
Quantity Equal or Unequal
Quality Similar or Dissimilar
Place Above or Below
Time Before or After
Situation Sitting near or together
Condition Possessor and Possession
[Action] Activity or Passivity
Fig. A.1 Taxonomy of Properties in De Trinitate II.25447
447 This taxonomy of properties predicated of Divinity is from Boethius’s De Trinitate IV. It was 
common to the 12th century. William of St. Theirry uses this taxonomy as the loose structure for his 
Enigma fidei. See Anderson, The Enigma of Faith, 57ff.
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He states, “And so, it is better at the moment to refrain from this discussion than to 
attempt a study [that] we cannot furnish in a concise manner.” But when we look at the 
material that precedes this in II.22-24 we see that Richard has addressed every one of 
these categories. II.25, therefore, was connected with material that came earlier and 
Richard inserted II.22-24 at a later time (see Appendix B).
This notion of taking a concluding point not only as a starting point for a new claim, 
but also giving it an “expanded treatment” of its own—filling out further details—is a 
pattern with Richard. As we noted when looking at the relationship between Richard’s 
Twelve Patriarchs and Mystical Ark, the latter seems to be a full articulation of the last 
stage of contemplation in the first. Twelve Patriarchs treats the knowledge of self, 
leading it on an ascent to the contemplation of God. It is moral work. One must walk with
the patriarchs in an effort to purge oneself of vices, inculcate virtues, and ultimately learn
the grace of discretion. Mystical Ark picks up where Twelve Patriarchs finishes; but 
rather than start a new journey, Mystical Ark “abides” at the final location of Twelve 
Patriarchs. What Mystical Ark continues is the ascent begun at the end of Twelve 
Patriarchs by filling it out, in rich detail, as an ascent of crafting the Ark of the Covenant 
on God’s “holy hill.” There, the lessons of the grace of discretion are transferred to the 
grace of contemplation. So in the relationship of Richard’s treatises we see a pattern of 
seeking the “plenitude” of conclusions already established in previous work. 
My suggestion is that we can see Richard looking over his previous compositions, 
trying to find seeds that could be cultivated and watered—of giving them fuller treatment,
fuller insight and articulation; and once finding them, adding material that gives that 
fuller detail within the existing structure of his previous work. It would be the equivalent 
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of adding pages to a section of a book without rewriting what came before and after it. 
The pages simply elaborate some element in more detail but do not significantly disrupt 
the flow of the previous work (Fig. A.2).
Two further points are worth making with respect to this. One is another place in 
Richard’s work where he indicates that he is “inserting” new material, and the second is 
how all of this connects with his explicit statements of this method in book I of De 
Trinitate. In VI.18 Richard writes: 
But, in order that we may return (redeamus) to that question on 
account of which we inserted these remarks (ista interposuimus), 
with respect to God [the Father] begetting a Son is identical to 
naturally producing at will a person from his own person according 
to a singular conformity of his property (emphasis mine).448
This indicates that Richard is “inserting” new material to previous work and not merely 
adding new books or sections to this treatise. Second, Richard explains how this method 
of insertion is related to his general approach of fides quaerens intellectum. As he writes 
in the introduction of book I:
It is therefore necessary for us to enter by faith into the knowledge 
of truths concerning which it is correctly said to us: if you do not 
believe, you will not understand. Nevertheless, we must not stop 
immediately at the entrance; but we must always hasten toward a 
deeper and more profound understanding and pursue it with every 
effort and with supreme diligence, so that we can advance daily 
toward an understanding of what we hold by faith.449
Moreover, in the next chapter, he writes, “But it does not belong to any soul to elicit 
those reasons from the profound and hidden bosom of nature, and to draw them out into 
448 Richard, De Trinitate VI.18.
449 Richard, De Trinitate I.3.
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the open, as if uprooting them from some secret sanctuary of wisdom.”450
What this indicates is that not only is Richard’s entire treatise on the Trinity an 
“expansion” upon works like those of Anselm and Augustine, but it also indicates a 
specific method by which Richard “returned” to his own work. The plenitude he adds to 
Anselm, Augustine, Boethius, and others is a plenitude he seeks in delving into 
profundities left unearthed in his previous writing! 
Fig. A.2 Richard’s “Focus & Magnify” Method of Expansion
So how does this all relate to the ambiguities of the textual process for Richard in 
books IV-VI of his De Trinitate? The answer is that books IV-VI are an “expansion” of 
450 Richard, De Trinitate I.4.
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Richard’s argument for the harmony of unity and plurality.451 The broad structure of the 
entire treatise is Power-Goodness-Wisdom. The consideration of power in books I-II 
gives Richard his argument for the aseity and singularity of Divinity. The consideration 
of goodness in book III gives Richard his conclusion for the plurality of Divinity. Book 
IV gives the argument for the harmony of unity and plurality of Divinity. By book V 
Richard has already established those three conclusions. But book IV, while giving an 
argument for unity and plurality of Divinity based on similitudes, does not provide 
necessary reasons nor resolve the perplexities involved in explaining the relationship 
between the divine substance and the divine persons. In a word, it establishes the 
coherence and logical consistency of the harmony of unity and plurality of Divinity. It 
provides knowledge that this harmony is true, but it does not explain how this harmony is
to be understood. Books V and VI provide more detail in explaining the “how” of this 
harmony. But we have to wait until the final chapters of book VI for Richard’s argument 
from the fullness of Wisdom that fittingly completes the governing triad of the treatise. 
Thus starting with this Power-Goodness-Wisdom triad, Richard composed his work 
arguing for the unity, plurality, and harmony of unity and plurality; and as he 
contemplated these things further, he “expanded” and “filled out” his previous work with 
new insights and contemplations. His final argument for the harmony of unity and 
plurality from a consideration of the fullness of wisdom at the end of book VI was part of
451 Nico den Bok sees the Power-Goodness-Wisdom triad as the “rough structure” with bks. IV-VI 
filling out the latter part of that triad. Den Bok, 371-372, see esp. n. 177. However, the Wisdom component
is concentrated in the final chapters of bk. VI. The important points to highlight are the following: (a) this 
rough structuring based on this triad had precedents in Anselm, (b) that Richard “expanded” his work 
which explains why the material for the Wisdom component of the triad is concentrated at the end of bk. VI
and (c) that the textual difficulties pointed to by Ribaillier, Salet, Bligh, and von Balthasar extend beyond a 
question regarding the authenticity of bk. VI and can be better understood in light of (a) and (b).
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an earlier stage of his writing, probably directly connected with content we find at the end
of book IV. It is only as Richard continued to expand and provide further details on the 
definition of ‘Person’, the intricacies of procession and generation, etc. that we find the 
final component of the Power-Goodness-Wisdom triad drifting further and further away 
from material it used to be connected with. And this gives us an indication of just how 
much Richard added to books IV-VI. 
Given that Richard’s “expanding” method is the result of making arguments fuller 
and more complete, it is not surprising to find evidence of this in earlier sections of his 
work (i.e., in books I-III). But for now, the important point is that there is evidence of this
method in Richard, that it connects well with how he describes his work of “drawing 
profundities out into the open,” of “uprooting them from some secret sanctuary of 
wisdom.” All of this has implications for better understanding the development of 
Richard’s thought on the Trinity, the evolution of his composing De Trinitate, how this 
method may apply to other of his works and that of his contemporaries at St. Victor. But 
here we can only point it out. The detailed work of identifying where the insertions are, 
when they were added, and what this says about Richard’s developing thought on the 
Trinity must be left for future study. 
The reason why it is important for us to point out is that it helps us broaden our 
understanding of Richard’s “intentionality” in composing this work. It is tempting, given 
what we have discovered about Richard’s intricate triads and triadic structuring to treat 
De Trinitate as a finished work of art, a sculpture in its most perfect and final form. But 
as we step closer, we discover it is more like a work of art “in relief”: a sculpture attached
to the block of marble from which it was carved. The picture is almost full and complete; 
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about as full and complete as could ever be imagined—the form is in “high relief.” And 
we can be incredibly thankful for this. For unlike a sculpture detached from the mold and 
marble that gave it life, where all we see is the work of art and the feeling it evokes as we
behold its form, a relief shifts our attention to the artist and his craft. We imagine how the
beauty and craft with which the artist chipped away at those things he was able to “draw 
out” from the marble would advance through those elements left untouched. It brings us 
to the lines that mark the margins of the artist’s thought. We connect with the “process” 
of his craft. He invites us to take up our own theological chisels and join him in his work.
But Richard did not anticipate leaving De Trinitate as a sculpture in relief. He was 
in pursuit of a full and perfect contemplation of the Trinity and his goal was to forge its 
final form in his readers. However, he never finished. He was still in the process of 
carving out more to behold and ponder. Yet this unintended “incompleteness” to 
Richard’s work is all the more wonderful for how well it fits with Richard’s 
understanding of Trinitarian contemplation; for there is always more above and beyond 
the rock. De Trinitate, like a sculpture in relief, provides comprehension but not full 
comprehension. To write a treatise on the Trinity is to concentrate the mind on the most 
Eternal and sublime of all things. As he says, no one can fully comprehend the triune God
though we grope at that divine light with all we can. Richard’s De Trinitate is all the 
more “perfect” for having been left as a work-in-progress. For in that very form it 
captures the ongoing nature of the theologian’s craft: contemplation added to 
contemplation, more of the mystery disclosed and still more to pursue. Thus Richard—
like his own theological predecessors, and above all, like God—leaves us with still more 
to see, more to discover, more to “draw out” from the “secret sanctuary of Wisdom.”
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APPENDIX B:
COMPREHENSIVE DIAGRAM OF RICHARD’S DE TRINITATE
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Power
for Unity of 
Divine 
Substance
I-II
Goodness?
Method of 
Study
Scope of 
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Unity
“one God”
Singularity
“only one 
God”
Expansion
Harmony:
Unity & 
Singularity
I.1-5
Two Modes of 
Being “from 
eternity”
I.6-10
Highest
I.11-12
Best
I.13-18
Fullest
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Uncreated-
Eternal-
Immeasurable
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(see Fig. 4.5)
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Concern: Aren’t 
Power & Wisdom 
Communicable?
II.11-14
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Unity & 
Singularity
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Eternal-
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of Single 
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Main Triad Used Throughout this 
Section:
Essence-Power-Wisdom
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General-Special-Individual
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(one Omnipotent-God-Lord) and then 
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connected with Power & Wisdom in 
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specific use of Power-Wisdom-
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Experience-Reason-Faith
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Other Divine 
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Power-Wisdom-Goodness (15)
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redundancy in book VI makes it more 
difficult to pin down. What *is* clear: 
(a) Fullness of Wisdom argument only 
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language to Books I & II in specific 
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book VI.
Discovered-Learned-Read
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Reading
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NOTES ON COMPREHENSIVE DIAGRAM OF RICHARD’S DE TRINITATE:
This diagram represents Richard’s organization of De Trinitate as I currently see it. 
The bold lines indicate trinitarian structuring. The bold line furthest left extends down 
the entire work, and indicates Richard’s broad use of the Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad 
that organizes the entire treatise. The break in that line between books IV to VI indicates 
how the earlier, “fullness of wisdom” material migrates to the very end of book VI as 
Richard expanded books IV-VI with new additions. As these bold lines progress inward 
to the right, they indicate Richard’s use of more localized triads (e.g., Goodness-
Happiness-Glory in book III) as he “draws them out” from each element in the Power-
Wisdom-Goodness triad. This is seen most clearly in Fig. 4.3.
The darkest grey sections indicate some of the earlier material in Richard’s 
treatise that became “distanced” as Richard added to his work. 
The lighter grey sections indicate some of Richard’s expansions. In books V 
and VI one sees this in the condignum-condilectum material, the similarity of language 
and thought indicating the same stage of redaction. In book II there is the “taxonomy of 
properties” Richard added that distanced the earlier material in II.25 where he states that 
he doesn’t have time to describe the properties but then adds a discussion of them in 
II.20-24. 
The greyed out diagonal shading indicates a possible third level of 
redaction, where Richard adds an explanation to mitigate a logical concern (e.g., 
explaining how the communicability of wisdom and power found in rational beings 
differs from the incommunicability of these properties for Divinity, II.11-14). We know 
that II.11-14 was added after Richard’s insertion of the Uncreated-Immeasurable-Eternal 
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chiasm in II.1-10. What’s more, the technicality of language (e.g., Danielitas) in II.12 
along with distinctions he borrows from other sources (e.g., General-Special-Individual) 
parallels the technicality of language found especially in book IV (e.g., person vs. 
substance, subsistence vs. existence, etc.) where Richard is working with Boethius, and 
for that reason may indicate the same stage of redaction. 
But I must emphasize the preliminary nature of this diagram. Richard may just as 
well have written the material in II.11-14 at the same time he added the chiasm of II.1-10,
his mind foreseeing the logical concern at that point. Further, I believe that the earliest 
material in Richard’s work is found in books I and VI on the Quicumque and the church 
fathers, and pieces of which can be found in book II, that became distanced as he added 
to the work.452 But I do not use the darkest grey shading for this material in books I-II, 
instead shading only the “fullness of wisdom” material found at the very end of book VI. 
Thus the darkest grey sections do not indicate the same stage of redaction, but only show 
where earlier material becomes distanced by Richard’s insertions. This highlights what I 
wish to emphasize: I am more interested in indicating that redaction is taking place than I
am in showing exactly what material goes together or the chronology of Richard’s 
additions. This diagram, and these shaded regions, help us attend to divisions of material 
that may represent new stages of redaction as Richard returned to his work. The point is 
to show that (a) Richard’s additions extend throughout his treatise and are therefore not 
452
 This similarity of language and style has been noticed by others. See, e.g., Ribaillier, 10:             
“ . . . dans le livre VI les références à l’Ecriture, à la liturgie, aux Pères sont plus abondantes,” and “Dans 
l’ensemble du traité, on ne relève que 46 citations explicites ou implicites: la plupart se trouvent dans le 
Prologue et au livre VI.” But rather than seeing this as evidence for distancing the material bk. I shared 
with bk. VI at an earlier stage, the focus has been on what the status of bk. VI is to the rest of the treatise. 
On the earlier Quicumque sequence, see n. 309 of this work.
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limited to book VI and (b) much more work remains to be done to discern where these 
additions are and what their chronology is. This diagram merely depicts the strong, prima
facie justification we give for (a) in Appendix A and indicates places where further text-
critical analysis might help us with questions related to (b). 
When I first began working with Richard’s De Trinitate I discovered the triadic 
structures in book III and then began an investigation into his uses in the rest of his work.
Initially, the level of intricacy in content and form in book III led me to expect a 
proportionally high degree of the same throughout the rest of the work. What I found 
instead is that the most crystalized employment of triads and triadic structuring is in book
III and that the triadic structuring in the rest of the work tapers off from there. Further, 
once I realized where these triads were, I started to notice those places with less refined 
structure and language. What became the most apparent was that the lack of this structure
and refinement is found in the final sections of Richard’s books. These are indicated by 
the darkest grey sections in the diagram. In addition, this lack of refinement in language 
and structure is also accompanied by a glaring omission of summaries and conclusions 
found in those more intricate sections. So, for example, when one reads through the 
intricacies of the triadic structures and summaries in III.1-20, one is struck by the 
omission of any of the same language, content, or conclusions in III.21-25 that ends the 
book. What’s more, one discovers a surprising simplicity of language in these final 
sections—much simpler than the more intricate material that precedes it. This led me to 
discover that Richard was not just “inserting” remarks, but that he was expanding entire 
sections of his work and leaving previous material on either side of those expansions. A 
good example of the evidence of this can be found in comparing the material in 
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VI.18c-21 with that in VI.11. In VI.11 Richard has already made an argument for the 
Holy Spirit not being called “image,” but only the Son. But in what follows in VI.18c-21 
Richard makes the same argument with different language. The explanation for this is 
that the latter comes with the Unbegotten-Begotten polemical material, and VI.11 must 
have been inserted later. This explains both the redundancy, the placement, and the 
dissonance of language in both places. Further examples of this method are the 
expansions found in books I and II, especially the chiastic structure of Uncreated-Eternal-
Immutable in II.1-10 and the “taxonomy of properties” that Richard initially says he 
doesn’t have time to do in a concise manner in II.25 but obviously found time later when 
he provides this in II.20-24.
The structure of books I-III have been much easier for me to discern than IV-VI 
(esp. VI!).453 But there are still questions that can be asked. In book III I know this is the 
final, triadic structuring of the work Richard intended and added. But it is more difficult 
to ascertain whether Richard first provided the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad in III.1-5
and then added two new ones in III.13-20 or whether he had the first two in III.1-13 and 
then added a final one in III.13-20 with a “Single Argument from Benevolence.” What 
does seem clear is that Richard would often take the final piece of one of his earlier 
treatments and then expand that in more detail. Thus his conclusions often become 
starting points for new expansions of his material.454 I am thus more likely to see Richard
453
 The difficulties in bk. VI have long been acknowledged, e.g., Ribaillier, 15: “Le livre VI présente 
un plan assez confus: la démonstration que le Fils est l’image du Père y est bizarrement dissociée: elle 
commence au chapitre XI, puis est reprise au chapitre XX.” This thesis corroborates the difficulties that 
have been noted with bk. VI, but also clarifies why this is so: Bk. VI lacks the intricate trinitarian 
structuring Richard employs in the other books and consists of earlier material that became distanced as 
Richard added new meditations.
454
 Indeed, as indicated in chapter 2 of this work, this method extends to the relationship between 
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doing this with his Single Argument from Benevolence as a later expansion. It is also 
clear that Richard doesn’t hesitate to add a section after some element in his work where 
more clarity is needed. So, for example, if he suddenly realizes after treating the 
incommunicability of God’s divine Power and Wisdom that other rational creatures have 
some power and wisdom, he knows further explanation is needed. The perplexity is that 
what he just argued is incommunicable may seem to the alert reader to be communicable 
as well, which is a contradiction. Thus in book II.11-14 he contends with that concern. 
And the content on either side of that material reveals that it was a later expansion.
When we look to the parenthetical comments at the end of book V we know that at 
least some of the content of book VI had not been written yet.455 I believe this material 
consisted mainly of the “operation of grace vs. nature” questions left unaddressed in book
V. If this is true, as seems most likely from the comment in book V, then something has 
to explain the “table of contents” Richard seems to provide for books III-VI in the 
opening of book III; for Richard says there what he plans to do in book VI.456 It seems 
more likely that the most intricate language and structuring in a work is a sign of the 
more mature thought of its author. And when we look over the entire treatise of Richard’s
Richard’s treatises as well. On this, I agree with den Bok (see p. 75 of this work) and only wish to point out
that in the same way that this helps us see Richard’s Mystical Ark as an expansion of the final stage of 
contemplation in his Twelve Patriarchs, here we have evidence of Richard using the same method within 
De Trinitate itself (Fig. 4.3).
455
 But now that we know Richard’s insertions extended throughout his treatise and were not limited 
to bk. VI, it is more likely that the “problematic” statement at the end of bk. V represents an earlier stage in 
Richard’s writing—material we find largely in book VI on the question regarding the operation of nature 
vs. the operation of grace. Bk. VI, therefore, need not be explained as “ . . . qu’une ébauche non destinée 
primitivement à la publication.” Ribaillier, 10.
456
 As Richardian scholars have pointed out before, in addition to the similarity of language and 
style, this allusion to the content of bk. VI in this opening outline of bk. III is evidence for seeing bk. VI as 
authentically Richardian. Den Bok, 372 n. 177. Ribaillier, 9.
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De Trinitate we see that book III’s triadic structures from 1-20 are the most intricate of 
all. Book III has a greater crystallization of structure and intricacy and nuance. It also has 
the table of contents Richard provides at the opening of book III that includes a 
description of what book VI is about (something we know he wrote—at least pieces of—
later than book V). In light of these facts, I believe book III represents Richard’s most 
mature thought. And as a result, this should caution a solely linear analysis of his 
argument which would fail to see the further ascent in Richard’s thinking by flattening it 
in that linear flow. Even though his additions are consistent with the flow of the work 
(e.g., he is simply expanding more details within an existing linear structure of 
argumentation) there is more to appreciate in Richard. If we see the maturity of his 
thought as he returned to composing his treatise with new insights it may turn out that the
zenith of his contemplations are not to be found at the end of his work, but somewhere in 
the middle, and probably in book III.457
When we step back and look at the entire picture we discover that Richard himself 
was still in the process of crafting De Trinitate. This should remind those who seek a 
final, finished piece to proportion their analysis to the object of their gaze. We cannot 
claim a finality for a work that was still in progress. What we can do, however, is assess 
457
 Den Bok, referring to bk. III says, “Richard’s notion of love («caritas») does seem to initiate a 
social view of God’s trinity,” (p. 460), but rejects it on the basis of (a) constraints Richard initiates with his 
arguments for divine aseity/personhood in bks. I-II, IV, and (b) the fundamental nature of divine-to-human 
communication as Person-to-person, where the ‘image of God’ mediates this relation. On the final analysis,
Richard brings the fullest plenitude to Divinity within those limits, leaving only “great metaphorical value”
(p. 491) for his social trinitarian language in bk. III. But this analysis rests on a linear reading of Richard’s 
De Trinitate, allowing bks. I-II / IV to rein in the “bold undertaking” of bk. III. But if bk. III contains 
Richard’s most mature thought, and I-II his earliest—as seems evident in bk. III’s having the most intricate 
structuring as well as the final table of contents for the entire work—then ipso facto bk. III gets the final 
say and Richard’s mature trinitarianism may be bolder than den Bok suggests. 
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and discern the clues to the methods and the patterns that reveal where the author was in 
the process. Having spent extensive time with Richard’s work, and knowing that there is 
still much work to do, my latest view is that Richard began with the material of the 
Quicumque as he states in book I. This explains the One Omnipotent, God, Lord 
sequence in books I and II (though it is spread apart now).458 And this material connects 
with the Unbegotten-Begotten polemical material found in book VI.459 What I believe is 
that De Trinitate began with the Quicumque as part of a polemical exchange on the 
meanings of its terms, the teachings of the church fathers, and probably as a discussion. 
Then as Richard returned to his written work he expanded with new material, arguments, 
definitions, clarifications, and structures as he thought of them. Thus De Trinitate 
probably began with the material of the Quicumque and a discussion centered on the 
teachings of the church fathers and the debate over Unbegotten-Begotten substance. It 
therefore started in an oratory setting which explains the numerous places that speak of 
“hearers.” But subsequently it evolved from this oratorical setting to become a work of 
written composition, one Richard expected someone to pick up and “read.”460 Given the 
458
 See n. 309 of this work.
459
 As others have noted, this Begotten-Unbegotten polemical material may have been inspired by 
Peter Lombard’s Sentences and the debate over the traditional formula “substantia genuit substantiam.” If 
so, Richard must have composed this material after the release of the Sentences in the year 1151. See 
Ribaillier, 11, 29.
460
 For more on oratorical elements in De Trinitate, see n. 129 of this work and den Bok, 99 n. 21. 
While I agree with den Bok and others on the presence of these elements, they may also represent an earlier
compositional stage. Given the simplicity of language found in these sections (e.g., VI.23-25) by contrast 
with the more intricate sections (e.g., refining Boethius’s definition of ‘person’), and other evidence we’ve 
put forward, De Trinitate probably began by bringing the Quicumque into a composed, dialogical exchange
with contemporary ideas on the Trinity (e.g., Abelard, Peter Lombard) and developed subsequently as 
Richard returned to “focus and magnify” sections with new contemplations, and refine the treatise with 
more localized triads and trinitarian structures (e.g., III.2-20). 
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polish of Richard’s other works, it is likely Richard would have rewritten the entire 
treatise with those crystallizations as a new starting point. He simply wasn’t done 
thinking about them and still believed he might have more to add. And it is fitting that we
find a work like Richard’s never ending in its contemplation of the splendor of the Trinity
since the journey from imperfect to full and perfect contemplation of Divinity is 
everlasting. Richard never stopped, he just simply couldn’t finish—an appropriate gift, 
given the nature of his subject and the craft involved in its contemplation. 
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APPENDIX C:
LIST OF TRIADS IN RICHARD’S DE TRINITATE BY BOOK
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Prologue
Faith Hope Love
Manifestation Contemplation Knowledge
1st Heaven 2nd Heaven 3rd Heaven
Immortality Incorruptibility Eternity
Human Angelic Divine
Inheritance Merit Divinity
Actuality Virtue Intellect
Knowledge by Faith Knowledge by Reason Knowledge by Experience
Book I
Demonstration Inference Certainty
Supreme Utility Supreme Pleasantness Highest Riches
Worthy Suitable Diligent
Eagerness Longing Happiness
Essence Power Wisdom
Book II
Uncreated Eternal Immeasurable
Better State Equal State Worse State
General Substance Special Substance Individual Substance
Happiness Divinity Simplicity
Unity Simplicity Identity
Book III
Fullness of Goodness Fullness of Happiness Fullness of Glory
Power Goodness Divinity
Permit Undertake Seek with Longing
Good Better Best
Plurality Equality Trinity
Supreme Mutual Love Supreme Integral Love Supreme Consummate Love
Established Magnified Consummated
One Equal Co-Eternal
Easy Difficult Impossible
Supreme Benevolence Equal Benevolence Perfect Benevolence
Goodness Wisdom Power
Divinity Glory Majesty
Power Wisdom Nature
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Book IV
Unity Plurality Mutuality
Immediately Mediately Mediately & Immediately
Eve Seth Enoch
Proceeds from None Proceeds from One Proceeds from Two
Gratuitous Love Gratuitous & Owed Love Owed Love
Will Love Goodness
Giving Receiving Giving & Receiving
Poured Out Poured In Poured Out & In
Book VI
Immediate Principal Order Operation of Nature
Son Grandson Great-Grandson
Spirit Intention Purpose
Same Love Same Desire Equal Desire
Conception Articulation Audition
Unbegotten Begotten Neither-Begotten-Nor-Unbegotten
Father Son Spirit
Power Wisdom Goodness
Discovered Learned Read
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